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From the Editor in Chief

I

n addition to introducing our new cover design and font styles, this issue
of Parameters opens with an In Focus contribution concerning Extremism in the
US Military. In “The Alt-Right Movement and US National Security,” Matthew
Valasik and Shannon Reid identify potential causes for the disproportionate
number of current and former members of the military associated with White
supremacist groups. They then suggest steps the Department of Defense can take to
address the problem.
Our first forum, Crisis Management and Risk, begins with Leonard R. Hawley’s
personal experience article, “Crisis Management Lessons from the Clinton
Administration’s Implementation of Presidential Decision Directive 56.” Hawley’s
contribution offers some best practices for policy practitioners when responding to
global crises. We would like to extend a special thanks to Michèle Flournoy who
graciously wrote a prologue for the article. Wade Germann and Heather Gregg
follow Hawley’s article with “Assessing Risk at the National Strategic Level:
Visualization Tools for Military Planners.” Germann and Greg propose two
models—the National Strategic Risk Abacus and the National Strategic Risk Radar
Chart—to aid military planners in addressing America’s current security challenges.
Jason Warren and John Bonin close out the forum with “Reversing the Readiness
Assumption: A Proposal for Fiscal and Military Effectiveness.” In light of anticipated
cuts in defense spending, Warren and Bonin suggest some guidelines for helping
defense leaders make wise choices in the months ahead.
In this issue’s second forum, Soft Power and Military Aid, Michael W.
Wissemann’s “Great (Soft) Power Competition: US and Chinese Efforts in Global
Health Engagement” draws attention to an underutilized element of American
soft power. Wissemann contends the United States has important advantages over
the People’s Republic of China in the realm of health services. In “Hope versus
Reality: The Efficacy of Using US Military Aid to Improve Human Rights in
Egypt,” Gregory Aftandilian offers ways policymakers and military personnel can
leverage US military aid to promote human rights.
Our final forum, Leadership and Professionalism, begins with Brian
McAllister Linn’s “Samuel Huntington, Professionalism, and Self-Policing in
the US Army Officer Corps.” Linn considers the third phase of Huntington’s
model of professionalism—self regulation—and reviews how well the US
Army implemented it from the Civil War through the Vietnam War. He then
discusses the implications of this implementation for the Army’s officer corps.
In “The Battalion Commander Effect,” Everett Spain, Gautam Mukunda,
TOC

4

Parameters 51(3) Autumn 2021

and Archie Bates present statistical evidence confirming how Army battalion
commanders are significant determinants of the retention of their lieutenants—
especially high-potential lieutenants—and what that might mean for promotion
boards and professional military education. In “The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare:
Implications for Strategy and the Military Profession,” Ilmari Käihkö considers
the evolution of the concept of hybrid war and its implications for strategy and the
military profession. ~AJE
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In Focus: Extremism in the US Military

The Alt-Right Movement and US National Security
Matthew Valasik and Shannon E. Reid
©2021 Matthew Valasik and Shannon E. Reid

ABSTRACT: Identifying the January 6 insurrection at the US Capitol as an
inf lection point, this article analyzes the historical relationship between White
supremacy and the US military from Reconstruction after the Civil War to the
present. The article posits causes for the disproportionate number of current and
former members of the military associated with White power groups and proposes
steps the Department of Defense can take to combat the problems posed by the
association of the US military with these groups.

C

Introduction

urrently, there is an overrepresentation of military veterans affiliated with
far-right groups and the broader White power movement, but the disturbing
relationship between White supremacy and the American military dates to before
the American Civil War.1 Most recently, this affinity was underscored by the
disproportionate number of servicemembers, who participated in the failed attempt
to prevent the certification of the 2020 election on January 6, 2021. This incident
renewed concerns about the association between the US military and the White
power movement.2
As of July 16, 2021, 563 individuals have been arrested and charged in
federal court in the aftermath of the insurrection at the US Capitol. At least 82
(14.6 percent) of those arrested are individuals with military backgrounds
predominately affiliated with the Army and the Marine Corps—more than double
the percentage of servicemembers in the US population (approximately 6.1 percent).3
While the motivations driving those individuals vary, almost two-thirds of those
arrested are affiliated with either Proud Boys, an alt-right gang, or Oath Keepers, a
far-right militia. Like many alt-right groups with a White power orientation, these
two groups are loosely structured, lack a rigid ideological focus, and are united
by things they oppose (for example, immigration, feminism, gun restrictions, and so

1. Carter F. Smith, Gangs and the Military: Gangsters, Bikers, and Terrorists with Military Training (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2017); and Kathleen Belew, Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).
2. Daniel Milton and Andrew Mines, “This Is War’’: Examining Military Experience among the Capitol Hill Siege
Participants (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 2021).
3. Michael Jensen, Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan Kane, “Extremism in the Ranks and After” (research brief,
University of Maryland, College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism, 2021), 5; and Milton and Mines, Examining Military Experience, 18–20.
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forth) rather than any central tenet, and are best described as racist.4 Based on
US Code, Title 18, Section 2331, Item (5), both groups would be classified as
organizations engaging in domestic terrorism.5 The FBI and the Department of
Homeland Security commonly refer to these groups as domestic violent extremist
(DVE) organizations.6
This overrepresentation of veterans, however, is supply driven and reflects
veterans’ greater willingness to join far-right groups than the average civilian. It
appears servicemembers are more susceptible to the propaganda and diatribes of
far-right groups, and this relationship needs to be addressed. This article examines
the disconcerting connection between the US military and the White power
movement, traces the historic relationship from past conflicts through the War
on Terror, and provides direction on steps the US military can take to combat
this dilemma.

Historic Relationship with the Military
White anxiety about the inclusion of former slaves into the social order,
including economic competition with White middle and working classes produced
not only the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), which was founded by six Confederate war
veterans, but the Knights of White Camellia, the White League, and other
assorted White power DVEs.7 It was not until the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 and
1868, forcing former Confederate states to rewrite their constitutions, granting
voting rights to Black citizens, and installing the US Army as peacekeepers,
that White power groups proliferated, offering an outlet for Whites to terrorize
Black citizens.8 Arguably, the aftermath of the Civil War and the subsequent
Reconstruction era could be viewed as an outlier exaggerating the affinity
between the White power movement and military veterans.
Yet, surges in membership among veterans enlisting in White power
DVE organizations correlate all too well with the ending of wars and
4. Mike Giglio, “A Pro-Trump Militant Group Has Recruited Thousands of Police, Soldiers, and Veterans,”
Atlantic, November 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/right-wing-militias-civil
-war/616473/; George Hawley, Making Sense of the Alt-Right (New York: Columbia University Press,
2017); Sam Jackson, Oath Keepers: Patriotism and the Edge of Violence in a Right-Wing Antigovernment Group
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2020); Matthew Kriner and Jon Lewis, “Pride & Prejudice: The
Violent Evolution of the Proud Boys,” CTC Sentinel 14, no. 6 (2021): 26–38; and Shannon E. Reid and
Matthew Valasik, Alt-Right Gangs: A Hazy Shade of White (Oakland: University of California Press, 2020).
5. Smith, Gangs and the Military, 25–27; and “Definitions,” US Code, Title 18 – Crimes and Criminal Procedure,
Section 2331, Item (5).
6. FBI, “What We Investigate,” https://www.f bi.gov/investigate/terrorism.
7. Edward Ball, Life of a Klansman: A Family History in White Supremacy (New York: Farrar, Straus, and
Giroux, 2020); David J. Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1987); Elaine Frantz Parsons, Ku-Klux: The Birth of the Klan during Reconstruction (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); and Rory McVeigh and Kevin Estep, The Politics of Losing:
Trump, the Klan, and the Mainstreaming of Resentment (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019).
8. McVeigh and Estep, Politics of Losing, 22–24.
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conflicts involving the US military, creating a pattern following World
War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and
the War on Terror.9 In particular, America’s defeat in the Vietnam War
produced “loss, frustration, and doubt” among servicemembers, similar to
the feelings experienced by Confederate veterans.10 Whereas state power
reinforced a White supremacist social order and enabled DVE violence during
Reconstruction, the fallout from the Vietnam War was quite different.11
First, after the Vietnam War ended, the fear of communism spreading
across the globe remained a foreign policy concern that provided veterans with
an outlet to channel their discontentment by participating in counterinsurgency
operations as “soldiers of fortune.”12 Such operations were supported by both
neoconservatives and the White power movement, creating a complex web of
interconnections.13
Second, the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s drew attention to the
legacy of White supremacy in policing and state power and created an environment
in which vigilante violence was no longer publicly supported by the state.14 This
disavowal marked a turning point in how the White power movement viewed its
relationship to the government. The narrative introduced was a corrupt,
bureaucratic, and ineffective federal government that had hamstrung Vietnam
veterans from becoming triumphant warriors—by restraining their use of force
against the enemy—which the White power movement used to sow distrust of
the government in the minds of veterans.15
The overrepresentation of Vietnam veterans in the White power movement
played an instrumental role in transforming the structure, operation, and
direction of White power DVE organizations. For instance, noteworthy Vietnam
veteran Louis Beam made a major impact on the White power movement. As
a former Klansman and prominent neo-Nazi, Beam urged the White power

9. Belew, Bring the War Home, 20–21; James William Gibson, Warrior Dreams: Violence and Manhood in
Post-Vietnam America (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 212–30; and Matt Kennard, Irregular Army: How
the US Military Recruited Neo-Nazis, Gang Members, and Criminals to Fight the War on Terror, (New York:
Verso, 2012), 47–49.
10. Belew, Bring the War Home, 21.
11. Kathleen Belew, “Lynching and Power in the United States: Southern, Western, and National Vigilante
Violence,” History Compass 12, no. 1 (2014): 84–99; and Kathleen Blee and Mehr Latif, “Ku Klux Klan:
Vigilantism against Blacks, Immigrants and Other Minorities,” in Vigilantism against Migrants and Minorities,
ed. Tore Bjørgo and Miroslav Mareš (London: Routledge, 2019), 31–42.
12. Belew, Bring the War Home, 77–100; and Gibson, Warrior Dreams, 195–230.
13. Belew, Bring the War Home, 78.
14. David Cunningham, Klansville, USA: The Rise and Fall of the Civil Rights-Era Ku Klux Klan
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Belew, Bring the War Home, 106–7; Blee and Latif,
Ku Klux Klan, 38–39; and Geoff Ward, “Living Histories of White Supremacist Policing: Towards
Transformative Justice,” Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 15, no. 1 (2018): 167–184.
15. Belew, Bring the War Home, 22–23; and Gibson, Warrior Dreams, 7–10.
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movement to utilize the strategy of “leaderless resistance.”16 Beam contended
that large, centralized White power organizations, such as the KKK or Aryan
Nations, should be abandoned in favor of small groups to better avoid detection
and disruption by law enforcement. Guided by this strategy, Beam established
“Aryan Liberty Net” (Liberty.net) in 1984. This clandestine Aryan Nations
online bulletin board (a precursor to websites today) allowed users to access
recruitment materials, pen pals, password-protected personal ads, and lists of
potential targets to sabotage or individuals to assassinate.17 This capability made
Beam and the broader White power movement one of the first adopters of the
Internet to communicate digitally and organize globally.
The asymmetric use of digital technologies, evolving from Liberty.net, has
allowed White power DVE organizations to maintain communication even if
members are not spatially proximate to each other and spread positions and
propaganda with minimal resources. The adoption of leaderless resistance as
a strategy significantly contributed to the proliferation and persistence of the
movement throughout the United States and internationally.18 The Order,
also known as the Silent Brotherhood, is an example of the application of
leaderless resistance by White power DVE organizations. This group, composed
of military veterans, engaged in paramilitary training and used weapons and
tactics from the Vietnam War to participate in an array of serious and violent
crimes (for example, counterfeiting, bank/armored car robberies, and murder) in
the mid-1980s before being apprehended.19
As the Vietnam War drifted from American collective memory, the public’s
distaste for militarism began to dissolve, and the cycle started again following
the Gulf War. In 1990 Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. The United States
responded, along with a broad coalition of support, and drove out Iraqi forces
and restored Kuwait’s independence in under six weeks. While this quick
and seemingly easy victory ended American’s aversion to foreign military
conflicts, it had an unintended consequence among members of the White
16. Louis Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” originally written 1983, reprinted in Seditionist 12 (February 1992);
Belew, Bring the War Home, 19; and Jeffrey Kaplan, “Leaderless Resistance,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9,
no. 3 (1997): 80–95.
17. Belew, Bring the War Home, 120–21; Chip Berlet and Carol Mason, “Swastikas in Cyberspace:
How Hate Went Online,” in Digital Media Strategies of the Far Right in Europe and the United States,
ed. Patricia Anne Simpson and Helga Druxes (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 21–30; Travis Morris,
Dark Ideas: How Neo-Nazi and Violent Jihadi Ideologues Shaped Modern Terrorism (Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books, 2017), 56.
18. Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” 12–13; Belew, Bring the War Home, 108–13; and George Michael, Lone Wolf
Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012), 55–56.
19. Belew, Bring the War Home, 115–37; James Coates, Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist
Right (New York: Noonday Press, 1987), 41–76; Kevin Flynn and Gary Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood:
The Chilling Inside Story of America’s Violent, Anti-Government Militia Movement (New York: Signet, 1990);
Mark S. Hamm, In Bad Company: America’s Terrorist Underground (Boston: Northeastern University Press,
2002); and Pete Simi, Bryan F. Bubolz, and Ann Hardman, “Military Experience, Identity Discrepancies,
and Far Right Terrorism: An Exploratory Analysis,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 8 (2013): 662–64.
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power movement. Instead of the Gulf War being viewed as a heroic triumph
able to offset the defeat and frustration of the Vietnam War, the White power
movement used the resounding success of the military campaign as evidence
that an untrustworthy federal government had betrayed Vietnam veterans and
prevented them from wearing the mantles of triumphant warriors.20
In conjunction with the standoff at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and the siege at
Waco, Texas, in the early 1990s, the White power movement further fueled
the fabrication of a brutish federal government that was intentionally targeting
civilian groups (for example, far-right) and oppressing them.21 This narrative
circulated and gained support from Gulf War servicemembers and veterans who
were disaffected with the US military, often as a result of personal difficulties.22
By far, the most noteworthy Gulf War Army veteran who subscribed to these
White power talking points is Timothy McVeigh, who perpetrated the deadliest
act of domestic terrorism in the United States on April 19, 1995—the Oklahoma
City bombing that killed 168 people and injured 509.23
Perhaps Beam and McVeigh’s experiences and training in the Army assisted
them in later endeavors among various White power DVE groups and inspired
others. Beam and McVeigh are just two examples of a litany of servicemembers
who have brought the war home with them and continue fighting today. In the
aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, the scrutiny of far-right groups,
particularly antigovernment militias, by federal law enforcement agencies
peaked and drove affiliates underground and into the recesses of the Internet.24
The White power movement festers and metastasizes in this digital medium
until a physical environment becomes hospitable for them to reemerge in public.
During the 2000s, the growth of the White power movement remained generally
uninterrupted, due to the focus on jihadi violent extremists and the subsequent
War on Terror following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.25

20. Belew, Bring the War Home, 211; and Gibson, Warrior Dreams, 195–96, 291–97.
21. Belew, Bring the War Home, 187–208; Lane Crothers, Rage on the Right: The American Militia
Movement from Ruby Ridge to the Trump Presidency, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019),
34–58; Betty A. Dobratz, Stephanie L. Shanks‐Meile, and Danelle Hallenbeck, “What Happened on Ruby
Ridge: Terrorism or Tyranny?” Symbolic Interaction 26, no. 2 (2003): 315–42; Mark S. Hamm, Apocalypse
in Oklahoma: Waco and Ruby Ridge Revenged (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1997); and
Jackson, Oath Keepers, 92–99.
22. Belew, Bring the War Home, 213.
23. Belew, Bring the War Home, 209–34; Crothers, Rage on the Right, 76–87; Hamm, Apocalypse in Oklahoma;
Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman, “Military Experience, Identity Discrepancies,” 661–62; Arie Perliger, American
Zealots: Inside Right-Wing Domestic Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 70–71;
Smith, Gangs and the Military, 51–53; and Stuart A. Wright, Patriots, Politics, and the Oklahoma City Bombing
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
24. Crothers, Rage on the Right, 91–95; and Daryl Johnson, Hateland: A Long, Hard Look at America’s
Extremist Heart (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2019), 57–58.
25. Crothers, Rage on the Right, 109–18; and Smith, Gangs and the Military, 68–73.
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The War on Terror and the White Power Movement
While the swift and resounding victory of the Gulf War seemed to shake
“Vietnam Syndrome,” it appears the ghosts of Vietnam “buried forever in
the sands of the Arabian Peninsula” have become poltergeists, tormenting
American servicemembers once again with America’s never-ending War on
Terror, now approaching its twentieth year.26 The same “loss, frustration, and
doubt” felt by Vietnam and Confederate veterans is being experienced by
today’s servicemembers.27 Even more alarming, post-9/11 veterans are more
likely to have been deployed, served in combat, experienced emotional trauma,
had difficulty transitioning to civilian life, and felt less proud to serve in the
military than pre-9/11 veterans.28 A modern-day all-volunteer US military
might be expected to be less disillusioned than those who were drafted during
the Vietnam War.29
Arguably, the quota requirements for troops needed for the War on Terror
lowered the recruitment standards, increased the use of “moral waivers” to dismiss
criminal convictions, and decreased the use of discharges for misconduct.30
Shifts in these policies resulted in the military enlisting substandard
personnel to meet the quotas, an outcome observed among other federal agencies
(for example, the Department of Homeland Security) that succumb to filling
positions with warm bodies.31
While the mass recruitment of less-than-ideal servicemembers is problematic
on its own, the War on Terror is substantially different from America’s prior
conflict in Western Asia (for example, the Gulf War). Differences include the
structure of warfare, fighting an insurgency, guerilla war tactics, suicide bombers,
and pervasive improvised explosive device use, with infantry and special operators
being the principal military component as opposed to the use of tanks supported
by air and sea campaigns in the Gulf War.32 Additionally, the duration of the
26. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 912–16; and Arnold R. Isaacs, Vietnam Shadows: The War, its Ghosts, and Its Legacy
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 65–66.
27. Belew, Bring the War Home, 21; Kennard, Irregular Army, 215–16.
28. Kim Parker et al., The American Veteran Experience and the Post-9/11 Generation (Washington, DC:
Pew Research Center, 2019), 3–5.
29. Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the
Vietnam Generation (New York; Vintage Books, 1978); and Kennard, Irregular Army, 5–6.
30. Belew, Bring the War Home, 27; Kennard, Irregular Army, 46–47, 74–76; and Smith, Gangs and the
Military, 38–39, 201.
31. Melissa del Bosque, “A Group of Agents Rose through the Ranks to Lead the Border Patrol: They’re
Leaving It in Crisis,” ProPublica, February 10, 2020, https://www.propublica.org/article/a-group-of-agents-rose
-through-the-ranks-to-lead-the-border-patrol-theyre-leaving-it-in-crisis; and Bryan Schatz, “New Report
Details Dozens of Corrupt Border Patrol Agents—Just as Trump Wants to Hire More,” Mother Jones,
April 24, 2018, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/04/new-report-details-dozens-of-corrupt-border
-patrol-agents-just-as-trump-wants-to-hire-more/.
32. Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular
War (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 103; and Christopher Coker, The Warrior
Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror (New York: Routledge, 2007), 24.
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War on Terror is approaching two decades while the Gulf War only lasted 43 days.
Together, these distinctions have contributed to servicemembers experiencing
greater emotional trauma and more challenges transitioning back to civilian
life. In addition, the poor quality of care provided to servicemembers has only
facilitated disillusionment.33
Present-day White power DVE organizations harness and pervert these
feelings to support their narrative and refine their talking points to connect with a
broader, more mainstream audience—a process accelerated by the ubiquity of the
Internet and the increased use of social media platforms.34 They cast a much wider
net to ensnare potential followers by deploying ironic and caustic memes rapidly
across a variety of digital platforms.35 There is a variability in the content that gets
distributed, depending on the level of fanaticism. For instance, many alt-right
gangs, like Proud Boys or Rise Above Movement (an alt-right mixed-martial arts
group), tend to obfuscate their extremism to appeal to more mainstream youth.36
Other more extreme DVE groups do not attempt to mask their adherence
to White supremacy. Atomwaffen Division, The Base, and Boogaloo Bois use
extreme imagery and catchy slogans in their propaganda materials and explicitly
advocate for violence against the government in preparation for an upcoming race/
civil war.37 They require members to participate in paramilitary training, similar
to long-established far-right militias.38 Even though such activities make these
militias illegal in all 50 states, there is no shortage of veterans in their ranks.39
Furthermore, the accelerationist rhetoric used to recruit members—calling for
a second civil war or a racial holy war—is translating into real-world violence.
Members have been arrested for stockpiling firearms and explosives, plotting
terror and infrastructure attacks, kidnapping government officials, and
committing murder.40

33. Kennard, Irregular Army, 200–18; and Parker et al., American Veteran Experience.
34. Ariadna Matamoros-Fernández and Johan Farkas, “Racism, Hate Speech, and Social Media: A Systematic
Review and Critique,” Television & New Media 22, no. 2 (2021): 205–24.
35. Reid and Valasik, Alt-Right Gangs, 47–50, 100–3; and Heather Suzanne Woods and Leslie A. Hahner,
Make America Meme Again: The Rhetoric of the Alt-Right (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2019).
36. Cynthia Miller-Idriss, Hate in the Homeland: The New Global Far Right (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2020), 99–105; Reid and Valasik, Alt-Right Gangs, 24–29.
37. Reid and Valasik, Alt-Right Gangs, 42–44; and Southern Poverty Law Center, Sounds Like Hate,
produced by Geraldine Moriba and Jamila Paksima, podcast series, https://soundslikehate.org/.
38. Belew, Bring the War Home, 77–134; Gibson, Warrior Dreams, 195–230; and Harel Shapira, Waiting for
José: The Minutemen’s Pursuit of America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).
39. Crothers, Rage on the Right, 128–37; Jackson, Oath Keepers; and Perliger, American Zealots, 53–59.
40. Reid and Valasik, Alt-Right Gangs, 42–44; Kaleigh Rogers, “Why Militias Are So Hard to Stop,”
FiveThirtyEight, May 18, 2021, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/militias-pose-a-serious-threat-so-why-is-it
-so-hard-to-stop-them/; and Bradley E. Wiggins, “Boogaloo and Civil War 2: Memetic Antagonism in
Expressions of Covert Activism,” New Media & Society (August 2020), doi:10.1177/1461444820945317.
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Current State of the Problem
The level and extent to which support for White power sentiments has
infiltrated the US military remains unclear. As routine practice, the service
branches deny its persistence. Both the FBI and the Department of Homeland
Security have expressed concern for over a decade about the recruitment of active
servicemembers by White power DVE groups. Yet, there remains limited
knowledge about just how pervasive far-right affiliations are among active-duty
personnel.41 What little is known about the current prevalence of White
power sympathies comes from a 2019 poll of Military Times readers. The poll
revealed 36 percent of troops witnessed “[W]hite supremacist and racist ideologies,”
with enlisted and non-White members being more likely to observe these
behaviors than officers and White members.42 This is a substantial increase from a
2018 poll of Military Times readers when only 22 percent reported the presence of
White power activities. This trend is moving in a concerning direction.43
The military’s response to DVE affiliations has been inconsistent, partially
due to maintaining troop quotas and not raising alarms that would increase
congressional scrutiny.44 When the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq required more
troops, the number of discharges declined and the standards for recruitment were
relaxed, meeting quotas with substandard personnel.45 The combination of reduced
standards and an entrenched “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy regarding the attitudes of
servicemembers toward White supremacism and other extremist beliefs have fused
in a dangerous and volatile manner.46
As details about the January 6 insurrection continue to emerge, it becomes
clear alt-right gangs, antigovernment militias, and conspiracy theorists (for
example, QAnon) played an outsized role.47 The fact that this attempt to usurp
America’s democracy involved not just an overrepresentation of servicemembers,
who solemnly “support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic,” but any at all is disconcerting.48
Recent years have shown a greater portion of the public than expected are
sympathetic to identity politics and White power propaganda of the alt-right—
41. Johnson, Hateland; and Smith, Gangs and the Military, 106–9.
42. Leo Shane III, “Signs of White Supremacy, Extremism Up Again in Poll of Active-Duty Troops,”
Military Times, February 6, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/02/06
/signs-of-white-supremacy-extremism-up-again-in-poll-of-active-duty-troops/.
43. Shane, “Signs of White Supremacy.”
44. Belew, Bring the War Home, 27; and Kennard, Irregular Army.
45. Kennard, Irregular Army, 46–47; and Smith, Gangs and the Military, 38–39, 201.
46. Kelly R. Buck et al., Screening for Potential Terrorists in the Enlisted Military Accessions Process, Technical
Report 05-8 (Monterey, CA: Department of Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2005).
47. “American Insurrection,” Frontline, season 39, episode 15, PBS, aired April 13, 2021, https://www.pbs
.org/wgbh/frontline/film/american-insurrection/.
48. “Enlistment Oath,” US Code, Title 10, Section 502, May 5, 1960, https://www.army.mil/values
/oath.html.
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approximately 6 percent of non-Hispanic, White Americans, or about 11 million
citizens.49 The presence of extremists in the ranks should raise concerns among
military leaders about the way military training and practices fail to prevent these
associations and may perpetuate them. Furthermore, servicemembers, active duty
or discharged, present a potentially greater threat than civilians given their
leadership skills, military training, and advanced training in special operations,
explosive ordnance disposal, or cyber-operations.50
Despite well-documented incidents over the years involving servicemembers
engaging in White power-inspired violence and disrupting civilian communities,
ongoing efforts by the military to address the public’s outcry on White power
DVE groups are lackluster. Though lacking the sustained scrutiny of the
January 6 insurrection, the 1995 murders of two Black civilians by active-duty
paratroopers in Fayetteville, North Carolina; the 2012 mass shooting by an Army
veteran at a Sikh Temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin; and the participation in
violence by at least four Marines, two active-duty and two discharged, at the
2017 “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, were inspired by
the White power movement.51 January 6 produced an inflection point about
the growing number of active-duty and discharged servicemembers who are
associated with far-right groups. The US military now has an opportunity to
address the concerns raised for over a decade by the Department of Defense,
the Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI.52

Combating the White Power Movement
As the understanding of the connections between the White power movement
and the military continues to grow, the US military needs to take serious steps
to prevent, intervene, and potentially suppressthe far-right activities of both
active-duty and retired servicemembers. The ubiquity of the Internet and other
digital communication (for example, online forums, image boards, and social media
platforms) has allowed individuals interested in or affiliated with the White power
49. George Hawley, “The Demography of the Alt-Right,” Institute for Family Studies, August 9, 2018,
https://ifstudies.org/blog/the-demography-of-the-alt-right.
50. Belew, Bring the War Home, 52–53; Kennard, Irregular Army, 39; Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman, “Military
Experience, Identity Discrepancies,” 654–71; and Smith, Gangs and the Military, 187–96.
51. Belew, Bring the War Home, 135–55; William Branigin and Dana Priest, “3 White Soldiers Held in
Slaying of Black Couple, Washington Post, December 9, 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
politics/1995/12/09/3-white-soldiers-held-in-slaying-of-black-couple/1f11ca9f-9fe2-4e28-a637-a635007deeaf/;
Kennard, Irregular Army, 45; Arno Michaelis and Pardeep Singh Kaleka, The Gift of Our Wounds: A
Sikh and a Former White Supremacist Find Forgiveness after Hate (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2018);
Michael A. Peters and Tina Besley, “White Supremacism: The Tragedy of Charlottesville,” Educational
Philosophy and Theory 49, no. 14 (2017): 1309-12; and Paul Szoldra “These Are the Faces of Extremism in
the Military: It Only Takes One to Wreak Havoc in the Ranks,” Task & Purpose, April 23, 2021,
https://taskandpurpose.com/news/us-military-extremism/.
52. Johnson, Hateland, 32–34; and “Gangs in the Military: How Much Do We Know?” Stars and Stripes,
February 8, 2007, https://www.stripes.com/news/gangs-in-the-military-how-much-do-we-know-1.60141.
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movement to connect.53 Despite military personnel being governed by the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and its narrower application of the First
Amendment—limiting the free speech protections of servicemembers
and veterans—it would be a hefty challenge for the US government to
monitor all the digital communications of active-duty servicemembers, let alone
veterans.54 While the ethics and legality of such an undertaking are problematic,
such monitoring is also likely to experience blowback, a succession of false
positives, and further serve the White power movement’s distorted narrative that a
corrupt and disloyal federal government is restricting the freedom of individuals.55
Instead, a starting point would be to consider the shifts in a
servicemember’s life course—from recruitment to basic training to deployment to
reintegration to end of active-duty service. These different transitions may have a multitude
of impacts on an individual’s behavior. For example, research shows that entering military
service can be a turning point that inhibits criminal activity.56 What is less clear is how
the act of leaving military service, particularly if it is involuntary, might impact future
behavior when the institutional social structure and networks are removed.57 As seen in
other research areas, such as traditional street gangs or White power DVEs organizations,
risk factors can shift over time and life circumstances.58 This finding includes a key dynamic.
Once an individual joins either of these groups, their behavior is more delinquent than
individuals who are just surrounded by delinquent peers.59
Intervention and prevention programs should target these turning
points and provide appropriate transition services, including initial social
53. Kennard, Irregular Army, 34–36; and Miller-Idriss, Hate in the Homeland, 138–60.
54. Danley K. Cornyn, “The Military, Freedom of Speech, and the Internet: Preserving Operational
Security and Servicemembers’ Right of Free Speech,” Texas Law Review 87, no. 2 (2008): 463–86;
Walter M. Hudson, “Racial Extremism in the Army,” Military Law Review 159 (March 1999): 1–86;
and “Uniform Code of Military Justice,” US Code, Title 10, Chapter 47.
55. Ken Klippenstein, “Pentagon Plans to Monitor Social Media of Military Personnel for Extremist
Content,” Intercept, May 17, 2021, https://theintercept.com/2021/05/17/military-pentagon-extremism
-social-media/.
56. Leana Allen Bouffard, “Examining the Relationship between Military Service and Criminal Behavior
during the Vietnam Era: A Research Note,” Criminology 41, no. 2 (2003): 491–51; Glen H. Elder Jr.,
“War Mobilization and the Life Course: A Cohort of World War II Veterans,” Sociological Forum 2, no. 3
(Summer 1987): 449–72; John H. Laub and Robert J. Sampson, Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives:
Delinquent Boys to Age 70 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); and John Paul Wright,
David E. Carter, and Francis T. Cullen, “A Life-Course Analysis of Military Service in Vietnam,”
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 42, no. 1 (2005): 55–83.
57. Lauren Van Staden et al., “Transition Back into Civilian Life: A Study of Personnel Leaving the
UK Armed Forces via ‘Military Prison’,” Military Medicine 172, no. 9 (2007): 925–30; and Kevin M.
Wilson-Smith and Philip J. Corr, Military Identity and the Transition into Civilian Life: “Lifers,”
Medically Discharged and Reservist Soldiers (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
58. Beidi Dong, Chris L. Gibson, and Marvin D. Krohn, “Gang Membership in a Developmental and
Life-Course Perspective,” in the The Handbook of Gangs, ed. Scott H. Decker and David C. Pyrooz
(Oxford, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2015): 78–97; and Pete Simi, Karyn Sporer, and Bryan F. Bubolz,
“Narratives of Childhood Adversity and Adolescent Misconduct as Precursors to Violent Extremism: A
Life-Course Criminological Approach,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 53, no. 4 (2016): 536–63.
59. Maxime Bérubé et al., “Converging Patterns in Pathways in and out of Violent Extremism,” Perspectives
on Terrorism 13, no. 6 (2019): 73–89; and Chris Melde and Finn‐Aage Esbensen, “Gang Membership as a
Turning Point in the Life Course,” Criminology 49, no. 2 (2011): 513–52.
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media literacy and critical-thinking courses as part of basic training and a
survey and assessment at each turning point in a service career. As an added
benefit, these assessments would also help servicemembers take stock of
other mental health issues while giving military leaders a screening tool for
identifying personnel susceptible to White power DVE groups or even those
working on behalf of the organizations. Following active-duty service, the
US Department of Veterans Affairs could establish moderated in-person and
online social support groups as an alternative forum to challenge the disinformation
propagated by White power DVE organizations. While all veterans would likely
benefit from increased social support, a more-tailored approach focused on veterans
who are assessed as being vulnerable to extremism, far-right or otherwise, could be
required to participate in the prosocial support groups or one-on-one therapy or risk
losing benefits.
Research has also shown that in paramilitary organizations (for example,
police departments) where the chain of command oversees disciplinary action, the
consequences of misconduct are frequently light and often thought to be one-off
incidents without any systemic influence on the unit or department.60 Recent studies
have noted that misconduct by law enforcement officers spreads through a police
department’s social networks.61 This contagion model of misconduct could be applied
to understanding how White power beliefs and behavior spread through institutions,
such as the military.
The assumption that an individual’s behavior is separate from the larger unit has
led to a dearth of research regarding deviance among those in positions of power and
the influence of these individuals on the larger group.62 For example, the arrest of an
active-duty Marine at the January 6 insurrection underscores that the rules in place are
not sufficient to restrain individual behavior.63 Furthermore, that Marine’s larger social
network may have influenced this behavior (including those who may have been present
but not arrested) and should be investigated instead of treating him as a single bad apple.

60. Kimberly D. Hassell and Carol Archbold, “Widening the Scope on Complaints of Police Misconduct,”
Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 33, no. 3 (2010); and Kim Michelle Lersch
and Tom Mieczkowski, “An Examination of the Convergence and Divergence of Internal and External
Allegations of Misconduct Filed against Police Officers,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies &
Management 23, no. 1 (2000).
61. Marie Ouellet et al., “Network Exposure and Excessive Use of Force: Investigating the Social
Transmission of Police Misconduct,” Criminology & Public Policy 18, no. 3 (August 2019): 675–704; and
Linda Zhao and Andrew V. Papachristos, “Network Position and Police Who Shoot,” ANNALS of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 687, no. 1 (2020): 89–112.
62. Matts Hammarstrom and Birger Heldt, “The Diffusion of Military Intervention: Testing a Network
Position Approach,” International Interactions 28, no. 4 (2002): 355–77; and Peter V. Marsden and Noah E.
Friedkin, “Network Studies of Social Influence,” Sociological Methods & Research 22, no. 1 (1993): 127–51.
63. Corey Dickstein, “Marine Major Charged with Assaulting Officers during Jan. 6 Siege of US Capitol,”
Stars and Stripes, May 13, 2021, https://www.stripes.com/news/us/marine-major-charged-with-assaulting
-officers-during-jan-6-siege-of-us-capitol-1.673373.
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In order to address this issue, the military should ensure support for or activity
with White power DVE groups will be identified as a criminal matter to be handled
by Criminal Investigation Divisions and not treated as a discipline and order issue.64
By reclassifying such activity as criminal rather than disciplinary, the Army could
prevent casual engagement with White power viewpoints that might grow into
serious criminal tendencies after separating from the military. A criminal investigation
would also help the Army to identify larger networks and mediums of influence and
how White power DVE organizations disseminate messages throughout their ranks,
enabling the US military a greater opportunity to educate and protect current and
former servicemembers. In addition to providing support services that would help
nullify the abandonment narrative, the military’s criminalizing support for White
power DVE organizations could help frame these extremists as villains who—like
foreign agents—seek to undermine and corrupt American democracy.65
The final, and perhaps most at-risk transitional phase for servicemembers is when
they exit the military. Disillusionment, trauma, lack of opportunities, and removal
of the rules and safeguards in place can put veterans in a vulnerable situation for
recruitment by White power DVEs and make them much more susceptible to the
pull of these groups, who provide a new enemy to hate and move against.
Again, using the insurrection at the US Capitol as an example, at least 82
individuals with military backgrounds participated in the vitriolic violence and
rioting.66 As we consider this transition, we can regard active-duty military service as a
period of strong labels, control systems, and associations. These labels and associations
are thrown into doubt during the preparation for and separation from the military. To
prevent these issues, the US military can conduct a series of exit interviews to monitor
the mental and social health of veterans and reach out with additional resources as
needed.
Additionally, the military should provide more career counseling and support
groups with former servicemembers to engage veterans in prosocial support groups
that meet synchronously online or in person. As the January 6 insurrection reveals,
without the US military creating and propagating a counternarrative among its
personnel that frames White power DVEs as terrorists and enemies of the state,
these extremist groups will continue to thrive and recruit active-duty, retired, and
separated servicemembers.

64. Kennard, Irregular Army, 44–46; and Smith, Gangs and the Military, 124–31.
65. John E. Finn, Fracturing the Founding: How the Alt-Right Corrupts the Constitution, (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2019).
66. Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “Extremism in the Ranks,” 5; Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “D.C. Officer
Daniel Hodges Called Capitol Rioters ‘Terrorists.’ Here’s Why That Matters,” MSNBC, July 28, 2021,
https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/d-c-officer-daniel-hodges-called-capitol-rioters-terrorists-here-n1275231; and
Milton and Mines, Examining Military Experience, 18–20.
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At the end of the day, all servicemembers come home. It is imperative military
leaders proactively address the issues surrounding the adoption of far-right
narratives or association with White power DVE organizations—and not brush
them aside or ignore them. To reduce the allure of far-right extremism, the military
should develop appropriate health-care systems for both active-duty and retired
servicemembers, particularly addressing PTSD, and establish wraparound services
to ease the transition to civilian life, including financial assistance programs for
economic hardships. Instead of protecting the nation from a domestic enemy, the
military’s inaction is contributing to the White power movement’s growth and
capacity for violence, making American communities less safe.
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I

Prologue

n the wake of the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 3-4, 1993,
in which 19 American servicemembers were killed and 73 injured, I was tasked
to lead an effort to discern the strategic lessons to be learned from the ill-fated
US intervention. The study highlighted several shortfalls: the absence of a clear US
strategy and whole-of-government plan for the operation, the onset of mission creep
as the operation evolved from a humanitarian mission into a manhunt for a notorious
Somali warlord, the lack of coordination across the US government agencies and other
coalition partners involved, and the failure to maintain proper oversight of execution as
one presidential administration transitioned to the next. The study’s recommendations,
which were briefed to the secretary of defense, the national security adviser, and other
key participants, ultimately led to a more integrated US approach to planning for US
operations in Haiti in 1994 as well as a new Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56),
Managing Complex Contingency Operations.
In this context, Len Hawley, a retired Army colonel, who as a civilian served as the
director of multilateral affairs, became the National Security Council’s (NSC) point
person to lead the implementation of PDD-56. Throughout his tenure in the Clinton
administration, Len oversaw the drafting of more than 40 political-military plans for
contingencies ranging from East Timor to Kosovo. These plans sought to incorporate
the costly lessons of Somalia in an effort to improve the outcomes and reduce the risks
associated with US contingency operations overseas.

After 25 years in the Army, Len continued to serve his country as a civilian
leader in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the NSC staff, and the 9/11
Commission staff. This article is the last piece Len wrote before he died of
complications from leukemia in 2020. It is full of the insights and wisdom of an
unsung hero who was an extraordinary public servant, strategic thinker, and
beloved mentor and colleague to many.
Michèle Flournoy

Cofounder and Managing Partner of WestExec Advisors
Chair, Center for a New American Security Board of Directors
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Importance of Interagency Management and Planning

S

ince the end of the Cold War, the national security environment
has placed new demands on American leadership abroad. As Thomas J.
Friedman wrote in 2002, “the lesson of 9/11 is that if we do not visit the
world’s bad neighborhoods, they will surely visit us.”1 This strategy is
employed because local conflicts in distant places can lead to threats to US
citizens and facilities abroad, incite fanaticism and import terrorism to the
US homeland, undermine regional stability and development, displace whole
population groups and create refugee crises, perpetrate human rights abuses
and atrocities, empower corrupt governments, and strengthen organized
criminal syndicates.
Warfare has fundamentally changed since the early 1990s in that
conflict has become more nonmilitary, irregular, and hybrid in nature. The
9/11 Commission concluded that while the American military and allied
armed forces needed to find and destroy terrorist groups in the field, the
future US counterterrorism strategy must be balanced.2 Long-term success
demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence,
law enforcement, border control, financial controls, cybersecurity, economic
development, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. A successful US
response to a future threatening adversary will likely rely heavily upon
civilian agency capabilities rather than applying entirely military coercion
and force. This shift places even greater reliance on interagency planning
of US multidimensional crisis responses.
In the face of these challenges, the Biden-Harris administration can learn
from the Clinton administration’s implementation of Presidential Decision
Directive 56 (PDD-56), Managing Complex Contingency Operations, which
ensured the unity of effort in interagency planning of multidimensional
coalition operations for international crisis response. 3 Drawing upon my
personal experience implementing PDD-56 and overseeing the drafting
of 44 political-military plans as director of multilateral affairs during the
Clinton administration, this article distills lessons for effective strategic
planning to address prospective future complex emergencies that could
1. Thomas L. Friedman, “9/11 Lesson Plan,” New York Times, September 4, 2002, https://www.nytimes
.com/2002/09/04/opinion/9-11-lesson-plan.html.
2. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “What to Do? A Global Strategy,” in
The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States, 2004), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Ch12.htm.
3. National Security Council (NSC), Managing Complex Contingency Operations, Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 56 (Washington, DC: NSC, 1997), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-56.pdf.
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profoundly affect vital US interests.4 These emergencies could range from
a September 11, 2001-style terrorist attack on the United States to armed
ethnic conflict to massive climate catastrophes and other natural disasters.
No country, however powerful, can deal with such complex emergencies
alone. While US leadership will be essential, the US government will need
the support of allied and friendly nations in responding to these emergencies
successfully. Indeed, not only will responses require cooperation between
nations, but any US response will call for disparate agency efforts to be
integrated into a coherent strategy to achieve US policy aims. Thus, strategies
for international collaboration and interagency management and planning,
like those promoted by PDD-56, are essential to ensure the US government
fully integrates all agencies when responding to foreign emergencies.

Genesis of Presidential Decision Directive 56
Presidential Decision Directive 56, crafted in response to a series of
crises in the 1990s, highlighted the need for greater international and
interagency cooperation. Its practicality and utility are best understood
as a by-product of the lessons its crafters and implementers learned from
these crises.
For example, the 1992–93 intervention in Somalia was a failure in nearly
all respects—impeded by meager interagency strategic planning in
Washington and contentious coalition operations in Somalia. Marine
Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, the director of operations for the
United Task Force Somalia, frequently spoke about “twenty lessons learned,”
emphasizing the necessity of better integrating civilian and military efforts.5
His lessons signaled a growing appreciation for effective interagency
management and political-military planning as being critical to the quality
of policy decisions and the success of complex contingency operations.
On the heels of the Somali intervention, the 1994 intervention in Haiti
marked the Clinton administration’s first venture into organized interagency
management and political-military planning. Before the intervention,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili briefed
President Clinton on the campaign plan to seize Haiti. Afterward, the
4. Dennis Skocz, director of State Political-Military Affair’s Office of Contingency Planning and
Peacekeeping, had daily conversations with NSC staff members planning complex contingencies and compiled
a list of 44 distinct political-military planning efforts in response to foreign crises.
5. Anthony Zinni, “LtGen. Zinni’s Twenty Lessons Learned for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace
Operations” (keynote address, transcript), http://cidbimena.desastres.hn/docum/crid/Marzo2006/CD2/pdf/eng
/doc10309/doc10309-c.pdf.
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president asked, “How long will this take?” The chairman replied, “Sir,
we will secure Haiti in about a week.” Then the president turned to several
of his policy advisers and asked, “What happens in the second week?”
No one had an answer.6
In reaction, NSC Senior Director for Global Affairs Richard Clarke
established an assistant secretary-level executive committee to prepare an
interagency political-military plan that designated objectives for the first six
months of the Haiti endeavor. Clarke ensured the NSC staff worked closely
with senior officials at the Pentagon, the Justice and State Departments, the
US Agency for International Development, the US Information Agency,
and the CIA. Their collaboration resulted in an overarching plan for
civilian and military activities that would achieve realistic political, security,
humanitarian, rule of law, and economic conditions on the ground.
Days before the Haiti intervention, Clarke had his assistant secretaries
conduct rehearsals of each agency’s responsibilities for operational success
for the Deputies Committee. With the NSC staff leading this innovative
planning effort, the US government secured the gains achieved by the
US military takeover of Haiti. Although only a first step, this pioneering
interagency planning effort tested several new management mechanisms for
planning and conducting future complex contingency operations.
Early in 1995, following the initial progress achieved in Haiti, Clarke
asked Michèle Flournoy, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to draft a presidential directive to
capture the emerging interagency management mechanisms and planning
activities that proved effective in the Haiti intervention. Flournoy codified
Clarke’s management vision to hold administration officials at the assistant
secretary level accountable for the programs, the people, and the funds
required for successful operations. If agency stovepipes emerged during a US
crisis response, the fault would lie with uncooperative assistant secretaries in
Washington—not lower-ranking agency officials working on the front line.
Flournoy’s draft outlined a broad and flexible crisis management
framework that dealt with a wide range of crises and strengthened the
unity of effort by harmonizing civilian and military endeavors during an
intervention. It also included two important initiatives—an after-action
review to capture lessons learned and annual training to develop US
expertise in planning future multidimensional operations. By mid-1995, the
6. Author recollection of conversation following briefing by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John
Shalikashvili, 1994.
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draft entered the cumbersome, legalistic vetting and clearance process for
presidential directives.
Applying Flournoy’s draft of PDD-56, Clarke quickly established an
interagency working group to conduct political-military planning for the small
UN peace implementation mission in Eastern Slavonia, a territory of Croatia
seized by Serbia in 1991. The administration’s plan guided the establishment
of the UN Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western
Sirmium, which proved to be an effective invention. After 1995, the Clinton
administration encountered continued occurrences of state collapse, ethnic
and religious conflict, threats of genocide, and the rise of criminal states, all of
which forced reluctant policymakers to deal selectively with crises abroad. From
1995 to 2001 under PDD-56, the Clinton administration planned over 40
interventions in Eastern Slavonia, Guatemala, Sierra Leone, Burundi (potential
genocide), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea-Ethiopia, North Korea
(potential collapse), Iraq, Serbia, Kosovo, East Timor, Kashmir, and Lebanon.
With the NSC staff leading the interagency working groups in these politicalmilitary planning efforts, credible American leadership emerged across the
international community.
By 1998 the Deputies Committee became accustomed to relying upon the
NSC staff to lead interagency working groups in anticipation of impending
crises adversely affecting US interests. The lessons learned from these complex
interventions were articulated in the Generic Political-Military Implementation
Plan.7 Initially only six pages long, the plan grew to 59 pages as it incorporated
new lessons from ongoing missions. Senior civilian and military officials, well
after the Clinton administration, regularly used this plan.

Kosovo: A Case Study of Success
The need for greater interagency management and planning and the positive
impact of PDD-56 upon planning can best be seen in the contrast between the
Bosnian crisis and the intervention in Kosovo. The bitter crisis in Bosnia greeted
the Clinton administration’s arrival in office. And soon, the US effort became
mired in the same problems experienced in Somalia—meager strategic planning
and contentious coalition operations. Unfortunately, the 1995 Dayton Accords
contained only a single mention of coordination by the civilian and military
components of the mission, and this coordination was not mandatory. The
sharp division was intentional—designed by the Pentagon to ensure the success
7. National Defense University, “Appendix B: Generic Political-Military Implementation Plan,” in Interagency
Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2003),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=33348.
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of the military mission would not depend on the performance of the civilian
mission. By insulating itself so effectively from the civilian component, the US
military guaranteed the failure of both.8 In Kosovo, a tight working relationship
between civilian and military efforts was forged in response to the failure of this
relationship in Bosnia.
In 1998 as senior officials and political-military planners looked ahead
to the emerging crisis in Kosovo, the theme was “let us not do Bosnia ever
again.”9 Reliance upon interagency planning and coalition operations
as outlined in PDD-56, therefore, became central to several Deputies
Committee decisions. To advance his war aims, Serbia’s President Slobodan
Milošević used various tactics to undermine unity among NATO allies,
including the ruthless 1999 displacement of 850,000 ethnic Albanian
citizens of Kosovo.10 As the crisis unfolded, US leadership prevented a
reversal in security cooperation between Russia and NATO and kept the
Balkans peace process on track.
The Clinton administration recognized Milošević as a serious threat to
NATO’s cohesion and European Union solidarity. Following the successful
NATO air campaign to pressure Milošević to exit Kosovo, US policymakers
determined the international community needed to mount an unprecedented
joint UN/NATO transitional administration for Kosovo to secure NATO’s
military success. Authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1244,
the UN/NATO mission established an interim civil administration for
the country as the first step toward Kosovo’s substantial autonomy.11
Between 1998 and 2001, the Clinton administration planned a series of
international interventions for Kosovo, including coercive diplomacy, sanctions
enforcement, humanitarian relief, a diplomatic observer mission, a NATO
air campaign, peace implementation, stabilization, and reconstruction. The
administration completed as many as six sequential policy-planning efforts,
each contributing significantly to the successful establishment of stability in
the Balkans and leading to the eventual removal, apprehension, and conviction
of Milošević by the International Criminal Tribunal. Kosovo declared its
8. Jock Covey, “The Custodian of the Peace Process,” in The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention
and Strategies for Conflict Transformation, ed. Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005).
9. Michele A. Poole, “Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations:
The Impact of
Presidential Decision Directive 56” (master’s thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, 2001), 30, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti
/pdfs/ADA397246.pdf.
10. Michael Dziedzic, Laura Mercean, and Elton Skendaj, “Kosovo: The Kosovo Liberation Army” in Quest
for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation, ed. Jock Covey, Michael J.
Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 156.
11. UN Security Council, Resolution 1244, Kosovo, S/RES/1244, June 10, 1999, https://undocs.org/S
/RES/1244(1999).
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independence in February 2008—a success for the fledgling nation and proof
positive of PDD-56’s efficacy for responding to international crises.12

Evolution of Successful Crisis Management
The Kosovo case demonstrates the Clinton administration’s substantial
growth and success in the “art and science” of crisis management. Interagency
planners developed insights and learned what it took to achieve success in
different situations, whether the international response sought to prevent a
crisis, wage war, protect human life, or implement peace. Many lessons required
planners to reexamine their perceptions of a given situation, including allowing
wishful thinking to flourish without prudent judgment and circumspection;
realizing the local situation among fighting groups as well as adversaries and
spoilers are poorly understood and often misjudged; being wary of dismissing
ill-defined threats as unlikely; overlooking potent corrupt economic incentives;
underestimating operational needs for a response, both civilian and military;
misreading partners’ commitments and realizing hopeful projections of
indigenous popular support are wrong; understanding that instruments of
government action are inadequate or irrelevant; and failing to ask the question:
What happens next? These insights advanced the art and science of policy
planning for crisis response and created a pragmatic appreciation for the many
obstacles confronting government leaders.
Over time, Clinton administration policymakers and interagency planners
became more risk-conscious. As they sought to understand the many
unintended consequences when planning a crisis response, they set aside
unrealistic expectations for a quick fix and exit and accumulated a sophisticated
appreciation for the complementary civilian and military contributions of a
US government response. Diplomacy, political moderation, military security,
humanitarian relief, public safety, economic assistance, governance, human
rights, public diplomacy, and social reconciliation—interdependent major
mission areas that were embraced within PDD-56 planning efforts—became
even more critical.

Art of Crisis Management
Clinton administration planners realized policymakers need flexibility and
want credible options rather than a detailed political-military plan right up
to the eleventh hour of an intervention. Conversely, agencies want a plan that
spells out agency roles, specific objectives, timelines for implementation,
12.

Dziedzic, Mercean, and Skendaj, “Kosovo,” 191; and Poole, “Interagency Management,” 67.
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and workable coordinating mechanisms. It is important to note that there is
considerable tension between the needs of policymakers for flexible options
versus the needs of agencies for clear guidance when planning assigned tasks as
directed by a political-military plan.
Over time interagency planners crafted the “Advance Pol-Mil Planning
Process” to address the demands of policymakers and the needs of agency
planners simultaneously.13 This cutting-edge process impacted NSCled interagency crisis management efforts, avoided critical interagency
problems, and generated an integrated, whole-of-government civilian-military
intervention plan to advance US interests abroad. This process provided
senior US officials with six planning outcomes that:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Shape prudent US policy aims in a crisis that range between do
nothing and save the world.
Develop a political-military intervention strategy that appreciates
the complex situation on the ground and garners international
support to respond.
Identify the range of unintended consequences of decisions.
Clarify the major mission areas of the intervention as the core
components of an integrated civilian-military campaign.
Mobilize allies, partners, and other nations and international
organizations to contribute to the coalitions deemed necessary.
Facilitate the hand-off to a follow-on mission after several years, as
local conditions improve to a viable peace, usually a redesigned
mission of less size and reduced costs, eventually leading to
ownership by the host nation over the coming three to five years.

These outcomes helped balance the need for clear and practical operating
procedures at the agency level while providing flexibility at the policy level.
A second refinement focused on decision making within the Principals and
Deputies Committees, which became more rigorous after Clinton signed PDD-25,
Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. It directed disciplined policy analysis of the
conflict situation as policymakers considered response options.14 The NSC tasked the
intelligence community to analyze crisis situations according to baseline and success
13. Leonard R. Hawley, “The Advance Pol-Mil Planning Process” (unpublished manuscript). This document
can be obtained from Michael Dziedzic by sending an e-mail to michaeldz71@gmail.com.
14. NSC, US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, PDD-25 (Washington, DC: NSC, 1994), https://
fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-25.pdf.
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factors derived from lessons learned during recent missions and provide this information
as inputs for the NSC planning process.15
NSC officials also relied on assessments from international partners, diplomatic
envoys and peace negotiators, officials of regional organizations, and other
knowledgeable actors residing in a region. Before a Principals or Deputies
Committee meeting, the NSC staff prepared a discussion paper to inform policy
deliberations with the support of the interagency working group. Just as the NSC’s
discussion papers brought together information and issues from disparate sources, so
too did the Clinton administration’s interagency planning experts in creating a
language or science of political-military planning.

Science of Crisis Management
Clinton administration interagency planning experts created distinctive
terms to capture their mission and establish a unifying lexicon rather than each
agency working from their own. By 1997, this lexicon included new terms such
as transformation strategies, major mission areas, and instruments of government
action, among others. A related interagency planning evolution involved
developing a realistic intervention strategy for mobilizing, wielding, and
sustaining global power for interventions. This critical section of the politicalmilitary plan, often written by members of the Policy Steering Group who are
officials at the deputy assistant secretary/major general level, fused intelligence
assessments; confirmed the policy aims of the intervention; clarified the strategic
purpose, mission, and near-term objectives; and integrated the international
coalition interests needed to gain adequate contributions to support a successful
intervention. The resulting intervention strategy became the core section of the
political-military plan for an intervention.
In addition, the nature of successful coalition operations evolved with
the important distinction between an intervention and a coalition. Complex
contingency operations are mostly multinational and multilateral, which means
interventions usually require several different coalitions to get the job done.
The international mission in Kosovo, for example, embodied eight coalitions
led by the Contact Group (Balkans) (political), NATO (military), the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (humanitarian relief ), the UN Department
of Peacekeeping Operations (rule of law), the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (democratization and institution-building), the European

15. Bruce R. Pirnie and William E. Simons, Soldiers for Peace: Critical Operational Issues (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 1996).
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Union (reconstruction and economic development), the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (human rights), and the G8 (donor coalition).
For interventions to succeed, the political and structural foundations of each
coalition had to be organized and set in place during the planning process, and
planning efforts had to be married with diplomacy at the assistant secretary/
lieutenant general level. High-level consultations with allies, regional friends,
UN Security Council members, international organizations, and other potential
contributors were crucial to ensure Washington’s political-military plan had buyin from partners and the various coalitions needed for success.
When Clinton finally signed PDD-56 in May 1997 after a lengthy
vetting process, various agencies were already applying a host of institutional
reforms. The changes constituted a significant transformation in how the
US government conducted interagency planning for crisis response. Under the
leadership of Ellen Laipson, vice-chair of the National Intelligence Council,
the intelligence community revamped its exercise and training programs to
focus on complex emergencies and incorporate PDD-25 baseline factors and
success factors into intelligence reporting as a crisis emerged. Meanwhile,
the US State Department increased its organizational planning capacity by
establishing an Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping within
its Bureau of Political-Military Affairs to support the NSC’s interagency
planning activities.
Within the military, the Joint Staff required all military operational-level
plans include an “Annex V (Interagency Coordination)” to address critical
civilian agency efforts necessary for military operations. The NSC staff
convened several after-action reviews to capture lessons learned from recent
planning efforts and interventions that were included in the Generic PoliticalMilitary Implementation Plan.
At the interagency level, the Deputies Committee approved professional
education programs within the Departments of Defense and State to offer
courses in interagency planning for crisis response. The War Gaming and
Simulation Center at the National Defense University worked with the
Foreign Service Institute to sponsor annual interagency training exercises to
strengthen the basic skills of mid- and senior-level agency officials. Though
the signing of PDD-56 codified the need for interagency cooperation
and collaboration, the changes made by these US government agencies
acknowledged the utility of the strategies the directive contained long before
it was signed.
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Overall, the historical evolution of the art and science of interagency
planning for multidimensional coalition operations is a story about conceptual
evolution coupled with the creation of new institutional mechanisms in
the policy planning arena. These innovations demonstrated contingency
operations could be successful despite their situational complexity, political
controversy, and pressures for disunity among US departments and agencies.

Dismantling of PDD-56
Soon after taking office in January 2001, the Bush administration
dismantled the Clinton administration’s interagency planning capabilities.16
Bush discarded the NSC-centric approach embraced by PDD-56 and adopted
an agency-centric approach in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)
1: Organization of the National Security System.17 The consequence of this
action was that under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the Pentagon
held the dominant role in crisis management in the Bush administration.
The dismantling of the PDD-56 process came quickly. In early 2002
James Dobbins, the US special envoy for Afghanistan, urged the Deputies
Committee to get interagency political-military planning up and running for
Afghanistan, but his proposal went nowhere. A ranking official at the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, at the direction of Rumsfeld, discarded a draft
presidential directive prepared by the Joint Staff that was akin to PDD-56. In
the run up to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Rumsfeld leveraged the Bush
administration’s agency-centric approach for crisis management to relegate
senior officials of the State Department, the US Agency for International
Development, the Justice Department, and other civilian agencies to the back
row in policy decision making and planning.18
The Bush administration did not draw on interagency strategic planning
capacity for its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. This serious deficiency,
exacerbated by feuding among senior leaders of departments and agencies,
resulted in serious gaps and disconnects on the ground. In 2004 after just one
year in Iraq, Americans witnessed the violent Sunni revolt in Fallujah, the
hostile Shia uprising, and the scandalous pictures of torture in the US prison
at Abu Ghraib. After three years of stalemate in Afghanistan, Congress in late
2004 asserted intense pressure on the Bush administration to fix its failures
16. Poole, “Interagency Management,” 65.
17. NSC, Organization of the National Security Council System, National Security Presidential Directive
(NSPD) 1 (Washington, DC: NSC, 2001), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/index.html.
18. David Von Drehle, “Rumsfeld Seized the Wheel of Power—and Steered Us Terribly into War,” Washington
Post, July 2, 2021.
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in interagency strategic planning and correct its structural deficiencies for
conducting complex contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.19
In August 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the
establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize US government
civilian capacity to prevent conflict and plan for stabilization operations. In
June 2005, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers
cited the importance of S/CRS for an integrated approach to peacekeeping,
reconstruction, and stability operations and to relieve stress on the armed
forces.20 In November 2005, the Pentagon published DoD Directive
3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
(SSTR) Operations, which gave stability and reconstruction operations
priority comparable to combat operations.21 Eventually, in December 2005,
President Bush signed NSPD-44 that sought to empower the secretary of state,
facilitated by the newly formed S/CRS, to lead and coordinate the US government
response in reconstruction and stabilization missions across all involved agencies and
to work with the secretary of defense to harmonize civilian and military activities.22
None of the Bush administration initiatives created under the agency-centric
approach favored by Rumsfeld in 2005 proved to be effective in crisis management.
S/CRS produced some useful work, such as the Interagency Management System, to
improve cooperation and planning between the Defense and State Departments and
other departments and agencies.23 The Interagency Management System, however,
was entirely disconnected from decision making for crisis management by Bush
Deputies and Principal Committees. Moreover, the powerful regional bureaus of
the State Department and offices of the US Agency for International Development
saw the work of S/CRS as infringing on their turf, and Congressional appropriations
committees never provided sufficient funding or staffing for S/CRS. Most important,
the Pentagon ignored S/CRS efforts to lead interagency planning because of its
prevailing view that the Pentagon does not work for the secretary of state.

19. Nina M. Serafino, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action
on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities,
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RL32862 (Washington, DC: CRS, February 5, 2009), https:
//apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA494853.pdf.
20. Status of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps in Fighting the Global War on Terrorism: Hearing before
the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate, 109th Cong., (2005), 13, https://www.govinfo.gov
/content/pkg/CHRG-109shrg28577/pdf/CHRG-109shrg28577.pdf.
21. Department of Defense (DoD), Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations, DoD Directive 3000.05 (Washington, DC: DoD, 2005), https://policy.defense.gov/portals/11
/Documents/solic/DoDD%203000.05%20SSTR%20(SIGNED)%2028NOV05.pdf.
22. NSC, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, NSPD-44
(Washington, DC: NSC, 2005), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html.
23. Serafino, Peacekeeping/Stabilization.

TOC

Crisis Management and Risk

Hawley

31

The key lesson from the Bush administration’s unsuccessful responses to crises
is that policy decision making and interagency political-military planning must
go hand in hand. This relationship thrived during the Clinton administration
because it applied the NSC-centric approach under PDD-56 to manage crises.
In contrast, the Bush administration’s agency-centric approach under NSPD-44
allowed Rumsfeld to control crisis decision making and skew planning toward
military priorities, without a corresponding civilian contribution by other US
departments and agencies or from international organizations. Rumsfeld’s
domination of the process expedited dysfunction in Washington, which led
to costly, stalemated missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The salient lesson for
future administrations is that an NSC-centric approach will not always guarantee
success, but an agency-centric approach will surely lead to failure.

Recurring Weaknesses and Critical Problems
in Interagency Collaboration
The critical problems examined in this section are based on my personal
involvement in managing the preparation of over 40 political-military plans
as NSC director for multilateral affairs. They highlight interagency planning
deficiencies and their adverse impact on effective crisis management. Most
of these deficiencies are correctable, and best practices and achievable
solutions for dealing with them are elaborated in the following section.
Insuff icient authority for the NSC staff. Over reliance on an agency-centric
as opposed to an NSC-centric model for crisis management encourages
discord, turf protection, inefficiency, planning failures, and unforeseen
disconnects that lead to severe adverse consequences for operational success
in the field.
Excessive growth of the NSC staff. The NSC staff ’s enormous size of about
300 professionals in recent years encourages the NSC to assume agency
operational responsibilities rather than to integrate, oversee, and focus
agency officials in support of the policy decisions of the Deputies and
Principals Committees.
Mistrusted dialogue between the intelligence and policy communities.
Discussions are often unproductive when intelligence professionals risk
retribution from policymakers when providing early warning, situation
assessments, historical analyses, and political forecasts necessary for timely
anticipation of a potential crisis.
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Predisposition by assistant secretaries to protect agency turf and resources.
Assistant secretaries are prone to set aside their responsibilities for
integrating their activities with other agencies, thereby creating independent,
disconnected agency stovepipes in the field.
Inadequate professional competence among senior off icials. Most rising
civilian and military officials do not appreciate their professional limitations
for collaborative leadership and integrated policy planning, leading to
high-level wariness and resistance to applying best practices for interagency
crisis management.
Inconsistent concepts of planning across agencies. Most agency planners do
not appreciate that planning an international intervention is fundamentally
different from their traditional agency planning methods.24 Their distinctive
agency planning methods are not relevant to requirements for NSC-led policy
planning of an intervention.
Inadequate information sharing among agencies creates disconnects and
disunity. Many US government officials consider information as power and
fail to share it with other agencies, thus breeding an unwelcome lack of trust
within an interagency planning group.
Parochial personnel management. Agency career tracks and assignment policies
discourage personnel who take broadening assignments in other agencies.
Cross-agency assignments are scorned as diversions from mainstream career paths.
Disappointing return on investments in agency training and exercises. Although
considerable agency money is spent on training and exercises, the return on these
investments is disappointing because interagency issues are rarely designed into
agency exercises.
Absence of a funding line for the NSC to support interagency training, tabletop
exercises, and strategy games. NSC staff must search for the funding needed for
training, exercises, and strategy games which impedes the development of expertise in
interagency planning for crisis response.
Disconnected agency budgets supporting foreign interventions. The practice of
submitting separate agency budgets to support each agency’s responsibilities in
24. A similar critical distinction is made by James M. Dubik, Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2016). See also Leonard R. Hawley and Dennis Skocz, “Advance
Political-Military Planning: Laying the Foundation for Achieving Viable Peace” in The Quest for Viable Peace:
International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation, ed. Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and
Leonard R. Hawley (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005).
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a foreign intervention results in an ad hoc, fragmented budgeting system that
usually leads to critical program funding shortfalls and execution delays.
Several reports and studies suggest the reform of the US government’s
interagency process for crisis management must be driven by Congress, in a manner
similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986. This landmark legislation created horizontal structures and processes to
strengthen jointness among the military services within the Department of Defense.
Presidential prerogatives in structuring the US government interagency to
meet emerging foreign policy and national security priorities, however, should be
preserved. One of the most valuable features of the current system is that the president
has complete constitutional authority to tailor existing interagency capabilities
of the US government to address emerging threats effectively (for example,
cybersecurity). Legislation dictating rigid bureaucratic arrangements which
would jeopardize the flexibility now granted to the president to retool the
interagency policy-making system to deal with new threats and seize emerging
opportunities should be avoided. The executive and legislative branches must
find the right balance between the need to adapt rapidly to emerging national
security threats and the need for oversight.

Best Practices for Interagency Planning
and Coalition Operations
Fortunately, seasoned Clinton administration interagency planners confronted
many of these problems and found solutions under PDD-56, thereby improving
unity of effort in interagency planning for multidimensional coalition operations.
What follows are best practices for addressing these recurring problems.
Interagency planning is best directed and coordinated by the NSC staff.
Consensus building is critical to effective interagency planning. The NSC
staff often champions an overarching US policy perspective compared to
agency officials. Under the NSC-centric model, the NSC plays a decisive role
as an advocate for US policy aims with the clout necessary to bring closure to
disputes over narrow agency interests.
Senior off icials need to be collaborative leaders. Appointees at the deputy
assistant secretary/major general level or higher should regularly demonstrate
the attributes of effective collaborative leadership in interagency activities.25
25. Russell M. Linden, Leading across Boundaries: Creating Collaborative Agencies in a Networked World
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010).
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High-performing senior officials who are collaborative leaders prefer a mutual
effort to find solutions to complex problems, listen to other points of view,
and are committed to building consensus among counterparts.
Processes help manage the overwhelming complexity of crisis situations. An
important benefit of the Advance Political-Military Planning Process is
that it can reduce the complexities associated with international crises. This
NSC-led interagency planning process can help senior officials better
understand an emerging crisis, including its historical roots, its local
politics, possible scenarios, the risks associated with a crisis response, and the
gravity of US concerns.
Effective interagency planning improves the quality and timeliness of
policy decisions. The clarification of policy issues is a core purpose of
interagency planning. Most immediate and longer-term policy questions are
identified in the Advance Political-Military Planning Process and are brought
to principals and deputies in a timely manner to support their decision
making for an effective response to a crisis.
Expertise in policy planning for crisis response must be assiduously
developed. This special knowledge is critical to creating conditions for
policy development, crafting effective strategies, and integrating available
instruments of power. Few mid-level officials have an in-depth understanding
of these special skills. An interagency training and exercise program in crisis
management is an absolute necessity to develop this expertise.
The intelligence community needs to be advised of the issues being confronted
by policymakers. Intelligence officials need advance notice of issues being
considered by Principals and Deputies Committees so a focused intelligence
summary can be distributed to committee members and NSC staff 24 hours
prior to their meeting.
Build trust within interagency planning groups by encouraging sensible
information sharing. There is no need for sharing sources and methods, but
sharing unbiased assessments is critical for the interagency planning team to
understand the nature of complex challenges and to find integrated solutions.
The NSC chair of the Interagency Planning Group should seek consensus
about how shared sensitive information will be protected and the practices
needed to achieve this.
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Informal dialogue among agency off icials is crucial. Informal discussions
among agency officials are often more constructive than formal meetings.
Such communications are aided by the cross assignment of personnel and
habitual relationships within the interagency planning community. The
trick is to bring together officials within diverse interagency clusters of
functional planners, such as military officers and human rights officials, in
ways that promote new understanding and unity of effort through friendly
crosstalk over a cup of coffee.
An intervention requires many different coalitions. A large, complex
intervention usually requires a political coalition to steer international action
and support, a military coalition to conduct security operations, a humanitarian
coalition to provide relief, a rule of law coalition to provide public security and
justice, a political-economic coalition to build a legitimate economy, a development
coalition to support post-intervention reconstruction, a human rights coalition to
address abuses, and a donor coalition to pay for operations. Each coalition has
both political and structural foundations that must be set up and managed by its
leading partner.
Coalitions are always ad hoc and inherently fragile. A standing coalition that
can be quickly deployed within a week is a planning fantasy. Each intervention
is essentially a pick-up game where willing participants in an ad hoc fashion
come to play. The core group of an international intervention is formed very
early in the interagency planning process because this small group of nations
makes a significant contribution to the planning and mobilization of other
nations and international organizations to participate in the intervention.
Cohesion is essential to success, yet unity can be quite fragile compared to an
adversary leader’s single-minded will and determination. Capable leadership
among political directors of a core group of coalition partners is central to the
success of an intervention.
Consolidated budgets for foreign interventions. The US government cannot
rely upon separate agency budget submissions for programs supporting
field activities for foreign interventions (for example, deployments,
relief activities, military operations, police missions, and elections). The
Office of Management and Budget should consolidate these one-year
agency budgets into a single consolidated three-year budget request, updated
annually, for funding the intervention. Authorized by a Joint Committee
of Congress for Foreign Contingencies, a single consolidated budget
passed on time each fiscal year will reinforce unity of effort for integrated
civilian-military activities.
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While these practices will alleviate most of the weaknesses and
problems identified in the previous section part of what makes the NSCcentric approach laid out in PDD-56 so successful is its responsiveness to
individual situations. Thus, each new crisis will create new and unique
problems and while these best practices can be applied broadly, no two crises
are the same.

Recommendations for Effective Crisis Management
The deadly global COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the ensuing global
economic disaster, has created an even more turbulent and dangerous world
than the one faced following the Cold War. Great power competition will only
make foreign crises more dangerous. To meet this challenge, the Biden-Harris
administration’s earliest and highest priority should be to establish a renewed
PDD-56 process. The following recommendations for updating PDD-56 are
distilled from my experience managing the preparation of 44 political-military
plans during the Clinton administration:

Structuring the Interagency
for Effective Crisis-Response Planning
To provide battle-tested management practices and implementing instructions
for Presidential Security Memorandum (PSM) 2: Renewing the National
Security Council System, the Biden-Harris administration should prepare a PSM
drawing on PDD-56 to operationalize an NSC-centric approach to managing
complex contingencies.26 The NSC senior director for strategic planning should
be empowered with authority across the US government. The office should be
staffed with planners who are collectively capable of managing about five to seven
complex emergencies and ongoing missions.
To identify operational issues for emerging political-military implementation
plans, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Undersecretary for Policy should host
a one-day “Red-Blue-Gray” strategy game involving participants at the deputy
assistant secretary/major general level from relevant departments and agencies,
including the J-5 director of planning at the relevant combatant command(s).
This game would help clarify the regional crisis scenario and US and allied
concerns, identify likely countermoves by bad actors, and highlight surprising
events and outcomes that might unfold through time.
26. “Renewing the National Security Council System,” White House (website), February 4, 2021, https://www
.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/04/memorandum-renewing-the-national-securitycouncil-system/.
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To support the timely execution of interagency planning by the designated
Interagency Policy Committee for the crisis response, the Biden-Harris
administration should direct specific intelligence assessments provided by the
National Intelligence Council that focus on early warning, comprehensive situation
assessments, historical analyses, political forecasts, and personality assessments of
bad actors/spoilers.
Finally, a political-military implementation plan should be the primary tool
used for integrating US government actions and managing complex contingency
operations with coalition partners. Prior to the execution of the plan, a rehearsal
should be conducted to review the political-military plan’s main elements with
each Interagency Policy Committee official presenting to the Deputies or
Principals Committee. The sequential implementation for their major mission
area, triggers and decision points, any unresolved policy issues, and the adequacy
of resources required for their major mission area should be included.

Setting Up the Interagency for Success
The Interagency Policy Committee should conduct an after-action/
lessons-learned review at the end of each major stage of the complex contingency
operation to capture lessons learned. Appointees at the deputy assistant
secretary/major general level and higher should be required to attend a one-week,
senior-level professional development course that addresses the administration’s
interagency planning process and imparts the talents and skills necessary
for effective collaborative leadership in interagency activities.27 To improve
America’s ability to manage future operations, an interagency training and
exercise program should be created within US government agencies to develop
a cadre of professionals familiar with the political-military planning process. All
departments and agencies involved should be directed to conduct a review to
identify agency upgrades to support timely implementation of the provisions
of a PSM for managing complex contingency operations.
Implementation of these recommendations will take a serious commitment
by the president and senior NSC officials to strengthen interagency planning
for international crisis response. As this article has demonstrated, however, the
PDD-56 process anticipated the exponential increase in global interconnectivity
and consequent need for collaboration between nations and within the
US government. To date, the directive remains the most successful template
for balancing military and civilian planning in a world where the need for
effective crisis management is only growing larger and more prevalent.
27.

Linden, Leading across Boundaries.
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Assessing Risk at the National Strategic Level:
Visualization Tools for Military Planners
Wade A. Germann and Heather S. Gregg

T

ABSTR ACT: The reemergence of great power competition, conf lict
with near-peer competitor states below the level of armed conf lict, and
persisting threats from nonstate actors with transnational ambitions and
global reach pose challenges for strategists planning, executing, and assessing
military operations and strategy. Building on current visualization tools, two
proposed models—the National Strategic Risk Abacus and the National
Strategic Risk Radar Chart—address these challenges and better depict
how the US military may inadvertently contribute to risk at the national
strategic level.

his article offers insights and tools to assist strategic planners in
assessing how US military actions may produce “national strategic risk”:
risk to the grand strategic goals of American security and prosperity over
time. Most current risk assessment tools are useful for capturing tactical and
operational level risk; however, as this article proposes, they are insufficient
for comprehending the complexities of national strategic risk. Specifically,
assessing risk at the national strategic level is more difficult than assessing
risk at the tactical or operational levels because of “compounding risk,” the
unanticipated effects of military actions on achieving national security goals.
Furthermore, military actions taken at one point in time could have unintended
long-term effects, “cascading risk,” making risk assessment at this level difficult.
Finally, the considerable challenges inherent in formulating an effective response
to what several scholars call “strategic surprises” to national security can also
produce risk.1

This article proposes two visualization models US military planners can use
to capture compounding and cascading risk and identify risk during times of
strategic surprise. These models will offer a first step for visualizing the complexity
of risk assessment at the national strategic level and will provide guidance for
military planners considering the macro-level and long-term effects of operations
on wider national security strategy.
1. For example, see Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken, Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor
of Michael I. Handel (London: Routledge, 2003), 1–58; Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer, and David Gordon, eds.,
Managing Strategic Surprise: Lessons from Risk Management and Risk Assessment (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2008); Robert S. Kaplan, Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard, and Anette Mikes, “Novel Risk” (working paper
20-094, Harvard Business School, 2020), 1–25; and Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual
(FM) 100-14, Risk Management (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1998).
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The article proceeds as follows. Section two outlines how the US military
addresses risk at the tactical, operational, and Joint levels, which are doctrine and
models designed to assess and mitigate risk within its own operations. Section
three defines national strategic risk, including how it differs from military risk,
and demonstrates some of the challenges associated with identifying, assessing,
and predicting risk at the national strategic level. Section four highlights
the utility of visualization tools and introduces two visualization models
designed to capture compounding and cascading risk: the National Strategic
Risk Abacus and the National Strategic Risk Radar Chart. Finally, section five
provides concluding remarks.

Risk Assessment at the Tactical,
Operational, and Joint Levels
The US military has developed a series of nested doctrine and models to assist
leaders in addressing risk at the tactical, operational, and Joint levels, including
Field Manuals (FM), Army Techniques Publications (ATP), and Joint documents.
While these tools have proven helpful in mitigating risk within the US military’s
operations, they are insufficient for assessing national strategic risk.
In 1998 the Army developed the first systematic tool to assess risk, FM 100-14,
Risk Management, to codify its process for assessing, managing, and evaluating risk,
primarily at the tactical level.2 The manual articulates a five-step risk management
process to “identify hazards, assess hazards to address risks, develop controls and
make risk decisions, implement controls, and supervise and evaluate.”3 These
steps, designed to help leaders make better-informed decisions that save lives and
resources during a mission, do not address broader considerations beyond basic
control measures. This risk assessment tool, therefore, has limited utility at the
national strategic level.
To provide a more holistic approach to risk assessment, the US Army published
FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management, in 2006.4 While maintaining the same
basic five-step risk management process from FM 100-14, FM 5-19 outlines a
new tool matrix that considers the severity of risk (negligible, marginal, critical,
and catastrophic) with the probability of risk (unlikely, seldom, occasional, likely,
and frequent).5 This combination of frequency and severity of risk produces an
assessed outcome (low, medium, high, or extremely high) that allows leaders to
identify an acceptable level of risk based on the likelihood of an event occurring
measured against the severity of impact to things like “personnel, equipment,
2.
3.
4.
5.

HQDA, FM 100-14, Risk Management (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1998).
HQDA, FM 100-14, 108–9.
HQDA, FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006).
HQDA, FM 5-19, 1-9 to 1-10.
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environment or mission.”6 Although this tool includes more aspects associated
with risk, it is still primarily focused on the tactical and operational levels.
Building on FM 5-19, the US Army published ATP 5-19, Risk Management,
in 2014 with the aim of further systematizing risk assessment by identifying
potential hazards, assessing them, and managing their associated risks, in
what the training publication calls “composite risk management.”7 ATP 5-19
retains a holistic view of risk management but adds the complexity of multiple
mission sets rather than the traditional practice of separating accidents into
single events. Additionally, it better integrates this approach into the Army’s
military decision-making process. Finally, ATP 5-19 calls for leaders to employ
the Risk Assessment Matrix, originally outlined in FM 100-14 and depicted
in FM 5-19, to use the five-step process cyclically and continuously and to
apply the process across all Army operations, big and small.8 Again, as with
FM 100-14 and FM 5-19, this manual focuses on the tactical and operational
levels of risk and is not easily applied to assessing strategic level risk.
In 2019, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted the manual Joint
Risk Analysis to assist senior leaders in understanding military risk at the Joint
level.9 The document establishes a new Joint Risk Analysis Methodology
( JRAM). The JRAM framework incorporates three major components to
assess risk: risk appraisal, risk management, and risk communication, with
four activities: “problem framing” (identifying what the risk is assessed against),
“risk assessment” (identifying where the risks are coming from), “risk judgment”
(identifying what level of risk is acceptable to assume), and “risk management”
(identifying what actions should be taken to help mitigate the risk).10 The three
JRAM components tie together the four steps of the framework and promote
the continual consideration of the components throughout the four steps.
The overall goal of the JRAM is to provide military leaders and staffs with a
model for assessing risk at the Joint military level, the actions needed to achieve
specific outcomes, and the resources required to achieve those outcomes. By
moving away from simple terms such as high or low to articulate risk, leaders
can identify greater specificity in the description of risk across a broader range of
events and actions. Despite the improvements the JRAM brings to assessing risk
at the highest operational level, particularly the inclusion of both quantitative
and qualitative methods of articulating risk, the tool addresses risk to military
6. HQDA, FM 5-19, 1-15.
7. HQDA, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-19, Risk Management (Washington, DC: Department of the
Army, 2014), v–vii.
8. HQDA, ATP 5-19, 4-1–4-14.
9. Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3105.01, Joint Risk
Analysis (Washington, DC: JCS, 2019).
10. JCS, CJCSM 3105.01, B-2–B-6.
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goals only and does not provide adequate means for assessing risk at the national
strategic level. As will be described later, more complex models are needed to
assess and visualize national strategic risk.

Assessing Risk at the National Strategic Level
The US military, despite developing doctrine and models aimed at
understanding how actions affect risk at the tactical, operational, and Joint
levels, has focused few resources on the ability to identify risk at the national
strategic level. This section provides insights into how US military actions
could create risk at the national strategic level, differentiates national security
strategy from military strategy, describes the instruments of national power
needed to realize national security and prosperity over time, considers the
role national security documents play in naming threats and opportunities,
and identifies specific types of risks the US military might create through its
actions at this level.
The first step in understanding how military actions may incur risk to
national security strategy is distinguishing it from military strategy. Military
strategy focuses on achieving an objective in war using the military as the
primary instrument of power. National security strategy (also called grand
strategy or statecraft) provides a broader, long-term vision of a country’s threats
and opportunities and actions that will help shape the world in a way that
favors its interests. Colonel R. W. Van de Velde describes statecraft as “the
process through which a nation attempts to minimize its weaknesses and
limitations, and to maximize its strengths and capabilities in a current
international situation.”11
National security strategy has much broader and longer-term goals than
military strategy, which include security as well as prosperity. It requires multiple
instruments of power and a whole-of-government approach for realizing these
goals.12 Van de Velde outlined four broad instruments of national power in
particular: “the diplomatic, the economic, the military, and the psychological”
tools of statecraft.13 Subsequent descriptions of the instruments of national power
have changed the psychological tool to the information tool, creating the acronym
DIME, but perhaps losing the purpose of information, which is to influence the

11. Colonel R. W. Van de Velde, “Instruments of Statecraft,” Army 13, no. 5 (December 1962): 53.
12. Sir Michael Howard, “Grand Strategy in the 20th Century,” Defense Studies 1, no. 1 (2001): 1–10.
13. Van de Velde, “Instruments of Statecraft.” Here it is assumed that no one agency or department controls
any given instrument of national power. For example, see Heather S. Gregg, “Crafting a Better US Grand Strategy
in the Post–September 11 World: Lessons from the Early Years of the Cold War,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 3
( July 2010): 237–55.
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thought and behavior of a target audience.14 Still others have expanded the tools
of statecraft to include finance, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-FIL
or MIDLIFE).15 Including intelligence as a separate tool of statecraft is
especially important because it differentiates the practice of gathering and
assessing information to help in decision making at various levels from
information as a tool used to “change or maintain the drivers of behavior” in
target audiences.16
To realize its national security strategy, the US government has developed
several documents to identify its threats, opportunities, and national strategic
goals. The National Security Strategy (NSS) drafted by the executive branch of
government is the principal vision for articulating the nation’s strategic threats
and opportunities. The 2017 NSS identified several threats to US interests, ranging
from “transnational criminal organizations” to the need to secure US borders
and territory to the importance of promoting “free, fair, and reciprocal economic
relationships” with other countries.17 Some of the opportunities addressed in
the 2017 NSS included promoting the prosperity of the United States through
“lead[ing] in research, technology, and innovation,” and renewing its competitive
advantage by improving capabilities across multiple domains, such as cyber and
space, as well as its nuclear posture.18 The NSS draws on all instruments of national
power to address these threats and opportunities over time.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy written by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense takes guidance from the NSS and applies it to the military instrument of
power. The National Defense Strategy names the following military goals: “build a
more lethal force, strengthen alliances and attract new partners, and change the
way we do business,” as the US military’s means of implementing the NSS.19 The
2018 National Military Strategy drafted by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff helps “inform the prioritization of force employment, force development,
and force design for the Joint Force.”20 The National Military Strategy identifies
14. Steven Heffington, Adam Oler, and David Tretler, eds., A National Security Strategy Primer (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 2019), 22.
15. Cesar Augusto Rodriguez, Timothy Charles Walton, and Hyong Chu, “Putting the ‘FIL’ into ‘DIME’:
Growing Joint Understanding of the Instruments of Power,” Joint Forces Quarterly 97, no. 2 (2020): 121–28.
16. For intelligence and statecraft, see John A. Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon, Strategic Warning
Intelligence: History, Challenges, and Prospects (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019). For
information, see JCS, Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment (JCOIE) (Washington, DC:
JCS, 2018), 111, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts_jcoie.pdf ?ver
=2018-08-01-142119-830, accessed January 29, 2021.
17. Donald J. Trump, 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White House
Office, December 2017), 11–12, 19–20. See also Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Strategy Guidance,
accessed August 14, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
18. Trump, National Security Strategy, v–vi.
19. Katie Lange, “What Is the National Defense Strategy?” US Department of Defense, October 8, 2018,
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Features/story/Article/1656414/what-is-the-national-defense-strategy/.
20. JCS, “Description of the 2018 National Military Strategy Released,” Office of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Public Affairs, accessed May 21, 2020, https://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News-Display
/Article/1903669/description-of-the-2018-national-military-strategy-released/.
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several threats to the US military, ranging from the “reemergence of great power
competition” to newly emerging technologies, which are “changing the character
of war” and “empower[ing] nonstate actors.21 Additionally, the National Military
Strategy addresses opportunities, including working with “allies and partners”
to strengthen national security and evolving areas within force employment,
development, and design.22 These strategic level documents identify a range
of threats and opportunities that all require the assessment of risk, not just for
military actions but for all the instruments of national power.
These documents are necessary but insufficient for identifying risk at
the national strategic level. Critically, risk can occur independent of threat
assessments of an adversary’s capabilities and intentions and can actually
be the unintended result of actions taken within a government to secure
itself. One critical way risk can inadvertently occur within the US military’s
actions is through compounding risk. Compounding risk can occur when
actions conducted by one department or agency in the government, such
as the military, could incur an acceptable level of risk for that particular
organization, but could also affect other agencies and cause unintended risk
to broader national security interests. This form of risk is similar to challenges
identified in complexity theory, where complex, nonlinear, loosely organized
yet interconnected elements within a system affect one another, or to the
butterfly effect, where small changes in a nonlinear system can have bigger
consequences across the organization and over time.23
One example of the US military’s creation of compounding risk comes from
an incident in Afghanistan. In 2012, the US military discovered detainees
were using religious materials, including Qur’ans, to pass information to one
another. Military police confiscated the materials and chose to burn them,
unaware of how Muslims would perceive these actions. Reports of the burned
materials led to violent riots in Afghanistan and resulted in at least 41 deaths
and strained relations with US allies.24 This poorly thought-out act incurred
minimal risk to US troops, but had compounding effects, beyond just the
military, on departments and agencies that use diplomacy and information to
achieve national strategic goals.

21. JCS, “National Military Strategy Released,” 2-6.
22. JCS, “National Military Strategy Released,” 2-6.
23. See Eve Mitleton-Kelly, Complex Systems and Evolutionary Perspectives on Organisations: The Application of
Complexity Theory to Organisations (Oxford, UK: Elsevier Science Ltd., 2003): 1–31; and Edward N. Lorenz, “The
Predictability of Hydrodynamic Flow,” Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences 25, no. 4 (February 1963):
409–32.
24. Craig Whitlock, “U.S. Troops Tried to Burn 500 Korans in Blunder, Investigative Report Says,” Washington
Post, August 27, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/military-disciplines-9-servicemembers-in-connection-with-afghan-incidents/2012/08/27/a25b6eaa-f065-11e1-8b5e-add8e2fb7c95_story.html/.
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Another challenge to assessing risk at the national strategic level requires
accounting for cascading risk, or the accumulation of risk over time. Unlike
tactical or operational plans in the military, national security strategy has a
much longer time horizon which, in theory, is never-ending, presenting
considerable challenges for military planning, which usually assumes an end
point.25 This lengthened time horizon complicates weighing opportunities
and risks associated with actions in the here-and-now and considering their
possible effects in the future. Actions that seem to have reasonable risk in the
near term may have lasting and cascading consequences for national security
over time.
An example of cascading risk is visible in the Global War on Terror,
declared by the president of the United States following the 9/11 attacks.
This strategy, which drew heavily on the US military, produced the following
cascading effects: it led to a major military engagement in Afghanistan, the
United States’ longest war; it contributed to the reasons given for invading
Iraq in 2003; it increased US military activities in Africa and Asia; and it
even prompted changes in US privacy laws. The Global War on Terror also
strained relationships with European countries and other allies and has had a
lasting negative impact on the image of the United States in the Muslim
world.26 This accumulation of actions related to the Global War on Terror has
incurred risk to national security through strained relationships with allies,
the prolonged deployment and expenditure of US military power around the
globe, and counterproductive perceptions of US intentions in the Muslim
world. It is unlikely these cascading consequences over time were considered
in 2001 when the Global War on Terror was declared.
Assessing risk at the national strategic level also requires planning for
events that are rare or without precedent. Several scholars study this form of
risk, “strategic surprise,” which includes events such as large-scale terrorist
attacks, covert nuclear proliferation, and sneak attacks from adversarial states.27
The difficulty in planning for and responding to risk from strategic surprise
in national security stems from the challenges associated with identifying
early warnings in intelligence gathering, the trust that policymakers have in
that intelligence and their overall belief in that threat, the ability of leaders
25. Jeremiah R. Monk, End State: The Fallacy of Modern Military Planning (Montgomery, AL: Air War College/
Air University, 2017).
26. For negative perceptions of US intentions in the Muslim world, see Andrew Kohut, “Arab and Muslim
Perceptions of the United States,” Pew Research Center, November 10, 2005, https://www.pewresearch
.org/2005/11/10/arab-and-muslim-perceptions-of-the-united-states/.
27. See Betts and Mahnken, Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence; and Bracken, et al, Managing Strategic Surprise;
and Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence. See also Erik Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack:
Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown Press, 2013). Nathan
Freier calls this “strategic shock.” See Nathan Freier, Toward a Risk Management Defense Strategy (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2009).
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to consume that information, and decision making under duress.28 Bracken,
Brenner, and Gordon also note the challenges posed by subject matter experts
who become too narrowly focused in their expertise, which inhibits their
consideration of new frameworks for analysis and poses another potential
hindrance to identifying strategic surprise.29 Finally, most individuals are
biased by their perceived understanding of the current environment and
historically similar events, which can skew decision making and risk analysis.30
Risk from strategic surprise and the need to respond in a crisis can in turn
exacerbate compounding and cascading risk. The Global War on Terror, as
described above, delineates the challenges posed by assessing risk in actions
undertaken during strategic surprise.
While the US government has articulated various threats and opportunities
to its national security in key documents, these documents are insufficient
for addressing how US military operations may incur risk to national
security strategy, specifically, the challenges posed by compounding risk and
its effects on other instruments of power and government activities, cascading
risk over time, and how strategic surprise can exacerbate these forms of risk.
The next section offers two visualization tools designed to help the US military
account for these challenges and assess risk at the national strategic level.

Visualizing Risk at the National Strategic Level
Assessing risk at the national strategic level requires the US military to
identify and assess how their actions may affect the government’s use of
other instruments of statecraft to achieve national strategic goals over time.
Visualization tools are particularly useful in this endeavor because they can
capture otherwise disparate information, show how various actions might
incur compounding and cascading risk, and identify potential risk in times of
strategic surprise.
Visualization expert Edward Tufte describes the utility of visualization
tools by summarizing “What is to be sought in designs for the display of
information is the clear portrayal of complexity.”31 Visualization tools can
present qualitative and quantitative data as well as spatial and conceptual
information. For example, French civil engineer Charles Joseph Minard’s
now-famous nineteenth-century depiction of Napoleon’s disastrous 1812
march to Moscow captures six different types of quantitative and spatial data
through a combination of size, placement, and color: “the size of the army, its
28.
29.
30.
31.

Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence; and Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack.
Bracken, Brenner, and Gordon, Managing Strategic Surprise, 2.
David Epstein, Range: Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World (New York: Penguin Random House, 2019).
Edward Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information (Cheshire, CT: Graphics Press, 2001), 191.
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location on a two-dimensional surface, direction of the army’s movement, and
temperature on various dates during the retreat from Moscow.”32 The result
is a clear visualization of Napoleon’s loss of troops relative to time, terrain,
and temperature. In the age of big data, visualization tools have become
particularly useful for gathering and presenting large amounts of statistical
information in a way that is understandable.33 Yet, as depicted by Minard and
others, nonquantifiable information can also be displayed with visualization
tools in a way that clarifies complexity.
Two visualization models help depict compounding and cascading risk to
military planners and may be particularly useful for identifying risk during times
of strategic surprise—the National Strategic Risk Abacus and the National
Strategic Risk Radar Chart. The National Strategic Risk Abacus helps military
planners think specifically about compounding risk, including compounding risk
incurred through strategic surprise. It depicts two sets of variables: a spectrum of
acceptable to unacceptable risk on the bottom horizontal line, and the instruments
of national power—diplomatic, information, military, economic, and external/
other which, for example, could include variables like allies—as the abacus beads.
See figure 1.

Diplomatic
Information
Military
Economic
External/Other
LOW

HIGH

Figure 1. National Strategic Risk Abacus – Example Assessment of Collective National Risk

The beads can slide from left to right, depending on the amount of risk assumed
within each instrument, to show how military actions can have a compounding effect
on the use of the other instruments within the departments and agencies of the
US government. Here it is assumed that no one agency or department controls any
given instrument of national power. The abacus is particularly useful for addressing
compounding risk incurred during incidents of strategic surprise; it allows for a simple
32. Tufte, Visual Display, 40.
33. Scott Berinato, “Visualizations That Really Work,” Harvard Business Review, June 2016, 92–100.
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and quick assessment of how military actions might inadvertently incur risk to the other
instruments of national power and US efforts to wield these instruments for national
security goals.
In the strategic surprise caused by the Global War on Terror, the US military could
have used the National Strategic Risk Abacus to consider the possible compounding
effects of specific actions on the other instruments of national power. The abacus could
have helped planners visualize how military actions might affect Muslim attitudes
toward the United States, which could incur risk to the information tool, or how military
actions might strain relationships with Muslim-majority allied countries, which could
affect the government’s use of both the diplomatic and the military instruments of
national power.
The second model, the National Strategic Risk Radar Chart, uses a radar chart
(sometimes called a spider chart) to depict compounding and cascading risk. A
radar chart “is a 2D chart presenting multivariate data by giving each variable an axis
and plotting the data as a polygonal shape over all axes.”34 More simply, a radar chart
plots different variables onto a graph. Each variable has its own ray originating from
the center, like a spoke on a wheel. Connecting each plot point creates a polygonal
shape on the chart. This chart is particularly useful for plotting multiple variables and
disparate information on a single graph for visual analysis, including both compounding
and cascading risk.
Several government agencies currently use radar charts to assess national threats,
incorporating numerous variables to visualize their holistic effect. The Department of
Homeland Security uses a radar chart to assess the effects of a potential “cyberattack
on critical infrastructure,” as well as to visualize the wide-ranging effects of an influenza
pandemic on the United States. These charts contain 5 levels of homeland security
hazards, ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high) in concentric rings across 16 identified attributes
(the spokes), including health-related issues such as injuries or deaths, economic impact,
and environmental effects. Risk is plotted on a scale from 0 (at the center) to 1 (at the
edge), with 0 representing the lowest value in this set of hazards, and 1 representing the
highest value.
Finally, the attributes are grouped in quadrants: the upper right quadrant addresses
health effects, the lower right quadrant focuses on economic damage, and the upper
and lower left quadrants consider environmental or atmospheric consequences.35
These three sets of factors—contributing variables, level of risk, and effect on health
34. Stephanie Glen, “Radar Chart: Simple Definition, Examples,” Statistics How To, February 7, 2018, https://www
.statisticshowto.datasciencecentral.com/radar-chart-simple-definition-examples/.
35. Russell Lundberg and Henry Willis, “Assessing Homeland Security Risks: A Comparative Assessment of 10
Hazards,” Homeland Security Affairs 11, article 10 (December 2015), accessed May 21, 2020, https://www.hsaj.org
/articles/7707.
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and economics—allow for a quick visual comparative representation of several types of
risks and their holistic effects.
Time
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Figure 2. National Strategic Risk Radar Chart

Radar charts are especially useful for assessing risk at the national strategic
level because they can accommodate many critical variables for quick visualization
of compounding and cascading risk. Figure 2 includes five levels of risk (from
low to high), along with 10 variables on the spokes, including time, allies, and
economic impact. The instruments of national power are depicted as polygonal
shapes, each with its own color, to visualize the risk to each instrument. Most
important, this radar chart includes time as a variable, allowing for cascading
risk to be considered. A radar chart like this one would have allowed military
lanners to see a wide range of possible risks incurred from actions in the Global
War on Terror, including the effects of actions on international support, resources,
allies, and partners and risks to their own missions and forces.

Conclusion
The US military’s role in assessing national strategic risk and its ability
to understand and mitigate this form of risk is a critically important task. This
article provided insights into what national strategic risk is and why current risk
assessment tools in the US military are insufficient for addressing risk at this
level. Specifically, it argued that assessing risk at the national strategic level is
more difficult for the US military than assessing risk at the tactical or operational
levels because this level of analysis involves considering the effects of military
actions on other instruments of national power across the US government and
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risk over time. US military actions could inadvertently cause compounding
risk, or risk to other instruments of power; it could incur unforeseen risk over
time, or cascading risk; and it could produce risk through decisions made under
duress from strategic surprise to national security. The two proposed visualization
tools for considering risk at the national strategic level—the National Strategic Risk
Abacus and the National Strategic Risk Radar Chart—could help military leaders
rapidly assess the risks associated with proposed courses of action and make more
informed decisions on a way forward.
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Reversing the Readiness Assumption:
A Proposal for Fiscal and Military Effectiveness
Jason W. Warren and John A. Bonin
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ABSTRACT: Looming budget cuts will necessitate adept management to retain
a military capable of competing and winning by avoiding the mistakes made in
prior drawdowns. This article presents a framework for government and defense
leaders to prepare for the coming drawdown and plan for the necessary capacity of
tomorrow across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic framework.

A

s Peter Mansoor posits “Anyone can design a military force in times of
plenty; it is in times of scarcity that strategic leaders with foresight are most needed.”1
The US economy is hurtling toward such an era with the Department of Defense (DoD)
fiscal year 2022 budget of $715 billion failing to keep pace with inflation, and for the
first time since 9/11, defense spending is facing significant realignment.2 While the
Service Chiefs have quietly begun planning for drawdown, there is a lack of overall
historical awareness for such decision making, as well as a clinging to a readiness paradigm
better replaced by an effectiveness framework.3 This coming austerity will necessitate
adept management to retain a military force with enough personnel and capabilities
to compete and win.
The result of a US Army War College project, Drawdown: The American Way of
Postwar, demonstrates the United States’ past failures to manage force reductions,
leading to inefficient expenditures and losses in “First Battles.”4 Heeding the insights
from Drawdown—technological development, strategic and doctrinal updating, and
more education for leadership—the military can counter a loss of force structure during
drawdowns and allow leaders to plan for necessary capacity across the diplomatic,
information, military, and economic (DIME) framework.5
The authors wish to thank Lawrence Tritle, emeritus professor of history, Loyola Marymount University Los Angeles,
and J. Casey Doss, lieutenant colonel, US Army retired, for their thoughtful reviews of this article.
1. Peter Mansoor, “Foreword,” in Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar, ed. Jason W. Warren (New York: New
York University Press, 2016), xii.
2. Joseph R. Biden Jr., President’s Fiscal Year 2022 Defense Budget (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
May 28, 2021); David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “The Headwinds Looming for the US Army,” War on the
Rocks, October 27, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/the-headwinds-looming-for-the-u-s-army/; and
F. G. Hoffman, “National Security in the Post-Pandemic Era,” Orbis 65 no. 1 (2021): 17–45.
3. Charles Q. Brown Jr. and David H. Berger, “Redefine Readiness or Lose,” War on the Rocks, March 15, 2021,
https://warontherocks.com/2021/03/redefine-readiness-or-lose/?f bclid=IwAR0YiGXMBSXHBDyh2T2HeT8DN
sE_YHksxnUlXn_6Ce_0FZhCv2bjDAmnt6I.
4. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., America’s First Battles, 1776–1965 (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1986), x–xi. The First Battles’ thesis was a positive critique of the tactical revolution of the 1980s, but it fueled
the readiness paradigm.
5. Michael E. Lynch, “Introduction: The American Way of Postwar: The Liberty Dilemma,” in Drawdown: The
American Way of Postwar, ed. Jason W. Warren (New York: New York University), 19. For DIME, see Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication (JP) 1, Incorporating Change 1
(Washington, DC: JCS, 2017), I-12–I-14, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf.
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Although the military controls only the military lever of national power, it
operates across the DIME framework as a part of the interagency, and government
leaders should take the following measures to ameliorate the coming drawdown:
(1) a ground forces reversion to a mixed standing force and cadre construct that
retains experience, while reducing some personnel costs; (2) increasing investments
in operations in the information environment (OIE); (3) a permanent integration
of allies into the standing military establishment; (4) meeting threats with a
periphery strategy; (5) and reprovisioning the US Air Force (USAF) and US Navy
(USN) for the reality of precision fires.6

Moving from Readiness to Effectiveness
For the first time in American history, National Security Council Report 68
(NSC 68) created a large standing military establishment at the onset of the
Cold War.7 Since this era, national security experts have preferred the readiness
of standing forces for possible near-term battles over an effective strategic force.
There has been little analysis about readiness as an appropriate organizing
principle for this construct, which is fiscally problematic because readiness requires
a significant investment in a large standing military establishment focused on
training for current missions.8 Toward the end of the Cold War, historian Paul
Kennedy warned policymakers to balance such perceived contemporary military
needs with the economic health of the nation state (the “E” in DIME).9
Measuring the effectiveness of military forces is a more realistic framework
and a cheaper organizing principle than readiness, with forces like cyber already
engaged with adversaries. Effectiveness entails how well military forces are
accomplishing missions across the levels of war and satisfying the requirements
of national policy objectives.10 The readiness of standing forces usually does not
equate to effectiveness in achieving national policy objectives. America’s pre-1950
era witnessed better strategic military results than the postmodern era even though
6. See Lieutenant General (US Army, retired) Michael K. Nagata, “Focus on the Enablers for Long
Range Precision Fires,” Breaking Defense, July 28, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/07/focus-on
-the-enablers-for-long-range-precision-fires/; and Andrew Feickert, U.S. Army Long-Range Precision
Fires: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R46721
(Washington, DC: CRS, March 16, 2021).
7. Executive Secretary, A Report to the National Security Council, NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs
for National Security (Washington, DC: US National Archives, April 14, 1950), https://digitalarchive.wilson
center.org/document/116191; and John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American
National Security Policy during the Cold War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005), 164–65.
8. “New Army Chief of Staff Wants to Put People First,” National Guard Association of the United States,
August 13, 2019, https://www.ngaus.org/about-ngaus/newsroom/new-army-chief-staff-wants-put-people-first.
There is even a “readiness” subcommittee in Congress for the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA):
“Readiness Subcommittee Mark Summary for H. R. 6395 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021,” press release, House Armed Services Committee, June 22, 2020, https://armedservices.house.gov/2020/6
/readiness-subcommittee-mark-summary-for-h-r-6395-national-defense-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year-2021.
9. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), xxiii.
10. JCS, Joint Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Incorporating Change 1 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2018).
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the standing military forces were not ready at the outset of wars, experiencing
tactical losses in First Battles.11
The post-1950 expensive standing military establishment has fostered a tactical
mindset, distracting military leadership from strategic thinking. This has led to
less national policy success at astronomically higher costs.12 US/NATO readiness
did achieve deterrence against the Soviet Bloc, but even during the Korean and
Vietnam Wars the Soviets remained deterred when US readiness in Europe
ebbed. As the Cold War intensified during the Reagan administration, scholars
explored military effectiveness, particularly the mismatch between policy objectives
and military ways and means.13 This scholarship complements Drawdown’s
conclusions on the necessity of technology and allies to offset the loss of f
orce structure means during drawdowns. Winning and losing wars is a complex
issue beyond the defense establishment purview alone, but the lack of strategic
results is a negative return on investment for an expensive force structure.14
Achieving strategic results is imperative in an era of renewed great power
competition which the Department of Defense has described as the “competition
continuum,” where powers remain in various states of cooperation, competition,
and conflict.15 Readying for a conflict in progress is a contradictory proposition.
The forces in competition rapidly adapt to current circumstances which may
require training for new equipment, organizations, and procedures that the
readiness structure did not anticipate. As the Joint Staff already utilizes metrics for
effectiveness in assessments of campaigning and operations, the Department of
Defense could readily refocus on effectiveness at the operational level of war that
links to both strategy and policy.16
Additionally, an effectiveness model corresponds with the competition
continuum, measuring a unit’s progress toward objectives with the reality of
continual campaigning. It acknowledges conflict occurring in multiple military
domains and reorienting military leadership to current missions. Readiness
is largely irrelevant when adversaries have already seized the initiative in the
11. Since 1950, the United States fought to a tie in Korea, lost Vietnam and Afghanistan, and achieved middling
results in Bosnia and Iraq.
12. After extremely high expenditures from 1943 to 1945, the budget recovered to pre-war levels until
doubling after NSC 68 to over $400 billion. It continued to climb steadily (except the Eisenhower administration)
by about $1 billion a decade until hitting the mid-$700 billion of this era (all are numbers in 2013-adjusted
dollars). William R. Johnston, “US Expenditures for Defense and Education, 1940–2014,” Johnston’s Archive,
last modified May 5, 2018, http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/edgraph.html.
13. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness: Volume 1, The First World War, new ed.
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10–11, 15–18.
14. Jason W. Warren, “The Centurion Mindset and the Army’s Strategic Leader Paradigm,” Parameters 45,
no. 3 (Autumn 2015): 28.
15. JCS, Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (Washington, DC: JCS, 2018), 8.
16. JCS, Joint Planning, JP 5-0 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2020), K-6, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36
/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0.pdf?ver=us_fQ _pGS_u65ateysmAng%3d%3d; JP 3-0 (2018), xi.
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information environment.17 Even within an effectiveness structure, readiness
processes must exist while tactical forces are reconstituted. Effectiveness would
take the lead in this model, while readiness would orient toward the type of
training units need based on the current effectiveness of friendly forces.

Understanding Mixed Force Structure
The route to high command once ran through the military’s educational
institutions. Douglas MacArthur was superintendent of West Point and Malin
Craig was commandant of the US Army War College before becoming Army Chief
of Staff. A critical difference between the contemporary and pre-1940 environment
was that few meaningful command opportunities existed in the interwar years.18
National Security Council Report 68 increased opportunities for tactical command,
and the expansion of the civilian workforce within the newly created Department of
Defense steadily pushed strategic thought away from the officer corps. A tacticalonly mindset emerged with the increased number of troops now available and
tactical level command became the nearly exclusive path to attain general officer.19
The previous officer paradigm rested on the development of strategic leaders.
The pre-1940 American officer corps appreciated this and spent much time
on professional military education, discussions of strategy, and broadening
assignments focused on managing the post-1898 US imperial holdings. These
officers produced strategic plans at the war colleges that resulted in victory in 1945.20
With approaching austerity, it is sensible to return to the earlier paradigm.
A realistic decrease in standing forces also recognizes relevant social conditions.
Since colonial times, Americans have been suspicious of the standing military,
described in Drawdown as the “Liberty Dilemma” or paradox where the standing
forces required to maintain American liberty represented a threat to that liberty.21
This view has not disappeared. For example, recent calls to avoid naming recently
retired General Lloyd J. Austin III as secretary of defense demonstrate the
lingering fears of military threats to civilian authority.22 A return to a smaller
establishment of a mixed standing and cadre force could ameliorate these latent
American attitudes.
17. Craig Timberg and Ellen Nakashima, “The US Government Spent Billions on a System for
Detecting Hacks. The Russians Outsmarted It,” Washington Post, December 15, 2020, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/national-security/ruusian-hackers-outsmarted-us-defenses/2020/12/15/3deed840-3f1111eb-9453-fc36ba051781_story.html.
18. Michael R. Matheny, “When the Smoke Clears: The Interwar Years as an Unlikely Success Story,” in
Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar, ed. Jason W. Warren (New York: New York University, 2016).
19. Warren, “Centurion Mindset,” 30, 32.
20. Michael R. Matheny, Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945 (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 2011).
21. Lynch, “Introduction,” 53–54.
22. Eliot A. Cohen, “This is No Job for a General,” Atlantic, December 8, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com
/ideas/archive/2020/12/no-job-general/617326/.
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A smaller standing military would also force the federal government to
observe the realities of current recruiting conditions. Due to ambivalent attitudes
toward national service, large numbers of eligible recruits in college, an increasing
felony rate, and the obesity epidemic, recruiting shortfalls have been legion.23
With troubled recruits often filling the shortfall, an intertwined military sexual
assault crisis emerged, leading recently to the unprecedented relief of 14 of Fort
Hood’s commanders, and the crisis has shown no signs of abating even with
additional leadership attention and budget outlays.24 The result of a responsible
drawdown would likely mean the retention of higher-quality recruits and reduced
military crime.25
All force reduction measures must be executed with caution and an eye toward
remobilization. A reduced force structure would only hold before reinforcements
arrived; hence a threat analysis is critical in harnessing resources at the decisive
point. As with any strategy, the possibility of failure does exist, particularly if
partners in the Pacific and Europe do not materialize or instead, join American
adversaries. What standing force posture is necessary to gain superiority in the
Indo-Pacific region through effectiveness of existing structure, offsetting some
active-duty personnel shortfalls with technology and other capabilities while
maintaining some presence in Europe? This question should ultimately drive the
current drawdown and the consideration of a better strategic and technological
capacity and more robust alliances, but with less standing forces.

Knowing Partners on the Periphery
The Chinese case calls for the United States to employ a peripheral strategy with
a new coalition of neighbors bordering China. The United States cannot shoulder
the manpower burden required to stare down a Chinese army of over two million
personnel and a half-million more reserves, while the China also maintains a strategic
population advantage.26 Offsetting this manpower disadvantage requires the United
States to both bolster alliances in the Pacific and fill staff shortages with allied officers.
Since World War I, the United States has fought with combined Joint headquarters.
23. Beth Bailey, America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2009), 128, for initial recruiting problems of the AVF. Also see Dennis Laich, “Manning the Military,
America’s
Problem,”
Military
Times,
July
22,
2019,
https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion
/commentary/2019/07/23/manning-the-military-americas-problem/. While the military mostly satisfies its
recruiting goals, it often lowers standards by issuing “waivers.”
24. Kyle Rempfer, “Fourteen Leaders Relieved,” Army Times, December 8, 2020, https://www.armytimes
.com/news/your-army/2020/12/08/fourteen-leaders-relieved-or-suspended-after-scathing-report-on-fort-hoodcrimes/.
25. This would not solve the problem of reconstituting during conflict.
26. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2020), https://media
.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-F
INAL.PDF, 38. For reserves, see Global Security, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china
/pla-reserve.htm.
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With the US military waiting until a crisis to fill all staff billets, lag time is created
between integrating allied officers and a proper functioning command and control
enterprise. Given the United Kingdom’s and the Commonwealth’s reduction of
forces, while American headquarters are too few and undermanned, there is an
opportunity for allied officers without meaningful billets to staff these critical US
shortages.27 The French should also join this arrangement.28
A peripheral strategy of continuous concentric pressure to contain China in
its near-abroad calls for strategic raids in the information environment, especially
against the Chinese command and control and party leadership structure. A US
coalition would simultaneously support anti-government rebels, cut off Chinese
garrisons in ocean areas, fix Chinese forces on the Korean Peninsula, and employ
a “grid” support structure on China’s southern flank.29 Some of this strategy
already exists in unclassified portions of US Pacific planning, the difference here
is counting on less-available force structure at the outset of conflict and more on
allies, while also reorienting most of the Marine Corps to this region.
The Pacific is the main focus of the Marine Corps, and with the service’s
proposed drawdown in forces, the US Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR) should
be expanded.30 The means for this strategy against China require stationing the
majority of the Marines in the I Marine Expeditionary Forces and the III Marine
Expeditionary Forces in the Pacific, with the II Marine Expeditionary Force
reduced to one Marine expeditionary brigade rotating as a Marine expeditionary
unit in the Atlantic as an emergency reserve. A remade, smaller-capital ship
Navy and a reconfigured littoral Pacific fleet would provide the technical
amphibious landing capabilities, temporary resupply, and some fire support, with
Naval reservists manning additional amphibious ships to support the USMCR.
With this strategy, US Army Pacific fully embraces not only the effectiveness
paradigm but also precision fires. It also provides both theater information and
fires commands with multi-domain task forces, and long-range fires battalions,
operating in conjunction with the Navy and Marines. Army Support to Other
Services (ASOS) would include providing longer-range fires and conducting OIE
27. For shortages, see John A. Bonin, “On Headquarters: Use and Abuse of Army Operational Headquarters from
2001–2015,” in Landpower in the Long War: Projecting Force after 9/11, ed. Jason W. Warren (Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 2019).
28. For recent French operations, see Michael Shurkin, “France’s War in the Sahel and the Evolution of
Counter Insurgency Doctrine,” Texas National Security Review 4, no. 1 (Winter 2020/2021), https://tnsr
.org/2020/11/frances-war-in-the-sahel-and-the-evolution-of-counter-insurgency-doctrine/.
29. John A. Bonin and Mark H. Gerner, Continuous Concentric Pressure, Land Warfare Papers 43 (Arlington,
VA: Institute of Land Warfare, 2003). See also John Schaus et al., “Four Paths to the Grid,” Indo-Pacific Theater
Design Working Paper 3 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2021), https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/wp
-content/uploads/2021/05/Four-Paths-to-the-Grid.pdf.
30. Philip Athey, “Corps Looks to Cut More Than 2,000 Active-Duty Marines in 2021 Budget,” Marine Corps
Times, February 10, 2020, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2020/02/10/corps
-looks-to-cut-more-than-2000-active-duty-marines-in-2021/.
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from bases in new Army area commands in the Western Pacific.31 As a war with
China would precipitate one with North Korea, the Eighth Army must remain at
current capacity, with the 2nd Infantry Division containing a rotational armored
brigade combat team (ABCT), a long-range missile brigade, and a theater air
defense artillery brigade forward in the Peninsula, as the core of a combined
Joint Force. Additional brigades, or even a multidivision corps, would remain
available for reinforcement from the continental United States. With the US-led
coalition fixing Chinese forces in anticipation of limited offensive operations, US
armored and mechanized forces would form the schwerpunkt upon which the rest
of the coalition would rally. The Army’s security force assistance brigades (SFABs)
would advise these allies, which are now critical to operations given the smaller
number of US forces.
The same strategic problem with China exists when conceiving an effective
military capacity for a resurgent Russia. Russia still poses a regional military
problem to critical American allies in and out of NATO, but to a lesser extent
than China because of a stagnant economy and static population. Russia, however,
has successfully modernized its once ineffective force and leads the West in the
crucial areas of missile technology, armor, and warfighting doctrine.
More dangerously, the Russians have embraced information warfare.32 Russia
employs an initial disinformation campaign against local populations, seconded
by cyber and electronic warfare attacks, followed by the insertion of special
operating forces; then, only if necessary, does it introduce conventional forces. This
is a far cry from its predictable echelon deployment of conventional forces in the
1980–90s. Russia also conducts strategic raids in the information environment
on the United States, meddling in two presidential elections and backing proxies
who hacked into the US Treasury and Commerce Departments through a
SolarWinds contractor. Even with a reduced force from the Cold War now
numbering around 950,000 soldiers (with an active reserve of one million),
Russia remains a dangerous enough threat to require some US forces designated
for Europe.33
A direct military approach against Russia is also a losing proposition and
calls for achieving exhaustion through continuous concentric pressure on its

31. John A. Bonin, “Area Commands” (unpublished concept, US Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, July
2021).
32. Andrew Radin et al., The Future of the Russian Military: Russia’s Ground Combat Capabilities and Implications
for U.S.-Russia Competition (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019), 47, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports
/RR3099.html.
33. Radin, “Russia’s Ground Combat Capabilities,” 42; and Gil Barndollar, “The Best or Worst of Both
Worlds? Russia’s Mixed Military Manpower System,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
September 23, 2020, https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/best-or-worst-both-worlds.
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periphery.34 As in China’s case, maintaining a large standing force bent on tactical
dominance in Russia’s near-abroad is a poor investment. Just enough US forces
repositioned in Europe are required to prop up NATO and other allies. This
posture would also decrease the need for scarce strategic lift assets that have
atrophied for decades. With this strategy, European allies would still bear the
brunt of an unwise conflict with a declining power.35 A more-capable Soviet
Union did not take advantage of a similar NATO economy-of-force posture
in Europe during the Cold War with the United States decisively engaged in
the Pacific.
An enhanced US Army Europe-Africa headquarters capable of providing
NATO an operational command post for the command and control of
multicorps combat would also take the lead in Europe and include a forward
stationed armored cavalry regiment backed up by a robust continental corps of
up to six divisions. Just as important in any of these potential conflicts is using
enhanced Army theater air defense artillery, long-range missiles, and OIE to
counter the Russian missile and area-and-access denial advantage.
Given the Army and Air Force’s multi-domain operations (MDO) concept
for combating China and Russia, these friendly heavy forces require their own
missile strike capabilities to fight a modern battle.36 The recent combat between
heavy forces in the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict evidenced the lack of
protection and survivability of these formations from precision fires enhanced by
drone/robotics technology.37 MDO doctrine is an attempt to offset current Russian
advantages and future Chinese capabilities. The Russian scenario has focused on
a so-called wet gap crossing into the Kaliningrad Corridor which would turn
Russian positions in old East Prussia. Refighting the Battle of Tannenberg on
the east European plain or Inchon in a Chinese Pacific Rim scenario will not
come cheaply and could end in nuclear conflagration, thus diplomatic efforts
(the “D” in DIME) must be exhausted before resorting to great power conflict.
The West would require the remaining standing forces of the post-drawdown to
bolster allied-centric coalitions until the United States could mobilize to fight a
global war.
34. A strategy of exhaustion undermines the adversary’s will to f ight. See Robert Doughty et al., Warfare
in the Western World: Military Operations from 1600 to 1871, vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Miff lin Company,
1996), 456.
35. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003),
1–28.
36. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028,
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: US Army TRADOC, 2018), vi–xii. This concept proposes
detailed solutions to the specific problems posed by the militaries of post-industrial, information-based states like
China and Russia. For USAF support, see USAF, USAF Role in Joint All-Domain Operations, Air Force Doctrine
Note (AFDN) 1-20 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL: USAF, 2020), https://www.doctrine.af.mil
/Portals/61/documents/Notes/Joint%20All-Domain%20Operations%20Doctrine--CSAF%20signed.pdf.
37. Jack Watling, “The Key to Armenia’s Tank Losses: The Sensors, Not the Shooters,” RUSI,
October 6, 2020, https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-defence-systems/key-armenia-tank-losses-sensors-not
-shooters?f bclid=IwAR28GkxEap70_wph64a5s3J23hgRvvFqW7SXqsHqCANOlT8lYZJWwrZxSzc.

TOC

Crisis Management and Risk

Warren and Bonin 59

Reducing and Reassigning Active Forces
The financial savings for a smaller standing establishment would be
significant. Downsizing the Army’s active divisions to 7 from 10 and active
brigade combat teams (BCT) from 31 to 29 would reduce over 12,000 tacticallevel personnel and still allow for 7 divisions at the outset of a conflict.38 Besides
the savings garnered by reducing recruiting, training (including transportation/
fuel), equipping, medical support, housing and other family and personnel costs, it
would also shrink BCT rotations through the training centers—one of the Army’s
biggest budget ticket items—from 20 to 14. The Army conducted 21 rotations
in 2019 for a cost of approximately $30 million each. By reducing the standing
force by one Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) and rotating only the six
priority Infantry BCTs (IBCTs) through training the Army would save $120
million.39 This dividend can be minimally reinvested in professional education
and assignment broadening for additional officers in fully staffed higher-echelon
headquarters capable of operating across the conflict continuum.
The DoD must remake mobilization, building back bureaucratic mechanisms
and structure to overturn the readiness posture that made mobilization seem
unnecessary. Planning for military expansion was a priority in the small
standing Army from its inception through World War II.40 SFABs may be
modified or even expanded to serve as mobilization platforms for the reduction
considered here, which with the proper planning and infrastructure can rapidly
reconstitute. During World War II, entire new infantry divisions were produced
in one year, while it took over a year for brigades to be created during the Iraq
“surge” after decades of neglect for mobilization processes.41 The “Total Force”
concept of relying on the reserve component can also offset tactical risk while
retaining an active cadre force structure and a practiced mobilization plan. The
Army would preassign Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) personnel to active units
with reserve-component training units expanding the training base during a
mobilization crisis, while the active-component cadres man new brigades.
The other services would face a similar budgetary reckoning. The Navy faces
not only cost overruns in its shipbuilding programs to replace an aging fleet but

38. John A. Bonin, Army Organization and Employment Data (working paper, last modified June 2021),
Microsoft Word file.
39. Matthew Cox, “Army Focus on Combat Training Center Rotations ‘Unsustainable,’ General Says,”
Military.com, October 13, 2020, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/10/13/army-focus-combat
-training-center-rotations-unsustainable-general-says.html.
40. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army,
1775–1945, Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-212 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 1955).
41. John Bonin and Justin Magula, “U.S. Army Europe and Africa Headquarters: Reforming for Future
Success,” War on the Rocks, February 16, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/u-s-army-europe-and
-africa-headquarters-reforming-for-future-success/.
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an overall lack of readiness with its surface force.42 Even with the advent of
precision fires ensuring pinpoint missile accuracy against large formations
such as carrier groups, the Navy retains 10 large-deck carrier groups. 43
Reassigning at least four of these legacy ships and their auxiliary armada
into the naval reserve—would generate a sizeable cost savings. The Navy
should convert its America-class amphibious helicopter assault ships to light
carriers capable of carrying 20 short-takeoff-and-land F-35Bs. The Navy
could reinvest some of the savings into a more employable short-deck carrier
capable of supporting more F-35Bs and a dispersed fleet of precisionmissile-carrying Zumwalt-class destroyers and littoral combat ships. Some of
these platforms would autonomously operate and posture to survive Chinese
missile salvos in the southern Pacific.44 Increased use of America-class light
carriers would also require transferring some, if not all, of the Marine Corps
F-35Bs squadrons to the Navy with a corresponding reduction in Navy
procurement of F-35Cs that are intended only for use on the now-reduced
number of large-deck carriers.
Further, the DoD must undertake a complementary reduction of 50,000
in the proposed force structure of 170,000 Marines now only earmarked
for amphibious operations. The Marine Corps Force Design 2030 envisions
eliminating capabilities for sustained land combat and reducing infantry
battalions from 24 to 21 and expeditionary units from seven to five.45 The
Marines will add up to four littoral regiments. Since each of the regiments
consists of only one infantry battalion and 1,800 to 2,000 total personnel, it
is difficult to justify this proposed size for so little capability.46 The Marine
Corps is around 35 percent of the Army’s size, but executes only a fraction of
its missions. After 30 days ashore, the Army provides substantial support to
the Marines except close air support.47 To compensate for active reductions,
the USMCR should expand to 45,000 personnel as the Marine’s authorized
third division/wing team of at least three infantry regiments.
42. David Sharp, “Navy Says It’s Charting a New Course after Rash of Problems,” AP, May 24, 2021, https//
apnews.com/article/europe-persian-gulf-tensions-navy-technology-health-5381d3dd9acf7af4498f18af6f516e6a;
and Kate Bachelder Odell, “If War Comes, Will the U.S. Navy Be Prepared? Wall Street Journal,
July 12, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/if-war-comes-will-the-u-s-navy-be-prepared-11626041901.
43. Bradley Bowman, Andrew Gabel, and Mikhael Smits, “Iran Attack Highlights US Missile Defense
Vulnerability,” DefenseNews, January 13, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020
/01/13/iran-attack-highlights-us-missile-defense-vulnerability/. China has more advanced systems than Iran.
44. Andrew Dyer, “Pentagon Adds ‘Ghost Fleet’ of Autonomous Ships to San Diego’s Cutting-Edge Navy
Squadron,” San Diego Union-Tribune, June 12, 2021, https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/military
/story/2021-06-12/ghost-fleet-autonomous-ships.
45. Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC), Force Design 2030 (Washington, DC: HQMC, 2020), 7.
46. David H. Berger, Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps (Washington,
DC: HQMC, 2019); and HQMC, Force Design 2030.
47. HQMC, MAGTF Ground Operations, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-10 with
Change 1 (Washington, DC: HQMC, 2018), A-3–A-7; and HQDA, Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations,
Field Manual 3-94 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2014), 1–20.
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The Air Force also maintains an excessive force structure, as the service
struggles to redefine its warfighting paradigm for the twenty-first century.48
A cut of 30,000 personnel is possible by adopting Army personnel practices,
transitioning the remaining A-10 squadrons to the Air National Guard, and
replacing aging fighters such as the F-16 with more and better drones.49 Adopting
Army force-structure practices could convert USAF squadrons with as few as 35
personnel commanded by a lieutenant colonel to flights commanded by a captain,
and converting USAF groups with as few as 400 personnel and a colonel in
command to squadrons with a lieutenant colonel in command.50 Assigning the
newly created Space Force to the Air Force would save redundant bureaucracy,
while retaining a capable joint force Space Command.
The active Army would provision the enabling brigades needed for full
multi-domain large-scale ground combat operations: aviation, fires, sustainment,
protection, and information. The remaining four partial-cadre divisions,
including the current 7th Infantry Division, could be rendered reduced
authorized levels of organization. Each organization would maintain only two
active BCTs with a reduced-strength cadre headquarters, and correspondingly,
reduce assigned division troops. Area commands, such as Southern European
Task Force and US Army Alaska, would be a new type of flexible operational
command designed for competition and deterrence for prevention with both
assigned and rotational units.51 Selected brigades from IBCTs would maintain
only two active maneuver battalions and a third battalion in the Army National
Guard. Infantry brigade combat teams could be employed for noncombatant
evacuation operations, small-scale counterinsurgency, domestic/global defense
support of civil authorities, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
operations.52 While SBCTs offer more protection, maneuverability, and strike
capability than IBCTs, the Army should eliminate one of them, converting the
Second Cavalry Regiment in Europe to an armored cavalry regiment. In total,
this reduction equates to three BCTs and nine total infantry battalions. This
would allow the Army to decrease by around 35,000 total personnel (including
the 12,000 above), as well as an artificial intelligence/machine learning
(AI/ML)-enabled reduction of over 2,000 intelligence and cyber personnel,
while still compensating for the current and proposed reductions in USMC
ground combat capability. At a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
48. William Waddell, “Not Only Above But Among: American Airpower and Leadership into the Twenty-First
Century,” in Landpower in the Long War: Projecting Force after 9/11, ed. Jason W. Warren (Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 2019), 155–70.
49. Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia MacDonald, “Views from the Ground on the A-10 Debate,” War on the
Rocks, March 16, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/views-from-the-ground-on-the-a-10-debate/.
50. USAF Headquarters (HAF), Manpower and Organization, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 38-101 (Washington,
DC: HAF, 2019), 74–76, 85.
51. Bonin, “Area Commands,” July 2021.
52. Daniel Vazquez, “Is the Infantry Brigade Combat Team Becoming Obsolete?” War on the Rocks, April 17,
2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/is-the-infantry-brigade-combat-team-becoming-obsolete/.
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estimated cost of roughly $107,000 per military personnel, the total
personnel savings for a 165,000 cut in all service personnel is estimated to be
$17,655,000,000.53 This does not include the more substantial additional cost
savings in corresponding elimination of bases and equipment.
Another cost-saving measure that increases effectiveness is embracing
AI/ML technology in place of some military personnel. The DoD has
created the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, however, there has been little
operational integration of these promising technologies, especially in the
realm of the information environment. For example, understanding the DoD
information network—a federated network of networks that encompasses the
entire Department of Defense (including the services and contractors) and its
computer-related equipment—has predictably proven impossible to secure,
operate, and defend.54 Artificial intelligence/machine learning could replace
some operational personnel in US Army Intelligence and Security Command’s
major subordinates, while serving as the first line of security for the cyber
terrain.55 This proof of concept is especially important across the force because
every piece of major equipment uses some element of technology vulnerable to
cyber or radiological attacks, where US forces face disadvantages.56 Instead of
adding to the complexity of soldier tasks and increasing risk to mission, AI/ML
employment can reduce risk by identifying threats and quarantining them more
rapidly than human operators can.
Friendly forces should also employ AI/ML as the first line of defense against
disinformation. Considering informational aspects are a central aspect of DIME
(“I” in DIME). Cyber operations are almost always aimed at protecting or
hampering information. Information also assumes a critical aspect in military
operations—the reason for fighting and sacrificing—and the ability to generate,
or reduce, morale rests on informational integrity and dissemination.

Moving into the Future
The DoD must study and understand the insights gleaned from its
history of drawdowns, implement needed changes, and replace the readiness
assumption for one of effectiveness. As in the past, a military leadership focused
on education, training, technology, and strategic and doctrinal updates can
create military capacity to operate successfully and effectively across a DIME
53. Katherine Blakeley, “Military Personnel,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, August 15,
2017, https://csbaonline.org/reports/military-personnel.
54. JCS, Cyberspace Operations, JP 3-12 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2018), viii.
55. See US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), website, http://www.inscom.army.mil.
56. Marcus Clay, “To Rule the Invisible Battlefield: The Electromagnetic Spectrum and Chinese Military
Power,” War on the Rocks, January 22, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/to-rule-the-invisible
-battlefield-the-electromagnetic-spectrum-and-chinese-military-power/.
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framework within the current fiscal parameters. The US Armed Forces must
also reinstitute a mixed-force structure of standing and cadre units and reduce
the active force to recruitable levels. This move should incorporate allied officers
before the shooting starts, integrate AI/ML to bolster OIE as well as new
technologies in the space domain and precision fires, and promulgate revised
strategy and doctrine that encompasses these changes and parallels the current
Russian doctrinal framework. These alterations should support a periphery
strategy to thwart China and Russia and allow time for national mobilization.
Only with this reckoning will the US national security apparatus once again
regain an affordable yet successful warfighting capacity that will help achieve
national objectives.
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Great (Soft) Power Competition:
US and Chinese Efforts in Global Health Engagement
Michael W. Wissemann
ABSTR ACT: Global health engagement, an underutilized strateg y
rooted in the strengths of soft power persuasion, can lead to more
military-to-military cooperation training, help establish relationships that
can be relied on when crises develop, stabilize fragile states, and deny violent
extremist organizations space for recruiting and operations. Examining
Chinese efforts worldwide to curry favor and influence and the challenges
posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, this article shows health as a medium is a
very compelling and advantageous whole-of-government approach to national
security policy concerns.

T

Introduction

he answers to achieving many of a strategic leader’s objectives may lay in
the use of soft power. “Soft power” was first coined by Joseph S. Nye Jr. in the
1990s. Nye’s definition of soft power distinguished itself from hard power
by using “attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment.”1 The
premise is that forging relationships with nations and key influential individuals
who have a like-minded view of a liberal world order will produce relationships
more inclined to stand the test of time. Conversely, relationships built upon fear
and the effects of coercive power are more likely to result in resentment and
crumble when stressed.
Global health engagement (GHE), sometimes referred to as medical diplomacy
or strategic health diplomacy, is a soft power strategy used by both China and
the United States. It is a natural derivative of soft power, focused on providing
a resource (health care) that many consider a human right. Countries that
use GHE effectively may be left with a marked advantage, especially in today’s
volatile, unpredictable, complex, and adaptive operating environment. While the
use of GHE cannot unilaterally halt some of the actions of revisionist powers or
violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in these environments, the process can
help stem the rising tide and slow revisionist rise.
Extremist powers and VEOs employ gray zone strategies to erode American
influence worldwide. These methods fall below the threshold for traditional armed
1. Joseph S. Nye Jr., “China’s Soft Power Deficit,” Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2012, https://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB10001424052702304451104577389923098678842.
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conflict. Some gray zone strategies include “disruption of order, political subversion
of government or nongovernmental organizations, psychological operations,
abuse of legal processes and financial corruption.”2 Not a new concept, this version
is a reincarnation of Sun Tzu’s famous adage that, “To subdue the enemy without
fighting is the acme of skill.”3 Sun Tzu goes on to say that to “capture his cities
without assaulting them and overthrowing his state without protracted operations”
is key.4 Not surprisingly, China is following the playbook of their greatest military
theorist. While a high-intensity conflict with a near peer remains a distant,
but catastrophic, possibility, subduing the enemy without the need for conflict could
prove far more effective, both financially and militarily. As the world witnesses
the erosion of social norms, grows tired of the international political banter,
and continues to toil with the COVID-19 pandemic, the environment is ripe
to inspire allies and potential partners to follow the America’s lead through
high-visibility, cooperative, medical partnerships.
The foundational basis for GHE is established in numerous national policies.
President Biden’s March 2021 Interim National Security Strategy Guidance:
Renewing America’s Advantages mentions “health” 23 times.5 He encourages
cooperation with the United Nations and European Union through the
Global Health Security Agenda and states as one of his three pillars the need
to “reinvigorate and modernize our alliances and partnerships around the
world.”6 Meanwhile, the latest available National Defense Strategy (NDS) 2018:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, a remnant of President
Trump’s tenure, also extensively discusses “Strengthen[ing] Alliances and
Attract[ing] New Partners.”7 Three key components of this objective are an
effort to grow alliances in the US Indo-Pacific Command, strengthen NATO
alliances to deter Russian aggression, and to support partner countries in
Africa to minimize the threat from terrorism. Diplomacy in the form of
incentives for allies through GHE, subject-matter- expert exchanges (SMEE),
and joint training exercises can sway host nation opinion and secure US influence.

US Efforts
Recently, the US military has provided medical assistance globally,
without regard for hemisphere, country, or creed. These efforts began with
2. Frank G. Hoffman, “Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges,” Prism 7,
no. 4 (2018): 36.
3. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.
4. Tzu, Art of War, 79.
5. Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance: Renewing America’s Advantages (Washington,
DC: White House, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
6. Biden, Renewing America’s Advantages, 10.
7. Department of Defense (DoD), Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of
America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: DoD, 2018), 10, https://dod
.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
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the construction of the Panama Canal which led to research and vaccines for
malaria and yellow fever, work that continues today through the Walter Reed Army
Institute of Research. The Department of Defense’s reputation as a world leader in
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is well earned, with medical care
being a key tenant of that mechanism. The codification to do so is provided in
Joint Publication ( JP) 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, which provides the
imperative “to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation” in
areas outside of the United States.8 Furthermore, Department of Defense Instruction
(DoDI) 6000.16, Military Health for Stability Operations, defines medical stability
operations as a fundamental competency and something the military health system
must be prepared to execute across the continuum of operations, up to helping
reconstitute a host nation health-care system, if necessary.9
In 2004, on the receding tides of the world’s most deadly tsunami, the
USNS Mercy arrived in Indonesia and began a humanitarian assistance medical
presence that would last for five months.10 Staffed by limited military medical
personnel and over 200 staff from the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Project
HOPE, the endeavor showcased America’s ability to cooperate and the country’s
willingness to care in desperate times.11 In Rear Admiral William McDaniel’s
words, “The ship sells itself. . . . Virtually everyone who visited Mercy became an ally in
our efforts.”12
The following year, the United States deployed military medical assistance
professionals to Pakistan to help the country in the aftermath of a 7.6-magnitude
earthquake. The 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital arrived from Germany
at the epicenter within three weeks, along with a medical battalion from the
3rd Marine Expeditionary Force. During their time in country, the unit cared
for over 14,000 patients.13 In the end, the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
donated the hospital tents and medical equipment to the Pakistani government,
certainly adding to the partnership of a key strategic ally needed to blunt the
influence of regional VEO.14

8. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Joint Publication (JP) 3-29 (Washington, DC:
JCS, 2019), viii, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_29.pdf.
9. DoD, Military Health for Stability Operations, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 6000.16 (Washington, DC: DoD,
2010), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/i6000_16.pdf.
10. PowerPoint Briefing, USNS Mercy Commanding Officer’s Brief, August 27, 2018, https://health.mil
/Reference-Center/Presentations/2018/08/27/USNS-Mercy.
11. James B. Peake, “The Project HOPE and USNS Mercy Tsunami ‘Experiment’,” Military Medicine 171,
no. S1 (October 2006), S27, https://academic.oup.com/milmed/article/171/suppl_1/27/4577798.
12. William J. McDaniel, “Lessons Learned from Indonesia: An Outline,” Military Medicine 171, no. S1
(October 2006), S61, https://academic.oup.com/milmed/article/171/suppl_1/59/4577813.
13. “When the Earth Shook: US Responds to Magnitude 7.6 Earthquake in Pakistan,” Year in Review (blog),
DoD, August, 4, 2005, https://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2006/2005yearinreview/article4.html.
14. Joshua Michaud et al., “Militaries and Global Health: Peace, Conflict, and Disaster Response,”
Lancet 393 (January 2019), 280, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330472289_Militaries_and_global
_health_peace_conflict_and_disaster_response.
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In 2010, the US military responded to the deadliest natural disaster in two
generations, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake on the island nation of the Republic
of Haiti, resulting in an estimated 300,000 deaths.15 The only hospital left
operating after the earthquake was an Argentine military field hospital; they were
quickly joined by medical teams from across the world, including the United
States, Russia, and China.16 Twenty-six countries provided everything from
supplies to field hospitals and hospital ships.17 The small nations of Qatar and
Israel established field hospitals. Again, the US Navy partnered with civilians from
an NGO, this time aboard the USNS Comfort hospital ship, and performed 843
lifesaving surgeries. Overall, the US task force performed over “1,000 surgeries [,]
and treated more than 9,000 patients.” While this intervention surely positively
impacted Haiti’s citizens’ impression of the United States by the thousands, a
lack of quantifiable data only allows us to posit conclusions. This common theme
in GHE should be rectified (see conclusions).18
US global health engagement efforts have employed both reactive and
proactive measures. Besides tsunami and earthquake-type humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief missions, one of the most recent large-scale proactive responses
to a medical crisis has been the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014–15. Named
Operation Unified Assistance, the response, at its core, showed progress toward
overcoming one of the largest stumbling blocks in providing medical aid across the
world. A common critique of foreign medical assistance, especially aid provided
by the Department of Defense, is that substituting US capabilities instead of
bolstering host-nation effectiveness increases reliance on the United States, and
in the long term, undermines the local system.19 It is easy to see how this creates
resentment from host-nation medical experts and runs counterproductive to US
strategic objectives.
To address these shortcomings, DoD involvement was “limited in scope and
duration; designed to supplement or complement Liberia’s own efforts; and
worked in support of the [US Agency for International Development] USAID.”20
15. Reginald DesRoches et al., “Overview of the 2010 Haiti Earthquake,” Earthquake Spectra 27, no. S1 (October
2011), S1–S21, https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/70042013.
16. David R. DiOrio, Operation Unified Response – Haiti Earthquake 2010 (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Staff
College, 2010), https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/4A_Haiti_HADR
_Case_Study_revNov10.pdf.
17. Gary Cecchine et al., The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake: Considerations for Army
Leaders (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, 2013), 56, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs
/research_reports/RR300/RR304/RAND_RR304.pdf.
18. Cecchine, U.S. Military Response, 58.
19. Michael D. Owens et al., “A Global Health Engagement Success: Applying Evidence-Based Concepts
to Create a Rapid Response Team in Angola to Combat Ebola and Other Public Health Emergencies of
International Concern,” Military Medicine 184, no. 5/6 (May/June 2019), 113, https://academic.oup.com/milmed
/article/184/5-6/113/5363849.
20. Alix Boucher, Supporting, Non-Standard Mission Role: US Operations in Liberia, 2014–2015, that Enabled
the US and UN Response to the EVD Outbreak (Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
(PKSOI), 2018), 35, https://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/2018/01/11/supporting-non-standard-mission-role-u
-s-operations-in-liberia-2014-2015-that-enabled-the-u-s-and-un-response-to-the-evd-outbreak/.

TOC

Soft Power and Military Aid

Wissemann

69

In recent years, an effort has been made to synchronize US efforts with the host
nation’s desired end states. For example, in December 2020, US Army Africa in
coordination with the US Africa Command hosted a virtual conference between
military medical leaders in countries identified for a partnership exercise to
be held in summer 2021 and their US partner units. In addition to fostering
buy-in from partners, this synchronization ensures that whatever plan is
implemented by the United States is beneficial for the host nation, and
sustainable in the long run, given the economic and cultural constraints other
nations’ experience.
A more common example of proactive measures occurs during the use
of Medical Civil Action Programs (MEDCAPs), sometimes called Medical
Civilian Assistance Programs. MEDCAPs were a staple of the Vietnam era and
an effort to influence the local population by providing health care to citizens
in remote areas and bolstering the locals’ ability to do so independently.21
MEDCAP II was designed to be an improvement but unknowingly supplanted
host-nation capabilities during counterinsurgency operations. People are the
center of gravity on which insurgency or counterinsurgency thrive.22 At times,
MEDCAPs are used to shape the operational environment, targeting specific
locations and populations or assisting in information operations. Lieutenant
Colonel Bradley Tibbetts was responsible for delivering MEDCAPs in Kosovo
in 2001–2. He shared:
A lot was about passive intelligence gathering. The more you know
the area and the people, the more they would tell you and the more you
started to notice things that were out of place. We never went out with
intel collection in mind or actively sought information but it’s amazing
what they would tell you after you gave them a bottle of Motrin and a
box of Sudafed. I later learned that tips from my reports identified both
arms smuggling from Macedonia and human trafficking.23

The aim of famed counterinsurgency theorist David Galula’s first law of
counterinsurgency is to gain the support of the people.24 MEDCAPs, such
as those conducted in Kosovo, and more broadly GHE, directly contribute
to this aim by allowing the military to gain support and connect with the
host-nation populace. Additionally, Galula’s fourth law states that zone by
zone, the counterinsurgent must clear the enemy and strengthen infrastructure
21. “Our History,” Military Health System, accessed September 4, 2019, https://www.health.mil/Military
-Health-Topics/Health-Readiness/Global-Health-Engagement/Our-History.
22. Robert J. Wilensky, “The Military Civic Action Program in Vietnam: Success or Failure?,” Military
Medicine 166, no. 9 (Sepember2001), 817.
23. Brad Tibbetts, e-mail message to author, November 7, 2019.
24. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (1964, Westport, CT: Praeger Security
International, 2006), 52–55.
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to help degrade insurgents. Medical exchanges and SMEE support this
by empowering host-nation medical assets and creating capacity and
medical infrastructure, giving potential insurgent groups less of a foothold in
struggling countries.
Additionally, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research plays a role in
being proactive and exporting US influence abroad. With a tangible research lab
presence in the country of Georgia, Kenya, Peru, and Thailand, as well as partner
and field sites in over 40 additional countries, the US armed forces conduct
research with host-nation partners on a myriad of endemic diseases.25 These
medical research labs do far more than just research and health protection for
US troops. They are part of US branding abroad. “In Peru, Kenya, Egypt,
Thailand and Cambodia,” the host nations have assigned the US facilities
high-visibility partner organizations from their own government, viewing the
US labs as “national assets.”26 These partnerships also serve as a symbol of hope
and support for many countries. Peru sits next to Colombia, which struggles with
narcoterrorism. Likewise, Kenya borders Somalia, which has difficulty providing
basic social needs for its population and lacks effective governance. Many of
the associated field sites for the labs are in or near fragile states. The US
partnership helps fill a void that another country or nefarious forces could exploit.
America, too, has demonstrated a large medical commitment to Africa
over the last 18 years. While the venture is State Department led, the result of
the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), established by
President Bush in 2003 and renewed twice since, is a resounding success in GHE.
Countries in sub-Saharan Africa with a PEPFAR program, compared with those
countries that do not have the program, demonstrated three times the growth
in UN human development index scores.27 They also showed a significant
increase in opinion of the United States and a 40 percent reduction in political
instability and violence. These effects are tied directly to the aid provided to
7.7 million Africans, through antiretroviral treatments. In Kenya, Nigeria,
and South Africa, the United States is viewed favorably in each country: 70
percent, 62 percent, and 57 percent, respectively.28

25. James B. Peake et al., The Defense Department’s Enduring Contributions to Global Health: The Future
of the US Army and Navy Overseas Medical Research Laboratories (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic &
International Studies (CSIS), 2011), vii.
26. Peake, Enduring Contributions, 6.
27. Tom Daschle and Bill Frist, The Case for Strategic Health Diplomacy: A Study of PEPFAR (Washington, DC:
Bipartisan Policy Center, 2015), 15, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/the-case-for-strategic-health-diplomacy
-a-study-of-pepfar/.
28. Kristen Bialik, “How the World Views the US and its President in 2018 in 9 Charts,” Pew Research Center,
October 9, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/09/how-the-world-views-the-u-s-and-its
-president-in-9-charts/.

TOC

Soft Power and Military Aid

Wissemann 71

There is little debate about the utility of PEPFAR efforts. Diplomats
express increased access, influence, and greater opinion of US forces following
humanitarian assistance and partnership exercises.29 The PEPFAR program also
helps foster more robust military relationships. Ambassadors have noted that
GHE opened the door to military collaborations, fighting VEOs and a range
of other security issues.30 The program has advanced public diplomacy, opened
doors in difficult relationships, extended the reach of US embassies, and
leveraged domestic investment in health.31 All these benefits help prevent a
void where VEOs can find space to operate, flourish, and destabilize countries
and regions.

Chinese and Foreign Efforts
While GHE efforts have increased US standing on the world stage, China
is narrowing the gap. Over the last several years, worldwide US approval ratings
dropped from 48 percent to 31 percent, while China’s leadership rating by
contrast posted a slow steady gain from 31 percent to 34 percent.32 According
to a 2020 poll, China’s President Xi Jinping received higher confidence “to do
the right thing regarding international affairs” than the US president (19 percent
versus 16 percent).33 Further, African countries such as Nigeria and Tunisia had
a more favorable opinion of China. China continues to ignore global rules and
to maximize their advantage, a common practice of rising powers.34
Essential to this tactic is the stick-and-carrot approach. China’s biggest
stick is using their mammoth economy to browbeat trading partners into bilateral
trade agreements that benefit only China. This stick is coupled with debt-trap
financing to leverage favorable deals when overwhelmed countries default
on Chinese loans, all backed by an aggressive military that has deliberately
disregarded UN rulings. China continues to expand military colonization of
islands in the South China Sea years after the area was awarded to the Philippines

29. Gary Roughhead et al., US Navy Humanitarian Assistance in an Era of Austerity (Washington, DC:
CSIS, 2013), 2.
30. Tom Daschle and Bill Frist, Building Prosperity, Stability, and Security through Strategic Health
Diplomacy: A Study of 15 Years of PEPFAR (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2018),
26, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Building-Prosperity-Stabilityand-Security-Through-Strategic-Health-Diplomacy-A-Study-of-15-Years-of-PEPFAR.pdf.
31. Daschle and Frist, Building Prosperity, 26–27.
32. R. J. Reinhart and Zacc Ritter, “China’s Leadership Gains Global Admirers,” Gallup, March 4, 2019,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/247196/china-leadership-gains-global-admirers.aspx.
33. Richard Wike, Janell Fetterolf, and Mara Mordecai, “US Image Plummets Internationally as Most Say
Country Has Handled Coronavirus Badly,” Pew Research Center, September 15, 2020, https://www.pewresearch
.org/global/2020/09/15/us-image-plummets-internationally-as-most-say-country-has-handled-coronavirus-badly/.
34. Robert Gilpin, “Hegemonic War and International Change,” in Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on
Cause of War and Peace, 4th ed., comp. Richard K. Betts (Boston, MA: Pearson, 2013), 107.
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by the International Court at The Hague.35 Given the aforementioned coercive
and sharp tactics, it is easy to overlook China’s use of other diplomatic strategies
that have the People’s Republic of China gaining ground around the world.
There is a misperception that China does not understand the use of soft
power. Their abysmal human rights record at home and in Taiwan, coupled with
censorship of the Internet, conjure visions of soft-power inadequacies.36 Married
with China’s sharp/coercive power and its prolific gray zone strategies, these
themes paint a dark picture. China, however, is quite astute in the applications
of soft power, leveraging soft power tools like Panda diplomacy, stadium
diplomacy, and Confucius Institutes.37 Additionally, China is using their Belt
and Road Initiative, a massive infrastructure program connecting China to other
continents, to open the door for application of softer means across Asia, Africa,
and even into Europe.
China initiated GHE efforts in 1963, when they sent medical teams to
Algeria, building a hospital there. Since then, according to Peilong Liu, “about
23,000 Chinese medical workers have been sent to about 66 countries to provide
services to an estimated 270 million people. At the end of 2013, 1,171 Chinese
medical workers were working in 113 medical centers in 49 countries.”38 China
has complemented these efforts in the past decade with the christening of its first
hospital ship.
The Daishan Dao, also known as the Peace Ark, is China’s most tangible
and visible instrument of influence abroad through medical means. Built for
a mission set like the USNS Comfort or USNS Mercy, China’s hospital ship is
an unwavering exporter of Chinese soft power. On its initial tour, the ship
conducted a three-month operational cruise around the Horn of Africa; a decade
later this location is now the site of China’s first overseas base.39 Since 2008, the
Chinese ship and its team of medical professionals have provided medical care

35. Stephen Burgess, “Confronting China’s Maritime Expansion in the South China Sea: A Collective Action
Problem,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 3, no. 3 (August 31, 2020): 112–34; Sarah Zheng and Rachel Zhang,
“South China Sea: Calls to Honour Hague Ruling 5 Years On, but Beijing Digs In,” South China Morning Post,
July 25, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3142456/south-china-sea-calls-honour
-hague-ruling-5-years-beijing-digs.
36. Joseph S. Nye Jr., “China’s Soft Power Deficit: To Catch Up, Its Politics Must Unleash the Many Talents of
Its Civil Society,” Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2012, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230445110
4577389923098678842.
37. David Volodzko, “China’s Medical Diplomacy: China’s Latest Contribution to the WHO Is Part of a
Long History of Using Medical Diplomacy as Soft Power,” Diplomat, April 12, 2016, https://thediplomat
.com/2016/04/chinas-medical-diplomacy.
38. Peilong Liu et al., “Chinese Distinct Engagement in Global Health in Africa,” Lancet, August 30, 2014,
794, http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:399727/FULLTEXT02.
39. James A. Chambers, “The Rise of Chinese Military Medicine: Opportunity for Mercy Ship, Not
Gunboat, Diplomacy,” Military Medicine 176, no. 9 (September 2011): 1045, https://academic.oup.com/milmed
/article/176/9/1043/4345491.
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to 180,000 people across 40 countries.40 According to the People’s Republic of
China, the ship contains several operating rooms and can care for 1,000 patients
simultaneously. During a weeklong stop in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea,
in 2018 the ship’s staff cared for 4,000 patients.41 That same operational tour,
titled “Mission Harmony,” included 10 other country stops, many throughout
the eastern Pacific and western hemisphere, including Venezuela.42
During past partnership exercises, such as Pacific Rim, US and Chinese
medical personnel worked together. These exchanges have helped craft Chinese
policy changes on how to employ or staff the hospital ship, which is a win when
viewed through a humanitarian lens.43 This collaboration establishes common
ground for cooperation in high-stakes humanitarian relief or disaster relief
operations. The People’s Liberation Army Navy is “gearing up the transformation
from a green-water navy to a blue water force that does not just protect its own
sailors in naval combat but also saves the lives of those in need, regardless of
nationality.”44 With China’s shift from a regional power to a country with
worldwide reach and ambitions, the Peace Ark will undoubtedly play a role in
those efforts.
In addition to the Peace Ark circumnavigating the globe, China has made
significant GHE contributions worldwide. The country contributed to Haiti
earthquake relief in 2010. More recently, China played a significant role on
the world stage during the Ebola endemic in West Africa.45 China has had a
significant medical presence across Africa since first aiding Algeria during
their war for independence in 1963. In 2015, they committed “to send 1,500
medical professionals to the continent.”46 Since 1963, they have deployed 18,000
medical professionals to 46 countries.47 It is clear China is well versed in using
GHE and continues to leverage this strategy to shape the operating environment
to its benefit.
A recent high-profile example of China using GHE to alter a country’s
ill-perception of them involved the shipment of face masks to Canada during
the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. While the whole world was in need,
40. Associated Press (AP), “Chinese Hospital Ship Stops in Turbulent Venezuela,” Navy Times, September, 22, 2018,
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2018/09/22/chinese-hospital-ship-stops-in-turbulent-venezuela/.
41. People’s Republic of China (PRC), official website, accessed August 9, 2019, https://eng.mod.gov.cn
/news/2019-04/23/content_4840098.html.
42. AP, “Chinese Hospital Ship.”
43. Da-Wei Li et al., “Inspiration of the Functional Localization of a US Naval Hospital Ship on a Chinese
Hospital Ship,” Military Medicine Research 3, no. 7 (April 2016).
44. PRC, official website, accessed August 9, 2019, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-04/23/content
_4840098.html.
45. Michaud et al., “Militaries and Global Health,” 281.
46. Volodzko, “China’s Medical Diplomacy.”
47. Lloyd Thrall, China’s Expanding African Relations: Implications for U.S. National Security (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2015), 49, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR905.html.

TOC

74

Parameters 51(3) Autumn 2021

Canada was in the midst of selecting a company to install 5G networks across their
country. Huawei, China’s state-sponsored telecom giant with ties to the Chinese
Communist Party, was a contender, however, fears of privacy violations and spying
were a major concern. The face masks were designed to increase the favorable
perception of Huawei and potentially get them beneficial action regarding their
bid.48 Similarly, China shipped supplies to European countries like Serbia and
Spain. These actions helped China reinforce the narrative that the United States
abandoned these countries, that China can fulfill the role of leader on the world
stage, and that China is taking COVID-19 seriously.49
Due to their participation in high-visibility medical missions and international
cooperation activities, it comes as no surprise that China enjoys a positive reputation
across Africa. A recent Pew Research poll explored over 24 countries’ views of China,
including three Africa countries. Kenya and Nigeria expressed a 67 percent and
61 percent positive rating of China, respectively. South African opinion was supportive
as well, with 49 percent favorable and 38 percent unfavorable.50 China’s medical
diplomacy will continue to help the country make inroads across the entire southern
hemisphere, especially in Africa.

Recommendations and Challenges
Several recommendations for improvement, many with a foundation or
framework already in place, bear consideration. Some proposals are best practices and
whole-of-government approaches that can be replicated across other combatant
commands. Leveraging existing organizations with expertise, resourcing those entities,
and investing early in cross-domain training for company-grade officers can pay
long-term dividends. First, there is a distinct need for greater synchronization of
efforts across the interagency and others to realize the full potential of GHE. There
has been little coordination in the past when synchronizing military and civilian
NGO efforts. Navy hospital ships have arrived in ports without advance planning
or communication with the NGO already on the ground.51 Coordinating across
all instruments of national power is imperative to maximize effectiveness and
achieve synergy.
Given the previously mentioned concerns regarding unity of effort, all combatant
commands should endeavor to provide synchronization, as the AFRICOM
48. Alicia Chen and Vanessa Molter, “Mask Diplomacy: Chinese Narratives in the COVID Era,” Freemen
Spogli Institute for International Studies (blog), Stanford University, June 16, 2020, https://fsi.stanford.edu
/news/covid-mask-diplomacy.
49. Brian Wong, “China’s Mask Diplomacy: By Shipping Medical Supplies to European Countries, China Is
Seeking to Boost Its Image as a Responsible Global Leader,” Diplomat, March 25, 2020, https://thediplomat
.com/2020/03/chinas-mask-diplomacy/.
50. Richard Wike et al., “International Publics Divided on China,” Pew Research Center, October 1, 2018,
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/10/01/international-publics-divided-on-china.
51. Roughhead, US Navy Humanitarian Assistance, 3.
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model does, through liaisons with other governmental agencies. US AFRICOM
has embedded more than 30 personnel from a variety of other US government
agencies, including personnel from USAID.52 USAID is a key partner in delivering
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and the training and provision of
host-nation medical facilities. Furthermore, the AFRICOM leadership team
includes a deputy commander for civil-military engagement and a senior Foreign
Service officer from the US Department of State. This integration enables a
whole-of-government approach and maximizes preexisting on-the-ground resources,
whether other governmental agencies or supporting long-term NGOs partners.
The framework to do so already tenuously exists.
The Department of Defense should leverage under-resourced tools already
in place to help synchronize efforts. The “Uniformed Services University
Health Sciences (USU) is the nation’s federal health professions academy,”
which should be doing more than just training doctors, nurses, and future
scientists.53 The university’s Center for Global Health Engagement was
established to provide support to the combatant commands.54 With the
alignment of the Defense Health Agency and Uniformed Services University
as a direct-report unit, the Defense Health Agency should be resourced to
synchronize efforts and act as a repository for GHE best practices across
combatant commands.
Second, GHE is a wide-reaching effort that affects not just the military
and needs the incorporation of interagency, NGOs, and other governmental
agency partners. Midgrade officers should receive yearlong assignments to
organizations such as the Department of State or USAID to gain interagency
experience.55 The Army Medical Department already affords similar opportunities
through “Training with Industry,” where select personnel spend a year with the
Joint Commission (responsible for health-care facility accreditation) and RAND,
among others.56 These officers then return to the Army Medical Department
and infuse it with fresh ideas. Further, the connections made with civilian
counterparts in these agencies can lead to career-long relationships that facilitate
cross-organization collaboration.

52. “About the Command,” United States Africa Command, accessed August 19, 2019, https://www.africom
.mil/about-the-command.
53. “About,” Uniformed Services University (USU), accessed August 26, 2019, https://www.usuhs.edu/about.
54. “Overview,” USU Center for Global Health Engagement, USU, accessed August 8, 2021, https://cghe
.usuhs.edu/home.
55. J. Christopher Daniel and Kathleen H. Hicks, Global Health Engagement: Sharpening a Key Tool for
the Department of Defense (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2014), 12, https://www.csis.org/analysis/global
-health-engagement.
56. “AAC Training with Industry,” US Army Acquisition Support Center (blog), accessed August 9, 2021,
https://asc.army.mil/web/career-development/programs/aac-training-with-industry/.
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Third, the United States can continue to project and brand American
global goodwill by leveraging high-visibility entities already performing on
the world stage. The USNS Mercy, stationed in San Diego with ready access
to the Naval Medical Center San Diego, should be a keystone component in
partnership enhancement. With one third of Indo-Pacific Command’s vast area
of responsibility composed of island nations, a hospital ship can expand global
influence and help brand American diplomacy across half the earth’s surface.57
Concurrently, the USNS Comfort, stationed on the east coast and colocated with the
Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, is a prime candidate to bring medical training
and assistance to Africa, something the Chinese have been doingfor half a century.
Medical SMEEs with NATO countries on the European continent will help reinforce
commitments to alliance partners staring down the barrel of overt Russian aggression.
Finally, abundant information on the statistical impact of global health
engagement is available. Initiatives that show results get funded. In an era of
constrained resources, it is incumbent upon the services providing GHE to show
the combatant commanders a return on investment. While subjective and anecdotal
evidence can demonstrate the great impact of this engagement, quantitative changes
in local perceptions would further support the need to continue or expand the
program. Quantitative analysis should start with pre- and post-questionnaires of
the local populace and foreign military medical personnel participating in
MEDCAPs and SMEEs. A survey created for a 2020 engagement in Senegal,
designed in English and translated into French, to receive frank quantitative
feedback, was not fielded due to the cancellation of the exercise. Adding tools
like this survey and leveraging processes and organizations already in existence
can help multiply the impact of American global health efforts.
Challenges for limited resources and the global pandemic will continue to
impact overseas engagements. The COVID-19 crisis phase and stateside response
necessitated the cancellation of three scheduled African GHEs in summer 2020.
As US response operations stabilized, and the organization reviewed the ability
to put together a single exercise, unknowns and quarantine restrictions hampered
the ability to gather a full team. During planning, a paucity of valid statistics on
COVID-19 prevalence rates in a given country, changes of embassy staff, and
sealing of national borders complicated issues. Further, there were cultural
questions about whether US personnel bringing in their personal medical
protective equipment would be perceived as favorable and considerate or
whether it would sow distrust.58 Finally, the time required to remove a critical
clinician from soldier-focused care, such as an orthopedic surgeon (two weeks
57. “About USINDOPACOM,” US Indo-Pacific Command, accessed August 15, 2019, https://www.pacom
.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/.
58. Author’s personal experience, April–May 2020.
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stateside quarantine, three weeks in country, two weeks quarantine upon
return) is untenable given the surgical caseload of musculoskeletal injuries the
active-duty population sustains. Some of these concerns can be mitigated by
utilizing fully vaccinated medical professionals. If GHE is to continue, the
remainder of these issues will need to be addressed early in planning through
requests for information and leveraging previously established relationships on
the ground.

Conclusion
While global health engagement and strategic health diplomacy are not
new concepts, they are still compelling tools for influencing behavior. The use of
global health engagement as an instrument of national power could provide the
catalyst for countries teetering between alliances to side with whoever can garner
favor with their population, achieving the ends of spreading democracy, values,
and influence worldwide.
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ABSTRACT: Using US military aid as a lever to achieve human rights reforms has
proven only marginally effective. This article examines the approaches employed by
the Obama and Trump administrations to US military aid to Egypt and proposes
practical steps that can be taken by policymakers and the military personnel on the
ground to advance US human rights values.

F

or the past 20 years there has been mounting controversy over the annual
$1.3 billion US security assistance package to Egypt. Critics have complained the aid
rewards the Egyptian government for repressive behavior and human rights violations.
Total US aid to Egypt is roughly $1.425 billion a year, of which about $125 million
is civilian economic aid.1 Supporters say it is necessary to protect Egypt from real
threats, maintain the peace between Egypt and Israel, and provide the United States
with influence in Egypt, including the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria affiliate in the
Sinai Peninsula.2
In recent years, a growing number of voices in think tank and nongovernmental
organizations (NGO) have advocated for cutting the aid, in whole or in part, in reaction
to the authoritarian practices of the government of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Some
estimates show Egypt may have as many as 60,000 political prisoners, nonviolent and
violent alike.3 Many supporters who have pressed for this tougher line claim US military
aid, which in 2005 accounted for as much as 80 percent of Egypt’s military procurement

1. Lama Al-Arian, “U.S. Military Aid to Egypt Gives a ‘Green Light’ to Repression, Say Rights Advocates,”
NPR, August 8, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/08/08/635381440/u-s-military-aid-to-egypt-gives-a-green-light-to
-repression-say-rights-advocates; and US Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021
/05/FY-2022-State_USAID-Congressional-Budget-Justification.pdf. See also William D. Hartung and Seth
Binder, U.S. Security Assistance to Egypt: Examining the Return on Investment (Washington, DC: Project on Middle
East Democracy and Center for International Policy, May 2020), https://pomed.org/report-u-s-security-assistance-to
-egypt-examining-the-return-on-investment/.
2. Bruce Clingan, “Commentary: The U.S. Is Right to Restore Aid to Egypt,” Reuters, July 30, 2018, https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-clingan-egypt-commentary/commentary-the-u-s-is-right-to-restore-aid-to-egypt-idUSKBN1KK1YE.
3. See Ruth Michaelson, “Threat of Jail Looms over Even Mildest Critics under Egyptian Crackdown,” Guardian,
January 24, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/24/threat-of-jail-shapes-egyptian-lives-nine-years
-after-uprising.
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budget, gives the United States significant leverage.4 These advocates believe the aid
should be used as a pressure point on the Egyptian government, by threatening a
cut in aid or by making an actual cut in aid, to compel the government to adhere to
human rights norms.
In recent years, some suspensions of military aid to Egypt have taken place
under successive US administrations (first under the Obama administration
and then under the Trump administration), which should give a sense of
whether such suspensions have been effective. Leveraging US military aid for
improvements in human rights have not proven effective historically, and this
article will provide alternative policy recommendations.

Obama Administration Approach
The Obama administration was confronted with a major crisis on July 3, 2013,
when Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood was
ousted in a military coup by then defense minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.5 This coup
was supported by millions of liberal and secular-minded Egyptians who opposed
what they believed was the incompetence of Morsi’s rule and the fear he would
turn Egypt into a theocratic state.6
The Obama administration was “deeply concerned” about Morsi’s removal and
the suspension of the Egyptian constitution. Despite Morsi’s many shortcomings,
as he was the first democratically elected president in Egypt, the administration
wanted to show its support for Egypt’s democratic transition.7 At the same time,
the Obama administration avoided using the term coup because that recognition
would have automatically cut off all US military aid to Egypt under the
Leahy Law, which prohibits funding of a foreign government brought to power
by a military coup. The administration clearly wanted to keep its options open
as it assessed the situation, particularly as the coup was initially popular with a
large segment of the Egyptian population. Both US and EU diplomats traveled
to Cairo that summer to convince the new Egyptian authorities to release Morsi,
but to no avail.8
4. US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to Assess How Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt
Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals, GAO-06-437 (Washington, DC: GAO, April 2006), 2, https://www.gao
.gov/assets/250/249655.pdf.
5. Dan Roberts, “US in Bind over Egypt after Supporting Morsi but Encouraging Protesters,” Guardian,
July 3, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/egypt-obama-us-mohamed-morsi-crisis.
6. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Egyptian Liberals Embrace the Military, Brooking No Dissent,” New York Times,
July 15, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/world/middleeast/egypt-morsi.html.
7. Jennifer Epstein, “Obama ‘Deeply Concerned’ by Egyptian Military’s Removal of Morsi,” POLITICO44
(blog), Politico, July 3, 2013, https://www.politico.com/blogs/politico44/2013/07/obama-deeply-concerned-by
-egyptian-militarys-removal-of-morsi-167603.
8. “State Department Calls for Morsi’s Release,” CNN, updated July 13, 2013, http://edition.cnn
.com/2013/07/12/world/meast/egypt-coup.
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Violence, however, appeared to have forced the administration’s hand. On July 8,
clashes occurred in front of the Republican Guard building in Cairo (where Morsi
was thought to be held) and at least 51 protestors (mostly Muslim Brotherhood
activists) and three members of the security forces were killed.9 That incident,
and Sisi’s unwillingness to restore the constitution and release Morsi, apparently
prompted the Obama administration to suspend the delivery of F-16 aircraft that
had been slated for Egypt, which prompted Sisi to complain to a Washington Post
journalist that the holdup was “not the way to deal with a patriotic military.”10
A violent mid-August crackdown on two large, pro-Morsi protest
encampments in the Cairo area then set off a sharp crisis in bilateral relations,
resulting in over 800 deaths in a single day.11 This crisis was followed by
more arrests of Brotherhood activists and members in subsequent weeks.
Obama interrupted his vacation to condemn the harsh crackdown, cancel the
US-Egyptian Bright Star military exercises that had been scheduled for the
following month, and promise to order a thorough review of US assistance
to Egypt.12
Within the administration there was a vigorous debate on how the United
States should respond to the crisis. In October 2013, the administration
decided a significant portion of US military aid would be suspended to signal
US dissatisfaction with Sisi’s harsh policies and to lay down markers on what
actions would be required for the aid to be restored. In the words of a US State
Department spokesperson: “We will continue to hold the delivery of certain
large-scale military systems and cash assistance to the government pending
credible progress toward an inclusive, democratically elected civilian government
through free and fair elections.”13 A few weeks earlier in an address to the United
Nations (UN) General Assembly, Obama criticized the new Egyptian government
for actions “inconsistent with inclusive democracy.”14 The military aid suspension,
however, proved ineffective.
Rather than heeding the rationale for the suspension, the Egyptian regime grew
more repressive. On November 24, 2013, the government implemented a new
protest law that, in the words of Human Rights Watch, “effectively grants security
9. Patrick Kingsley, “Killing in Cairo: The Full Story of the Republican Guards’ Club Shootings,” Guardian,
July 18, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/18/cairo-republican-guard-shooting
-full-story.
10. Lally Weymouth, “Harsh Words for U.S. from Egypt,” Washington Post, August 3, 2013.
11. Human Rights Watch, All According to Plan: The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protestors in Egypt
(New York: Human Rights Watch, August 2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan
/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt#.
12. Steve Holland and Jeff Mason, “Obama Cancels Military Exercises, Condemns Violence in Egypt,” Reuters,
August 15, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests-obama/obama-cancels-military-exercises
-condemns-violence-in-egypt-idUSBRE97E0N020130816.
13. “US Withholds Egypt Military Aid over Crackdown,” BBC, October 10, 2013, https://www.bbc.com
/news/world-middle-east-24470121.
14. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly,”
(annual address, United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 24, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/24/remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly.
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officials discretion to ban any protest on vague grounds, allows police officers to
forcibly disperse any protest if even a single protestor throws a stone, and sets
heavy prison sentences for vague offenses.”15 Adly Mansour, the titular head of
the government, defined such a vague offense as attempting to “influence the
course of justice.”16 The following month the government officially designated
the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and seized the assets of
Brotherhood-owned businesses.17
Cushioning the blow from the suspension of most US military aid was
the cash windfall Egypt received from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, and Kuwait shortly after the military coup in the summer of
2013—an estimated $12 billion in total. 18 This figure dwarfed the US
security aid package of $1.3 billion and enabled Sisi to purchase military
equipment from other sources, including Russia and France. 19 Supporters
of the US aid suspension claim that without this aid from the three
wealthy Gulf Arab states, Sisi would have succumbed to US pressure, but
that belief seems to have been based on wishful thinking given the size of
the Gulf aid package.
The combination of national pride and perceived threats have long
made Egypt a difficult partner of the United States. Even during the Hosni
Mubarak era, there were instances where Cairo refused to follow the US
lead, probably believing that, by doing so, the government would be accused
of being a toady of Washington and ignoring the public’s will.20 In late 2013,
there was every indication to believe that even if the Gulf Arab money did
not materialize, Sisi and his military and civilian allies would have continued
their repression of the Brotherhood in the face of the US aid suspension
as they saw that Islamist group as an existential threat. This is not to say
the Egyptian government was happy with the suspension of US military
aid. Indeed, Cairo hired public relations firms in Washington to try to
get the suspension lifted. The Egyptian military has been US-trained and
15. “Egypt: Deeply Restrictive New Assembly Law,” Human Rights Watch, November 26, 2013, https://www
.hrw.org/news/2013/11/26/egypt-deeply-restrictive-new-assembly-law.
16. “Egypt: Deeply Restrictive New Assembly Law.”
17. Erin Cunningham, “Egypt’s Military-Backed Government Declares Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist
Organization,” Washington Post, December 25, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypts
-military-backed-government-declares-muslim-brotherhood-a-terrorist-organization/2013/12/25/7cf075ca-6da0
-11e3-aecc-85cb037b7236_story.html.
18. Jeremy Ravinsky, “Friends Again? Saudi Arabia, UAE Jump into Aid Egypt,” Christian Science Monitor,
July 10, 2013, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-Issues/2013/0710/Friends-again-Saudi-Arabia-UAE
-jump-in-to-aid-Egypt.
19. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report RL33003
(Washington, DC: CRS), updated June 7, 2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL
/RL33003/104.
20. John Lancaster, “Mubarak Deprecates Summit,” Washington Post, October 2, 1996, https://www
.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/10/02/mubarak-deprecates-summit/c81bc595-d936-433c-ab0e
-ebbcc86fc419/.

TOC

Soft Power and Military Aid

Aftandilian

83

equipped for many decades, and it is not easy to switch to another foreign
military benefactor, as was the case after the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty when Cairo switched from a Soviet-supplied military to an
American-supplied one.21
During the suspension (about 18 months), then US Secretary of
State John Kerry walked a fine line by maintaining good relations with
Egyptian authorities while imploring Cairo to improve human rights.22 His
softer diplomatic approach, however, did not lessen the repression either. The only
concession the Egyptian government made after the aid suspension period was
the release of a dual US-Egyptian citizen, Mohamed Soltan, who had been
arrested during the August 2013 crackdown on the Brotherhood. Although
Soltan’s father was a member of the Brotherhood, Soltan himself was not and
he was considered by the State Department to have been unjustly arrested.23
His case became a priority for the White House, and Sisi probably believed that
releasing Soltan was a low-cost way to mollify the Obama administration.
By late March 2015, the Obama administration essentially backed down
and restored the suspended US military aid. The only punitive measure retained
was the suspension of cash-flow financing, a mechanism that allowed Egypt to
pay for US defense items in partial installments rather than in one lump sum.24
The administration’s decision to restore aid was likely due to Egypt’s need to
respond more effectively to the surging terrorist insurgency in the Sinai (though
the Egyptian government’s heavy-handed practices in the Sinai were often
counterproductive) and the realization that the aid suspension did not reverse the
government’s repressive practices as hoped.25

Trump Administration Approach
President Donald Trump initially took an opposite approach to the Sisi
government, though he too would later attempt to use military aid as a lever
against the Egyptian government. As a presidential candidate, Trump first met
Sisi in September 2016 when the latter was in New York for the UN General
21. Erin Quinn, “U.S. Lobbying, PR Firms Give Human Rights Abusers a Friendly Face,” Center for Public
Integrity, December 17, 2015, https://publicintegrity.org/politics/u-s-lobbying-pr-firms-give-human-rights-abusers
-a-friendly-face/.
22. John Kerry, “Remarks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Shoukry after Their Meeting,” (remarks,
Cairo, June 22, 2014), US Department of State transcript, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary
/remarks/2014/06/228234.htm.
23. Rubina Kapil, “Ohio State Alumnus Receives Life Sentence in an Egyptian Prison,” Lantern,
April 13, 2015, https://www.thelantern.com/2015/04/ohio-state-alumnus-receives-life-sentence-in-an
-egyptian-prison/.
24. CRS, Egypt.
25. Gregory Aftandilian, “Egypt’s Sinai Struggle Not Going Away Anytime Soon,” Al Jazeera,
February 19, 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/02/egypt-sinai-struggle-anytime
-150218051345497.html.
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Assembly. The two leaders reportedly got along well, due to a mutual antipathy
toward the Muslim Brotherhood. Trump also wanted to be seen as the
anti-Obama and believed it was important to embrace Sisi rather than to keep
him at arms’ length. At this meeting, Trump referred to Sisi as a “fantastic guy.”26
Trump’s good relationship with Sisi was initially used to obtain the release
of a dual US-Egyptian citizen and her husband from prison, but that event did
not lead to any overall human rights improvement in the country. After Trump
became president, Sisi was invited to the White House where Trump praised
him as a “great friend and ally” who was doing “a fantastic job in a very difficult
situation.”27 Trump clearly saw Sisi as a tough guy who would forcefully deal
with threats to Egypt. Trump only alluded to a “little problem” that he hoped Sisi
would take care of. The problem was later revealed to be the case of dual
US-Egyptian citizen, Aya Hijazi, who ran an NGO in Cairo and who was
imprisoned along with her husband on bogus charges. Trump, after the urgings
of some members of Congress and human rights groups, took up this case
and persuaded Sisi to release Hijazi and her husband. They were later received
in the White House, which Trump touted as a great foreign policy success.28
Undoubtedly, Sisi again believed releasing these two individuals would mollify
the US president and be a low-cost way to stay in his good graces. Trump
reportedly did not take up the cause of the thousands of other political prisoners
in Egypt in this or subsequent meetings.
In August 2017, the Trump administration, much to the surprise of the human
rights community, suspended about $195 million in US military aid to Egypt
over Egypt’s alleged military assistance to North Korea (at a time when the Trump
administration was ratcheting up pressure on that communist country) and made
the decision to move ahead with a draconian NGO law, which restricts the activity
of these organizations to only development and social work and imposes a fiveyear prison term for those who do not comply with it.29 The inclusion of the latter
was reportedly driven by the State Department which, institutionally, had long
bristled at Sisi’s repressive policies.

26. Cristiano Lima, “Trump Praises Egypt’s al-Sisi: ‘He’s a Fantastic Guy,’ ” Politico, September 22, 2016.
27. Peter Baker and Declan Walsh, “Trump Shifts Course on Egypt, Praising Its Authoritarian Leader,”
New York Times, April 3, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/world/middleeast/-egypt-sisi-trump
-white-house.html.
28. Philip Rucker and Karen DeYoung, “Freed Egyptian American Prisoner Returns Home Following
Trump Intervention,” Washington Post, April 20, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/freed-egyptian-american-prisoner-returns-home-following-trump-intervention/2017/04/20/d569fe1e-2608-11
e7-bb9d-8cd6118e1409_story.html.
29. Joshua Keating, “Wait, Does the Trump Administration Care about Human Rights Now?” Slate,
August 23, 2017, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/08/trump-administration-suspends-aid-to-egypt-in
-unexpected-move.html; and “Egypt Defends NGO Law U.S. Senators Call a Draconian Rights crackdown,” Reuters,
May 31, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-rights-usa/egypt-defends-ngo-law-u-s-senators-call-a
-draconian-rights-crackdown-idUSKBN18S3KA.
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Like in the Obama administration, the aid suspension did not last long—this
time about 11 months. In July 2018, the State Department announced the aid
suspension had been lifted. An unnamed department official did not cite any
specific steps Sisi had taken to improve human rights but instead emphasized
that “preserving U.S. security cooperation with Egypt” was a main reason the
funds were released.30
Although the State Department under the Trump administration had
reportedly raised human rights with the Sisi government in private, the temporary
suspension of US military aid in 2017–18 did nothing to improve the overall
human rights situation in the country. Thousands of political prisoners still
languished behind bars, bloggers and journalists continued to be arrested for
criticizing the government, and several potential Egyptian presidential candidates
in late 2017 and early 2018 were either arrested or forced to drop out of the race
so Sisi would have no serious competition for reelection.31 The one consolation
was that Egypt may have scaled back its assistance to North Korea, though the
details of these ties were largely out of the public domain.32
In spring 2020, reports surfaced that the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
of the State Department was in favor of suspending up to $300 million in
US military aid in reaction to the January 2020 death in custody of dual US-Egyptian
citizen, Mustafa Kassem. Kassem had been incarcerated for six years before going
on a hunger strike and dying from medical complications.33 After hearing the
news of Kassem’s death, David Schenker, the head of the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, called it “needless, tragic, and avoidable,” and vowed to continue
to take up the cause of human rights and imprisoned Americans in Egypt “at
every opportunity.”34 His apparent effort to once again use US military aid as a
lever on Egypt, however, did not gain traction inside the administration.
Hence, there were some similarities between the Obama and Trump
administrations on the issue of human rights and Egypt. While Obama occasionally
spoke out against Sisi’s repression, Trump did not, preferring to leave such things to
subordinates. Unfortunately, these examples show Washington has little influence
30. “U.S. Lifts Restrictions on $195 Million in Military Aid for Egypt: Official,” Reuters, July 25, 2018, https:
//www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-egypt-aid/us-lifts-restrictions-on-195-million-in-military-aid-for-egypt-official-idUS
KBN1KF2UU.
31. “Ahmed Shafiq: Egyptian Ex-PM Withdraws from Election,” BBC News, January 7, 2018, https://www
.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42597803.
32. Andrew Miller, “Commentary: Five Myths about U.S. Aid to Egypt,” Reuters, August 13, 2018, https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-miller-egypt-commentary/commentary-five-myths-about-u-s-aid-to-egyptidUSKBN1KY1WJ.
33. Jack Detsch, Robbie Gramer, and Colum Lynch, “After Death of U.S. Citizen, State Department Floats
Slashing Egypt Aid,” Foreign Policy, March 31, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/31/egypt-us-military
-aid-middle-east-trump-sisi-congress-death-mustafa-kassem-american-citizen-detained/.
34. David Schenker, “Special Briefing: Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker,”
(briefing, Washington, DC, January 13, 2020), US Department of State transcript, https://www.state.gov
/assistant-secretary-for-near-eastern-affairs-david-schenker-2/.
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over Egyptian state repression—aid suspension or not. The most the Egyptian
government has been willing to do under US pressure is to free some dual citizens
from prison, however, these releases have not improved the overall human rights
climate in the country.

A Values-Based Approach to US Aid
The above analysis presents a rather sober assessment of the limits of
US influence to make friendly but repressive governments adhere to human rights
norms, and this situation is not just confined to Egypt. It should be noted that in
the post–World War II era, when the United States became a major player in the
Middle East, there were periods when human rights were not even on the agenda,
as anticommunism and the Arab-Israeli conflict dominated the discussion. At
other times, human rights may have been among the talking points of US officials,
but the topic was not in the top tier of issues. Moreover, governments like Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain became adept at withstanding pressure on human rights,
when that issue did emerge as a US priority, either by patiently waiting out the
salience of the issue for a US administration or by playing the so-called strategic
card. For example, Bahrain, a country that has long repressed its Shiite majority
population, has been able to withstand US pressure and even some suspensions
of particular US military items by hosting the US Fifth Fleet and playing up the
Iran threat.
Understandably, American think-tank specialists and human-rights
activists have placed much focus on Egypt because of its central position in the
Middle East, its close relations with the United States since the late 1970s,
the relatively large amount of US military aid the country continues to receive,
and the repressive policies of the Sisi government that have received significant
media attention.
Given that Washington has limited influence on the overall human rights
situation in the Middle East and that strategic issues such as cooperation on
counterterrorism will remain important for the United States, what should US
leaders do in the case of Egypt? US policymakers should pursue realistic goals.
Eliminating the entire US military aid package, as some activists have advocated,
would be counterproductive, as it would likely end any influence Washington does
have with Cairo, while other players, like Russia, would be more than happy to step
in. Moscow has already begun to supply Egypt with some weaponry, reactivating
Egyptian-Russian ties that were close from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s.35
Moreover, a cutoff of all US military aid could potentially hurt Egypt’s security,
as the country continues to face an Islamic State in Iraq and Syria affiliate in the
35.

CRS, Egypt, 14.
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Sinai, instability and terrorist infiltration from neighboring Libya, and the need
to protect its economic interests in the eastern Mediterranean region.
Keeping business-as-usual is not a good option either because it erodes the US
image from a moral standpoint. To remain silent on the incarceration of thousands
of political prisoners and not take meaningful action gives the impression
Washington is uninterested in human rights, not just with Egypt but with
other strategic partners globally. For the United States’ own values, the current
administration and Congress should confer and agree to a reduction in military
aid to Egypt by a certain percentage (perhaps by a third), shift those resources to
economic aid as administered by the US Agency for International Development,
and keep the reductions in place until there is a significant improvement in human
rights. This reduction and shift in resources will certainly upset the Egyptian
political and military hierarchy, but it would conform to a values-based approach
to US foreign and security policy without scuttling the entire relationship. In
addition, it will signal to Egyptian nonviolent oppositionists who champion
democracy that the United States still stands for human rights and cares about
the plight of the Egyptian people despite its strategic ties to an authoritarian
government. As imperfect as this policy recommendation is (human rights
advocates will attack it as too soft while apologists for the Egyptian government
will say it is too harsh), it would allow for a values-based approach in an imperfect
world. Shifting the way the United States approaches aid to Egypt is not sufficient
by itself; it requires a more active approach by the US military.

Implications for the US Army
The US military has developed close relations with Egyptian counterparts since
the late 1970s, and many Egyptian military officers have undergone training in
the United States, including Sisi, where civilian control of the military and respect
for human rights is taught.36 Hence, US Army officers should not be swayed by
their Egyptian counterparts who may have disregarded this training, believing
that Egypt needs to keep tens of thousands of political prisoners locked up or
that journalists who do not toe the government line should be arrested to preserve
the country’s stability. In the long term, such draconian policies are likely to cause
more instability, as stifling dissent often breeds anger and upheaval.
The decision to reduce military aid to Egypt is the purview of the US civilian
leadership, both in the executive and legislative branches of government, as
mentioned above. While US Army officers are not such decisionmakers, they
36. Eric Trager, “Portrait of the General as a Not-So-Young Grad Student,” Foreign Policy, August 7, 2013,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/07/portrait-of-the-general-as-a-not-so-young-grad-student/.
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play a role when dealing with a strategically important but repressive country
like Egypt. Before US Army officers are sent to Egypt (for participation in joint
military exercises or as part of the Office of Military Cooperation in the US
embassy, for example), they should undergo predeployment training in the United
States on the types of situations and interactions they might encounter with
Egyptian counterparts. They should be taught to not be taken in by arguments
supporting the belief that the Egyptian government needs a heavy hand to
keep the country safe and stable, that Westerners do not understand democracy
is ill-suited for Egypt, and that Western standards of human rights should not
apply. If Egyptian military officers raise the fact that some dual US-Egyptian
citizens have been released from custody, US Army officers should acknowledge
such releases respectfully, but then ask about the fate of the thousands of
Egyptian nationals languishing in jail, not all of whom are terrorists, a term
that is used very loosely by Cairo to label most oppositionists.
This is not to say US Army officers should get into arguments with their
Egyptian counterparts. If they are confronted with such diatribes, they should
diplomatically remind their counterparts that such attitudes run counter to
Egypt being a signatory to the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
other international norms. Additionally, they should remind these counterparts
that the curriculum at US professional military education institutions, like the
US Army War College, emphasizes the importance of respect for human
rights for all US partner countries not just for Egypt. Critics of this approach
may argue it is improper for Army officers to play a role that is traditionally the
purview of professional diplomats, but since the military plays such a prominent
role in Egyptian society (military personnel run many businesses and are the source
of governorships of provinces), their officer corps is arguably the most important
institutional player in the polity, one that would be more receptive to the views of
fellow military officers than civilian diplomats.
In order for this strategy to work without causing severe rifts in the
government, State Department officials should be part of the instructional,
predeployment training. US Army officers assigned to Egypt should meet with
officials at the State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. That way, the messages US Army
officers will convey to their Egyptian counterparts will be in sync with State
Department policy. The effort made by US Army officers to raise these issues in a
respectful manner when in discussions will not magically turn around the human
rights situation, but the discussions might contribute to a marginal improvement in
rights and lessen repression down the road as these officers rise in rank and become
key decisionmakers.
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Another important role US Army officers can play in Egypt, and elsewhere,
is to be the eyes on the ground. If they see human rights abuses, such as US-supplied
military equipment being used against innocent civilians as opposed to genuine
terrorists, they have a duty to notify their superiors in Washington. Such unvarnished
reporting will give US national decisionmakers the data they need to make
informed decisions about whether to maintain or cut off aid and by how much.
Although this article has dealt with an issue relevant to the National Command
Authority and the decisions the Department of Defense must make on an
important, bilateral security relationship, US Army officers can play an important
role in supplementing traditional State Department reporting on human rights
by witnessing, for example, Egyptian counterterrorism training and hearing from
their Egyptian counterparts what took place in various security-related encounters.

Conclusion
This article argues that, despite much conventional wisdom to the contrary, the
United States has limited influence on human rights in a country like Egypt and
that using military aid as a lever to improve the human rights situation usually does
not work—or is only marginally effective. Egyptian officials will make decisions
on the use of repression based on their calculations of the perceived domestic
threats whether the United States likes it or not. That said, US officials should
not simply give up on this issue, but should make decisions based on strategic
and moral calculations. If repression continues, the United States should not
remain silent and should pursue policies consistent with a values-based approach
to foreign and national security policy. At the same time, the United States must
balance this moral stance with its strategic interests. Hence, reducing military aid,
but not cutting if off completely, and shifting US resources to economic aid may
be the appropriate approach.
Because Egyptian military officers play an important role in Egyptian
society it makes sense for US Army officers to serve as interlocutors on a host of
issues outside the military sphere. This proposed new role, however, would take
US military officers outside their comfort zones and require them to undergo
significant political training in order to address human rights concerns. As long
as their messages are in sync with State Department policy, their involvement
should be welcomed by the US government. This enhanced US military role, while
unlikely to change the human rights situation in the near term in any significant
way, could pay future dividends.
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I

ABSTRACT: Drawing on Samuel P. Huntington’s three phases of self-regulation
used to determine if an occupation qualifies as a profession, this article focuses on
the third phase of policing and removing those who fail to uphold the standards
set forth in the first two phases. It reviews how the Army implemented this phase
following the Civil War through the post–Vietnam War years and the implications
for the officer corps.

n the 64 years since its publication, Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and
the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations has inspired an extensive
literature on military professionalism. In keeping with Huntington’s own focus,
most of the commentary has focused on his concepts of proper civil-military relations,
such as objective control, corporate identity, responsibility to society, and apolitical
service. What has seldom been addressed is the implication behind his assertion
that the officers in the armed forces were professionals because there existed “an
organization which formalizes and applies the standards of professional competence
and establishes and enforces the standards of professional responsibility.”1 In short,
three phases of self-regulation—defining its ethics and proficiencies, credentialing
its members, and policing and removing those who failed to uphold those standards—
were essential to determining whether an occupation qualifies as a profession. While
the first two aspects of self-regulation have generated a great deal of literature, there
has been little study of the last.
This article redresses this imbalance by examining the US Army’s self-policing
efforts in the decades between the 1890s to the 1950s that Huntington used
as his model. It then extends its analysis to the volunteer professional force of the
post-Vietnam era. It will focus not on the discharge of officers for ethical or physical
causes, but on the elimination of deadwood—the substandard, the incompetent,
the placeholders who, like Beetle Bailey’s General Halftrack, continue to be not
1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New
York: Vintage Books, 1957), 10. For a small sample of the scholarship that expands on Huntington’s thesis, see
James L. Abrahamson, America Arms for a New Century: The Making of a Great Military Power (New York: Free
Press, 1981); Risa Brooks, “Beyond Huntington: US Military Professionalism Today,” Parameters 51 (Spring
2021): 65–77; J. P. Clark, Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 1815–1917 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2017); Edward M. Coffman, “The Long Shadow of The Soldier and the State,” Journal
of Military History 55 (January 1991): 69–82; William B. Skelton, “Samuel B. Huntington and the Roots of
American Military Tradition,” Journal of Military History 60 (April 1996): 325–38. Don M. Snider has
commented extensively on Army professionalism and ethics. For example, see Don M. Snider, “Reviewing the
Motivational Power of the Army’s Professional Ethic,” Parameters 44 (Autumn 2014): 7–12.
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only retained, but promoted. On an institutional level, it provides context on an
impediment to officer corps excellence that has concerned the service throughout
its existence. On an individual level, it addresses a question most officers have
asked themselves at least once: “How is that person still in uniform?”

Post-Civil War Era
Huntington began his study with the post–Civil War decades. For the
30-year period after Reconstruction the strength of the officer corps was fixed
at 2,200, creating a closely knit community. Upon commissioning in the Regular
Army, each officer received a number and advanced in seniority within their
branch or bureau as fast as officers ahead of them were promoted, retired, or died.
Although West Point held a virtual monopoly on new commissions, Civil War
veterans dominated the field grades and could be found commanding companies
as late as 1898. Most regarded officership as a sinecure for loyal service rather
than a profession, to be held until retirement at 45 years of service or the age
of 62 (after 1870). Their horizons were confined by decades spent in garrison
life, limited by the incessant routines of drill, administration, supervising
fatigue (work) details of perhaps 20 men, and social events: “soldiering had
long since become a chore to them, and they were not looking for work.”2 The
mediocrity of so many of their colleagues outraged progressives. In 1884,
Lieutenant Arthur Wagner put forward as a professional standard for any regular
officer the ability to command a wartime regiment. He noted sarcastically that
many who wore epaulets could not discharge a sergeant’s duties.3 That same year,
Commanding General Philip Sheridan told Congress the primary impediment
to Army efficiency was the overabundance of sick, crippled, and otherwise
incapacitated officers.4
In 1890 in what might be interpreted as the first effort at mandating
professional self-policing, Congress, despite significant Regular Army opposition,
required both annual efficiency reports and examinations for promotion up
to major. An officer who failed his examination lost his place on the seniority
list; if he failed again, he was discharged. Although the exam itself was rigorous,
there is no evidence of any officers, veteran or not, being discharged for
failing. In 1896 when Lieutenant William Carey Brown suggested that officers
incapable of physically or mentally performing their duties be retired, an officer
retorted it was better to have an infirm lieutenant of 60 then to force out a loyal
2. Hunter Liggett, A. E. F.: Ten Years Ago in France (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1928), 260; and
J. A. Dapray, “A Subaltern’s View of the Army,” United Service 5 (December 1881): 707–12.
3. Arthur L. Wagner, “The Military Necessities of the United States, and the Best Provisions for Meeting
Them,” Journal of the Military Service Institution 5 (September 1884): 262.
4. Report of the Secretary of War: Being Part of the Message and Documents Communicated to the Two Houses of
Congress, 48th Cong. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1884), 50.
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officer.5 The wars in Cuba and the Philippines demonstrated the consequences
of protecting caste rather than promoting professional merit. One veteran
wrote of his colleagues’ dismay at the “useless slaughter of our men at San Juan
through the worst possible mismanagement” and their bitterness that “the
blunderers were promoted with indecent haste, while most of the army thought
they would be courtmartialed.”6
Huntington considers the “Root reforms as a, if not the fulcrum” in the
transition to a professional officer corps. While it is certainly true the Root era
institutional reforms—the General Staff, the War College, the Leavenworth
schools, and so forth—contributed to professional expertise, did these
reforms result in enhanced professional self-policing? Like Huntington, many
researchers have confused this era’s creation of the aforementioned professional
organizations with the enforcement of higher professional standards but were
these parallel developments? Throughout the decade following Root’s alleged
transformation, there were complaints that the retention of the superannuated
ensured the “dead stagnation in promotion.”7 In 1905, only 11 of the 346
officers taking promotion exams failed, and not a few of these due to moral or
medical causes.8 A 1909 report by a major general noted many “officers utterly
incompetent for the commands they exercise have clearly demonstrated their
inefficiency yet under existing regulations and interpretations thereof it has been
found impossible to get rid of these officers.”9 In a 1910 letter to Leonard Wood,
John J. Pershing listed some of the “fossils” he was cursed with: “Colonel Bowen
of the 12th Infantry whose utter inefficiency you are familiar with; Lieutenant
Colonel Ames of the same regiment, whose worthlessness has continued
throughout his army career; and Colonel Dodd of the 12th Cavalry, who has
drunk himself into a hopeless state of imbecility.”10
Pershing’s sentiments, if not his pungent language, were echoed that year in
Chief of Staff J. Franklin Bell’s testimony to the Senate. The Army’s peacetime
promotion policies all but ensured “the minimum of promotion with the
maximum of rust and decrepitude.” Promotion by merit would “kill ambitions and
destroy zeal” and those passed over “would remain to spread dissatisfaction and
5. William C. Brown, “Reorganization and Graded Retirement for the Cavalry,” Journal of the US Cavalry
Association 9 (September 1896): 215–26, 226–35.
6. Charles Morton to his brother, “Philippine Campaigning,” Cavalry Journal 39, no. 138 (January 1929): 20.
7. Lloyd Buchanan, “Army as a Career,” World’s Work 11 (February 1906): 7236–38; and “Eliminating Army
Officers,” Nation 82 (February 1906): 110–11.
8. “Report of the Secretary of War,” in Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended
June 30, 1906, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1906), 12, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi
/pt?id=uiug.30112099981158&view=1up&seq=18&skin=2021.
9. “Report of the Philippine Commission,” in Annual Reports of the War Department for Fiscal Year Ended
June 30, 1909, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909), 3, 201; and Robert H. Noble,
“Selection versus Seniority,” Infantry Journal 6 (July 1909): 63–77.
10. John J. Pershing to Leonard Wood, February 11, 1910, Box 48, Leonard Wood Papers, Manuscripts
Division, Library of Congress.
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discontent and poison the military atmosphere in their vicinity.”11 Bell’s solution
was to increase the number of majors and colonels—the very group he admitted
were the most underperforming—on the grounds it would free up advancement
for lieutenants and captains. Unimpressed by this logic, Congress refused the plan.
Bell’s successor declared all efforts to eliminate “deadwood” in the officer corps
“a practical failure.”12

Era of the World Wars
The post–World War I peacetime force had a similar problem with
self-policing despite both the Regular Army and Congress declaring their
intention to purge the substandard. The 1920 National Defense Act mandated
an annual evaluation for each active-duty officer, first by his immediate superior
and then by the personnel department of his respective branch. Those who
received unsatisfactory ratings (Class B) were to appear before a board for possible
discharge. As with previous (and future) efforts to eliminate officers, this policy
worked better in theory than practice.
The first officer evaluation form was a fiasco. Its 1922 replacement had a
longer tenure, not because it was adequate but because the agencies overseeing
the profession’s self-assessment process could not agree on its revision. In one
respect, the evaluation system did work; it revealed a true Army of Excellence.
In 1926, 11,400 officers were rated; 343 were assessed as superior, 4,323 as above
average, 6,546 as average, and only 86 as below average. The 1927–28 Class B
board with 14,000 potential candidates, classified only 131 into Class B status,
of which only 46 retired or resigned.13 After a thorough study of the process,
Major J. C. F. Tillson of the US Army War College concluded they allowed
poor commanders to intimidate subordinates with the threat of a Class B, “thus
disgusting and losing the true loyalty of the better officers and making the
deceitful ones more cunning.”14 The criticism had merit. From a perspective three
decades later, one prominent military intellectual dated the decline in officer
integrity to making promotion dependent on efficiency reports rather than
examinations. Prior to this, he recalled, officers had obeyed orders with exactitude,
but did not hesitate to disagree with their superiors on military issues in social
11. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs Relating to Various Army Matters of the US Senate
Committee on Military Affairs (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910), 14–15.
12. “Report of the Secretary of War,” in War Department Annual Reports, 1911 (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1911), 8, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112099980879&view=1up&seq=16&sk
in=2021
13. “Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1928” in War Department Annual Reports, 1928
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1928), 221, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b49875
85&view=1up&seq=5&skin=2021.
14. J. C. F. Tillson, “Efficiency Reports: How May the Present Report be Improved?,” February 28, 1931,
US Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), Carlisle, PA; and War Department Annual Reports,
1928, 221.
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settings. Afterwards, they fawned over their seniors and avoided any hint of
independent thought.15
The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (OPA-47) represented, in part, another
Congressional effort to impose professional standards and remove subpar officers.
It replaced the century-old process of promotion by lineal seniority with one of
up-or-out merit and established a career path with clear gates to advancement.
Promotion would be rapid in the early grades, with a second lieutenant pinning
on lieutenant’s bars after three years, a captain’s bars after seven years, and
a major’s oak leaves at 14 years. Most careers would end with retirement at
20 years as senior majors with pension, health care, and other benefits. An
ever-shrinking select would progress to lieutenant colonel, colonel, and general,
all but the latter retiring by 30 years with even more generous pensions.
To ensure only the best officers advanced, promotion past lieutenant was
competitive, with each year’s candidates evaluated by selection boards. Officers
turned back twice were dropped from active duty. In theory, the OPA-47 provided
the nation and professional officers with three great benefits. It outlined a fair,
stable, and rewarding path to advancement for an elite of dedicated career officers
while eliminating anyone unable to make the grade. It provided sufficient senior
and field grade officers to prepare the Army in peace and administer and command
the mobilized citizen-soldier forces in war. Finally, it created in the reserves
a second tier of experienced commanders, specialists, and managers who could
be called back to the colors. A fourth benefit was not mentioned, but in making
the officer corps responsible for deciding the standards of merit, it awarded the
professionals autonomy in policing their membership (or what Huntington
termed “objective control”).16
Passed prior to the Cold War buildup, the OPA-47 anticipated an
all-volunteer career force of 50,000 officers and 400,000 enlisted. A decade
later the Army numbered 96,000 officers, with almost 900,000 in other ranks.
Congress deferred to the Armed Forces’ conviction that any future conflict would
require a host of senior managers to direct the nation’s military mobilization
and to train, administer, and command millions of citizen-warriors. In 1946
and 1971 the US Armed Forces were roughly equivalent at 3,000,000—
but in 1971 they boasted 21,000 more majors (or their equivalent), 15,000
more lieutenant colonels, and 4,000 more colonels—and almost 120,000 less
lieutenants! The ensuing emphasis on retaining senior management inflated
these grades far beyond peacetime needs. At the other end, the OPA-47 assumed
a steady, predictable stream of entry-level second lieutenants rising through
15. Conrad H. Lanza, “Military Honor,” Combat Forces Journal 1 (July 1951): 6.
16. Matthew W. Markel, “The Organization Man at War: Promotions Policies and Military Leadership” (PhD
diss., Harvard University, 2000), 200–6.
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in rank and keeping the career escalator moving smoothly. However, what if—
as was demonstrated after OPA-47’s passage—there were too few superior, or
even average lieutenants and captains willing to make the service a profession?
Then the need to maintain the career escalator might force the promotion of the
substandard who remained, adding a new layer of deadwood.17
The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 also encouraged Army career managers
to make professional military education one more box to check in the up-orout timelines. According to Michael David Stewart, historian, at the formerly
elite Command and General Staff College, “selection to attend, rather than
learning while in attendance, became a mark of professional achievement.”18
The Army further diluted education credentials by awarding them for
nonacademic duties and keeping high performers out of school. Huntington’s
definition of “expertise” emphasized individual experience was insufficient, and
a profession required “institutions of research and education for the extension
and transmission of professional knowledge and skill.” In the pre–World War II
Army, an officer’s performance at the elite staff and war colleges often played
a significant role in his selection for higher command. In the post–OPA-47
decades, however, the primacy of officer career management could make advanced
professional military education one more box to check: selection to the school
mattered, not excellence once there. Reflecting the emphasis on experience rather
than education, two years into the Korean War, the commandant of the Command
and General Staff College complained that not one of his 900 incoming students
had been a successful regimental commander in that conflict. He dreaded the
imminent bureaucratic fight to have even a few of these elites diverted from their
Pentagon assignments.19

Cold War and Corporatization
As matriculation at the educational institutions that formalized and applied
the standards of professional competence increasingly became rungs up the career
ladder, so the enforcement of standards to remove nonperformers declined. In
the two decades following the passage of OPA-47, the metric to identify both
merit and mediocrity—the Officer Evaluation Report (OER)—was rewritten
an average of once every three years. Surveys found a majority of officers
believed each variation was unfair, and some senior officers refused to follow the
17. Tom Barratt, “The Officer Personnel Act of 1947” (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education
Center, April 1, 1953); and Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on the Utilization of Manpower in the Military,
House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, HASC No. 92–51, 92nd Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions,
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971–72), 12241–42.
18. Michael David Stewart, “Raising a Pragmatic Army: Officer Education at the US Army Command and
General Staff College, 1946–1986” (PhD diss., University of Kansas, 2010), 306, https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu
/bitstream/handle/1808/6390/Stewart_ku_0099D_10887_DATA_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
19. Hiram I. Hodes to James A. Van Fleet, May 19, 1952, F-28, Box 69, James A. Van Fleet Papers,
George C. Marshall Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA.
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guidelines. Nor did the OER prove an effective pruning tool. The Army
emphasized that all officers with OERs placing them in the bottom 2 percent
must go before a board for possible separation; in the five years prior to 1957
only 220 regular officers were involuntarily eliminated.20 Frustrated by the
bloated officer corps and the inability to remove the substandard, Congress forced
reductions between 1953 and 1957, eliminating 5,500 active-duty officers. Yet
these draconian cuts may have actually increased the proportion of deadwood.
R. N. Young, one of the chief agents in the separation process, estimated the Army
would have purged over twice as many “at the bottom of the efficiency totem
pole” had not “voluntary attrition [of ] our most efficient officers” made their
retention necessary.21
Cuts came largely through outside directives and not the service’s elimination
process. Congress passed the 1960 White Charger Act that removed many of
the World War II cadre who had been rapidly promoted and then went to seed.
In 1964, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel estimated that among 110,000
active-duty officers less than 200 were separated each fiscal year for incompetence
and another 300 for being passed over twice. As a point of comparison,
the Army routinely lost three times as many officers through resignation.22
These resignations were most prevalent among the high-performing junior
officers the service needed to retain, and surveys consistently reported a, if not
the, primary reason was poor leadership. As an unintended consequence, the
generous retirement package provided by the OPA-47 led many officers to opt
for early retirement including roughly two-thirds of the colonels during the
Vietnam War.23
In the wake of the My Lai massacre and the US Army War College Study
on Military Professionalism, Army Chief of Staff William C. Westmoreland
made yet another effort at corporate policing.24 He directed General
Walter T. Kerwin Jr., his deputy chief of staff for personnel, to reform the
officer selection system. Even more than fast-tracking high performers, he
emphasized it was essential to “institute a vigorous ‘selection out’ process” for those
officers whose toxic leadership or mediocre abilities were “highly detrimental”
20. US Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel (DCSPER), “Quality of the Officer Corps: Staff Study,”
August 19, 1964, AHEC; and John T. English, “Military Personnel Management” (lecture, US Army War
College, February 27, 1957), AHEC.
21. R. N. Young, “Responsibilities and Problems of the Army G-1,” (lecture, US Army War College,
November 18, 1953), AHEC.
22. DCSPER, “Quality of the Officer Corps.”
23. Newton B. Morgan and Robert J. Morressey, “Premature Retirement of Senior Service College
Graduates—Why?,” March 9, 1970, AHEC; J. Robert Moskin, “Our Military Manpower Scandal,” Look 22
(March 18, 1958): 27–33; Max L. Pitney, “Retention of Junior Officers,” March 19, 1959, AHEC; and David
Byron Park, “An Analysis of the Factors Influencing the Retention of Junior Officers on Active Duty in the United
States Army” (master’s thesis, University of Washington, 1971).
24. US Army War College (USAWC), Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 1970).
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to the morale and effectiveness of their subordinates.25 Kerwin’s efforts to
incorporate Westmoreland’s mandate into the Officer Professional Management
System encountered great resistance from senior officers whose careers had
benefited from the existing methods. Most of the more ambitious initiatives,
including the identification and elimination of substandard officers, were not
implemented. Westmoreland’s successor, Creighton Abrams Jr., famously
warned field commanders, in his “pull up your socks” memo, that they would be
sanctioned if they inflated OERs. Within six months Abrams had been forced
to surrender, and OERs continued to rate the great majority of officers as
above average.26
Congressionally imposed postwar reductions cut active-duty officer strength
from 111,000 at the Vietnam War peak to 98,200 in 1976. Did the service
ensure this was a qualitative as well as quantitative reduction? According to
Secretary of the Army Robert E. Froehlke, the service’s boards had discharged
those “who, in the harsh light of competition, we felt would not measure up
in the longer haul.”27 Although the post-Vietnam officer elimination process
has been curiously understudied, it is clear the Army targeted specific skills,
reservists, Officer Candidate School graduates, and those lacking college
credentials. More revealingly, the cuts fell disproportionately on the lower grades.
Of the 4,900 officers involuntarily removed from active duty in fiscal year 1974,
all were at captain or major grade. These targeted eliminations so protected
the Regular Army senior leadership that in 1976 the Army’s grade structure
contained more lieutenant colonels (10,835) than lieutenants (10,320).28 This
disproportionate rank structure remained despite its original justification—that
a large corps of senior managers were necessary for wartime mobilization—had
essentially disappeared with the nation’s return to a small, all-volunteer professional
Army. Moreover, it occurred simultaneously with vacancies in the company
grades reaching “crisis proportions.”29
It might be argued the top-heavy rank structure reflects a higher standard
of professionalism. Presumably as officers advance in rank, they are subject to
ever-increasing institutional policing and thus become more expert and rigorous
25. William M. Donnelly, “Professionalism and the Officer Personnel Management System,” Military
Review 93 (May–June 2013): 17, emphasis original.
26. Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2008), 356–57. On the lack of faith in the officer evaluation system, see Department of
the Army Historical Report (DOAHR), FY 73, 72–73; George B. Bartel, “Are the Troops Getting Enough
Officer Duty?,” Army 23 (September 1973): 41–42; and Lorraine A. Rossi, “Executive Appraisal: Confidence in
the Officer Evaluation System” (student paper, USAWC, AHEC, June 18, 1974).
27. Robert F. Froehlke, “Peace-Keeping with Pride and Integrity,” Army 22 (November 1972): 17.
28. Karl E. Cocke et al., Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1976 (Washington, DC:
Center of Military History, 1977), 40; and Karl E. Cocke, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year
1974 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1978), 54.
29. Arthur T. Coumbe, Army Officer Retention: Historical Context (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
2010), 6.
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in upholding the profession’s standards for themselves and others. Officers
unwilling to accept these escalating professional standards depart. Unfortunately,
there is no evidence to support this trend. Rather, both survey and anecdotal
evidence indicates the primary reason the Army failed to retain high-quality
junior officers was that these officers perceived their seniors as lacking in both
professional ethics and competence. Supporting this view, in fiscal year 1979
one of five colonels and one of 10 lieutenant colonels declined command, the
majority on grounds command time would not advance their careers. Nor did
this trend get noticeably better in the “zero defects” force of the 1980s; one
command climate survey found that three in four officers believed the officer
corps was more focused on personal gain than professionalism.30

Implications
The great question remains. Why does a military institution that so
prides itself on its Huntington-derived definition of professionalism find
it so difficult to shed its deadwood? Additionally, why did this difficulty
persist even after Huntington defined officership as a profession because it
had, over a half-century of largely internal reforms, “applie[d] the standards
of professional competence and established and enforce[d] the standards of
professional responsibility?”31 Two explanations suggest themselves.
The first reason is that the professional corporate identity so valued by
Huntington impedes purging substandard personnel. A 1978 RAND study
found both Army officers and white-collar counterparts shared “an almost
pathological reluctance” to fire fellow managers. Instead, they “shelved” them
either through transfer or assignment to unimportant tasks.32 A career officer’s
disinclination to terminate underperforming colleagues may be even greater than
a white-collar equivalent due to emotional bonds established at the academy,
on troop duty, or through intermarriage between military families. This
inclination may also explain why the Army, unless forced by outside agencies,
had reduced its officer corps by lopping off personnel at the bottom of the
career ladder rather than known mediocrities, who are also peers.
A second reason is that Huntington failed to recognize that the rise of the
twentieth-century-professional US Army he extolled coincided with that
30. W. Berry, “Why They Quit,” Army 20 (December 1970): 3–4; William J. Hauser, “Professionalism and
the Junior Officer Drain,” Army 20 (July 1970): 17–22; Benjamin F. Schemmer, “Internal Army Surveys Suggest
Serious Concerns about Army’s Senior Leaders,” Armed Forces Journal International 122 (May 1985): 18–20;
and Anneliese M. Steele, “Are the Relationships between Junior and Senior Officers in the US Army Officer
Corps Dysfunctional?” April 30, 2001, Combined Arms Research Library.
31. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 10.
32. James H. Hayes, The Evolution of Military Officer Personnel Management Policies: A Preliminary Study with
Parallels from Industry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1978), 21.

TOC

100

Parameters 51(3) Autumn 2021

institution’s inability to retain enough high-quality career officers in the
6-to-12-year brackets during peacetime. The lack of sufficient high-performing
and proven company-grade officers choosing the service as a career creates a
vacuum that pulls lower-performing officers into the field grades. The result is a
self-perpetuating cycle of too many meritorious officers leaving, too many mediocre
officers rising, and the danger that the substandard becomes the new standard.33
Is it time to retire Huntington’s claim that corporateness equals
professional self-regulation as a structural pillar? To recognize that a profession’s
credentialing agencies exist more as gatekeepers to admission than as monitors
of lifetime adherence to its ethical or expert standards? To acknowledge that
once initiates have surmounted the hazing of the bar exam, the doctoral
dissertation, the medical boards, the tenure process, and so on, all further
enforcement of the profession’s ideals could well be interpreted as demonstrating
these policing agencies had failed?34
Perhaps today’s officers have become too complacent, claiming a Huntingtonbased professional status without reflecting on whether their institution is actually
following Huntington’s criteria. To some officers the very fact their careers are
successful proves that institutional self-policing not only exists but works! But
what of second-rate peers who are equally successful? When is quantity more
important than quality? When does Gresham’s Law apply to professions, and
when does the supply of bad officers begin to drive out the good?
These are all questions both the Army leadership and its officers must
constantly wrestle with. Perhaps, as occurred after the Vietnam War, it is
time for the Army officer corps to conduct a deep and hard examination of its
profession’s ideals and practices. An excellent start would be to recapture the
urgency that fueled the US Army War College professionalism and leadership
studies. Both studies shed a hard light on the state of the postwar officer corps
and inspired many members of the officer corps to reform their service.

Brian McAllister Linn

Dr. Brian McAllister Linn is the Ralph R. Thomas Professor in Liberal Arts
at Texas A&M University. He is the author of Elvis’s Army: GIs and the Atomic
Battlefield (2016), The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (2007), The Philippine
War, 1899–1902 (2000), and Guardians of Empire: The US Army and the Pacific,
1902–1940 (1997).
33. Brian McAllister Linn, Elvis’s Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2016), 180–88; and Thomas D. Koh, “Army Officer Retention: How to Retain the Best and
Brightest” (master’s thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 2018).
34. USAWC, Leadership for the 1970s: USAWC Study of Leadership for the Professional Soldier
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 1971); and USAWC, Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle Barracks, PA:
USAWC, 1970).
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ABSTRACT: Statistical evidence suggests that Army battalion commanders
are significant determinants of the retention of their lieutenants—especially
high-potential lieutenants. Further, this so-called Battalion Commander Effect
should be included in brigadier general promotion board assessments and used to
inform officer professional military education curricula.

A

n empirical analysis of 1,745 former US Army battalion commanders
and the 36,032 lieutenants who served under their command provides statistical
evidence for what many researchers have believed, anecdotally, for years: battalion
commanders significantly influence their lieutenants’ decision to stay in or leave the
Army. Moreover, the analysis shows this effect is even stronger on high-potential
lieutenants. Accordingly, battalion commanders should consider the effects of
their leadership on the junior officers in their formations, and the Army should
calculate and consider the battalion commander effect (BCE) when making
appropriate talent management decisions for senior officers. Ultimately, measuring
the BCE will enhance the Army’s overall assessment of leader effectiveness,
especially when used in conjunction with other newly emerging measures guiding
Army talent management.

Background
Consider two hypothetical newly commissioned lieutenants. At the completion
of the same Basic Officer Leadership Course, Second Lieutenant Smith and Second
Lieutenant Nguyen are assigned to different battalions on the same Army post.
During their three years as lieutenants in their first operational units, both Smith
and Nguyen serve under adequate yet unremarkable company commanders; however,
they have very different experiences with respect to their battalion commanders.
Smith’s battalion commander is an outstanding officer who cares deeply about others
and leads an exemplary personal life, much like the role model battalion commander
described in the seminal article, “The Subordinates.”1 In contrast, Nguyen’s battalion

1.

Dandridge Malone, “The Subordinates,” Army Magazine, December 1985, 16–25.

TOC

102

Parameters 51(3) Autumn 2021

commander frequently exhibits counterproductive leader behaviors and strained
personal relationships.
During their three years as lieutenants in their first battalions, Smith and
Nguyen demonstrate performance and potential—knowledge, skills, and
behaviors—at or near the top of their peer groups. As they prepare to depart
their first units, they receive orders to the Captains Career Course, the second
level of Army officer professional military education, and are promoted to the
rank of captain.
At this juncture, both officers face the most consequential professional
decision since joining the Army—should they stay in the Army? As they evaluate
their options, Smith and Nguyen might well reflect on the leadership and
examples set by their battalion commanders. Knowing their battalion commanders
are representative of other Army senior leaders, they might ask, “Do I want to
continue serving under leaders like my battalion commander?” Knowing people
grow more similar to those they spend time with, they might also ask, “Do I want
to become (a person like) my battalion commander?”
Fast forward two years. Thankfully, Smith and a majority of the 20 lieutenants
she served with in her first battalion chose to stay in the Army. She completed
the Captains Career Course, joined another unit, and will soon assume company
command. Most importantly, Smith remained in the talent pool from which
Army senior leaders are drawn. Unfortunately, Nguyen and a majority of the 20
lieutenants he served with in his first battalion chose to leave the Army, and the
Army lost their talents forever.
Although the Army’s top priority is its people, today’s Army does not reward
Smith’s battalion commander for her retention or hold Nguyen’s battalion
commander accountable for his loss. Consequently, the Army misses the
opportunity to spread the positive behaviors of Smith’s battalion commander
while Nguyen’s battalion commander remains on the fast track for promotions
and will likely continue his or her counterproductive behaviors, including driving
other top talent out of the Army. To avert such outcomes and better develop and
select future senior leaders, the Army must begin to measure and seriously consider
what we term the battalion commander effect.

Remaining in the Army
Prior research has shown battalion commander quality can predict the
performance of junior officers, but the impact of battalion commanders on
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their junior officers’ decisions to stay in the Army is less clear.2 A wide array of
research has shown many factors influence junior officer retention or attrition.3
Some lieutenants stay in the Army due to guaranteed pay and benefits, the officer
career education system, opportunities for diverse assignments, and frequent
leadership roles. Lieutenants who leave cite factors such as dissatisfaction with
long work hours and deployments, strains on personal life, frequent moves,
seniority-based promotions, and competitive job opportunities in the civilian
sector. Of note, most junior officers understand these structural factors before they
decide to join the Army.
Additionally, interpersonal factors such as relationships with peers and
subordinates are likely influential. People value serving with others who
enjoy their company, share their values, and hold similar interests; these and
other social factors influence this sense of belonging.4 Lieutenants’ direct
bosses—company commanders—are likely influential, as research has shown
that individuals stay in organizations when they have high-quality relationships
with their immediate supervisors and actively exchange value with their leaders.5
Still, other research has shown an employee’s job satisfaction and overall
performance increase when the employee sees his or her direct boss as an admirable
role model.6
Recent remarks by the Chief of Staff of the Army suggest battalion
commanders also affect junior officer retention and attrition: “That lieutenant
colonel influences 500 or 600 people, whether they want to stay in the Army
2. David S. Lyle and John Z. Smith, “The Effect of High-Performing Mentors on Junior Officer Promotion in the
US Army,” Journal of Labor Economics 32, no. 2 (April 2014): 229–58, https://doi.org/10.1086/673372.
3. Mark R. Lewis, “Army Transformation and the Junior Officer Exodus,” Armed Forces & Society 31, no. 1
(Fall 2004): 63–93, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327x0403100104; Susan Payne Carter et al., “Who’s the Boss?
The Effect of Strong Leadership on Employee Turnover,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 159
(March 2019): 323–43, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.028; and The Army Training and Leader
Development Panel, Officer Study Report to the Army (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army,
June 30, 2003): OS-8, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a415810.pdf.
4. Herminia Ibarra, “Provisional Selves: Experimenting with Image and Identity in Professional
Adaptation,” Administrative Science Quarterly 44, no. 4 (December 1999): 764–91, https://doi.org/10.2307
/2667055; George B. Graen, “Role-Making Processes within Complex Organizations,” in Handbook of
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, ed. Marvin D. Dunnette (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976), 1245;
and George Graen and James F. Cashman, “A Role-Making Model of Leadership in Formal Organizations:
A Developmental Approach,” in Leadership Frontiers, eds. James G. Hunt and Lars L. Larson (Kent, OH:
Kent State University Press, 1975), 143–65.
5. Bernard M. Bass with Ruth Bass, The Bass Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial
Applications, 4th ed. (New York: Free Press, 2008); Veronica M. Godshalk and John J. Sosik, “Mentoring
and Leadership: Standing at the Crossroads of Theory, Research, and Practice,” in The Handbook of Mentoring
at Work: Theory, Research, and Practice, ed. Belle Rose Ragins and Kathy E. Kram (Los Angeles: Sage
Publications, 2007), 150; Heather K. Spence Laschinger, Nancy Purdy, and Joan Almost, “The Impact of
Leader-Member Exchange Quality, Empowerment, and Core Self-Evaluation on Nurse Manager’s Job
Satisfaction,” Journal of Nursing Administration 37, no. 5 (May 2007): 221–29, https://doi.org/10.1097/01
.NNA.0000269746.63007.08; and K. Michele Kacmar et al., “The Interactive Effect of Leader-Member
Exchange and Communication Frequency on Performance Ratings,” Journal of Applied Psychology 88, no. 4
(2003): 764–72, https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.88.4.764.
6. Gregory A. Rich, “The Sales Manager as a Role Model: Effects on Trust, Job Satisfaction, and
Performance of Salespeople,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 25 (September 1997): 319–28,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0092070397254004.
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or get out of the Army. It’s a level of leadership that I think is the most
important. . . . If you look at officers who may have gotten out [of the Army] early,
you ask them how their battalion commander was, it was probably not who they
wanted or inspired them to serve.”7 Yet apart from an abundance of anecdotal
evidence, little was previously known about the impact of battalion commanders
on junior officer retention and attrition.
Even though company commanders spend more time with lieutenants
due to proximity, there are several reasons why battalion commanders may be
more influential. Battalion commanders have the sole right to approve or deny
promotion to first lieutenant. Additionally, the demographics of battalion
commanders make them stand out. While a company commander usually leads
4 to 7 lieutenants, a battalion commander normally leads 14 to 35. Battalion
commanders are approximately 15 years older than their lieutenants, 10 years
older than their company commanders, and often referred to as the unit’s “old
man” or “old lady.” Indeed, battalion commanders are at, or near, retirement
age—the Army’s equivalent of AT&T and General Motors “company men
and women.” And they are elite. While the Army practically guarantees officers
company command, only 25 percent of officers who remain in service for 18 years
will ultimately be selected for battalion command.

[My battalion commander] cared about his lieutenants. He asked us, “What are
your career goals, what do you want to do next, what can we do to keep you in?”
—Former lieutenant

Therefore, from the junior officers’ perspective, battalion commanders are
carefully positioned partners in the Army enterprise, and the Army considers
them to be models of the organization’s values. As the Chief of Staff of the Army
recently noted, battalion commanders’ organizational authority, influence over
command climate, and extensive experience give them an “out-sized ability to
shape the future service of the soldiers they lead.”8
Since battalion commanders have significant influence on their lieutenants’
career outcomes and are conspicuous examples of what the Army develops and
rewards in its leaders, this study hypothesized that battalion commanders would,
7. Christopher Woody, “The US Army Is Thinking about the Threat of Nuclear War Again and Wants
to Make Sure It Has the Right People to Deal with It,” Business Insider, January 17, 2020, https://www
.businessinsider.com/army-revamps-personnel-management-amid-turn-to-great-power-competition-2020-1.
8. James C. McConville and J. P. McGee, “Battalion Commanders Are the Seed Corn of the Army,” War on
the Rocks, December 23, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/battalion-commanders-are-the-seed-corn
-of-the-army/.
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on average, significantly affect their lieutenants’ decisions to stay in or leave the
Army. The study aimed to estimate and understand the BCE of these leaders,
which would enable the Army to improve its senior officer talent management—
both individually and collectively.

Research Methods
The researchers conducted a statistical analysis designed to test the hypothesis
that battalion commanders influence their lieutenants’ future decisions to remain
in or leave the Army. The study team accessed the Army’s officer personnel
database, with permission of the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis,
Department of the Army G-1. Since 1991, the Army has logged a monthly
database entry for each of its officers, including active-duty status, rank, assigned
unit (specific battalion, recorded by its six-digit unit identification code),
demographics, and some military school qualifications.
To limit variance in the analysis, the study included only traditional deployable
battalions of the 1990s and early 2000s. Current and historical organizational
documents were used to identify the name and six-digit unit identification code
for each active-duty battalion. Next, the Army’s electronic personnel database
was used to identify the lieutenant colonel assigned to each of these battalions
during each month. Finally, the database was searched for second and first
lieutenants who served in the same unit during one or more of the same months as
one or more of the previously identified battalion commanders.
The study did not include aviation battalions (due to the longer service
obligation), battalions that were moving home locations due to Base Realignment
and Closure actions, or battalion commanders who supervised fewer than 10 or
more than 60 lieutenants. In total, the study’s dataset included 265 deployable
battalions, 1,745 battalion commanders, and the 36,032 lieutenants who served
under them.
The study then defined the retention point that best signifies a lieutenant
staying in the Army past his or her initial obligation. Depending on commissioning
source, new lieutenants have three-year (Officer Candidate School [OCS] and
Reserve Officer Training Corps [ROTC] nonscholarship), four-year (ROTC
scholarship), or five-year (United States Military Academy [USMA]) active-duty
service obligations. When junior officers decide to separate from the Army at
the end of their obligation, they may not leave immediately; instead they often
wait until an optimal transitional point, such as one coinciding with a graduate
school start date, a significant family/life event, or a civilian job offer. Yet almost
all officers who intend to separate from the Army early in their career do so before
assuming company command, which typically happens during an 18-month
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period between the fifth and eighth year of an officer’s active-duty service. To
account for the varying active-duty service obligations and idiosyncratic decision
timing against the additional time commitment of company command, the
study defined the retention point as the end of an officer’s sixth year of service,
since very few officers would have completed company command by that time.
The study then employed a multivariable regression statistical model to
test the hypothesis that battalion commanders affect their lieutenants’ decisions
to remain in or leave the Army. The dependent variable was defined as a
lieutenant remaining in the Army past the sixth year of service, and the first
explanatory variable was defined as the battalion commander under whom the
lieutenant served. Although every junior officer’s retention decision is individual
and influenced by many factors, the sheer size of the dataset produced a high
degree of confidence in the results, particularly once the regression included
control variables like the lieutenant’s year group (which accounts for strength of
economy and Army-wide trends), branch, duty location (post), commissioning
source, gender, race/ethnicity, age, undergraduate institution quality, marital
and child status, and graduation from Airborne, Air Assault, or Ranger Schools.
This model enabled the study to measure each battalion commander’s
unique predictive effect on the retention decision of the average lieutenant who
served under him or her. The empirical results were as expected: some battalion
commanders have a positive influence, some have a negative influence, and others
have a negligible influence. Yet we wanted to test whether battalion commanders,
on average, influenced their junior officers’ retention and attrition in a significant
way. The study, therefore, applied a more-complex regression analysis that
measured the average effect of all 1,745 battalion commanders in predicting
their 36,032 junior officers’ decisions to stay or go. The results revealed—with a
99.9 percent confidence level—a significant battalion commander effect on the
Army’s retention of lieutenants.

[My battalion commander] was degrading. The best lieutenants in the battalion got
out. They could not stand his oppressive and demeaning behavior. By and large, most
lieutenants got out.
—Former lieutenant

To further test for this effect, the researchers ran a series of additional
regressions to compare the explanatory power of the battalion commander to the
explanatory power of the study’s 13 control variables. The results showed that the
identity of the battalion commander explained at least 22 percent and 58 percent
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more of the lieutenants’ retention decisions than any of the control variables, in
terms of main effects and incremental effects, respectively (measured with the
adjusted R2 statistic). This finding infers that the battalion commander may be
the most impactful factor in a typical lieutenant’s decision to stay or go.
But other leaders in the formation matter as well. Lieutenants’ platoon
sergeants, company commanders, and field-grade officers likely also exert
influence on retention decisions. The study’s empirical design, like Army culture,
implicitly holds battalion commanders responsible for the entire leadership
culture in their units. Consequently, the study conducted additional empirical
tests to see if other characteristics of the battalion, such as the other leaders who
influence the lieutenants and the traditions and culture not influenced by the
battalion commander, were more influential in explaining the retention pattern of
its lieutenants than the battalion commanders.
To test this finding for fixed effects of the battalion (influence from the battalion
not related to the battalion commander), the study added a battalion dummy
variable to the regression as an additional explanatory variable. Yet the study still
found that the battalion commanders’ variable remained statistically significant
while the battalion dummy variable did not. The analysis, therefore, indicates
battalion commanders, on average, may have more influence on the Army’s
retention of lieutenants than other battalion-level effects, such as other leaders in
the battalion.
Next, the study considered nuances from different types of battalion
commanders and lieutenants. Since a lieutenant can serve under several
battalion commanders, the study tested the relative influence of each battalion
commander and found the battalion commander under whom the junior officer
served the longest was more predictive than the order (first, second, or third)
of the commander. This finding is logical due to the likely increase in interaction
and observation in these relationships.9 The study then tested if the BCE was
different for officers from the three major commissioning sources. By running
three additional regressions, each regression conditional on the lieutenants
being commissioned by USMA, ROTC, or OCS, the study found an interesting
distinction. On average, the battalion commander effect is significant for ROTC
and USMA lieutenants, but not for OCS lieutenants.
This variance could result from the fact many OCS officers are prior enlisted
soldiers with experience serving under several battalion commanders, and who
are therefore more resilient under various qualities of leadership. Also, since
OCS officers are, on average, closer to retirement age than their ROTC and
9. Robert F. Bornstein, “Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis of Research, 1968–1987,”
Psychological Bulletin 106, no. 2 (1989): 265–89, https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.106.2.265.
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USMA peers, they have higher incentives to stay in the Army, and their retention
decision would correspondingly be less influenced by the identity of their
battalion commander.
Since the study previously matched each battalion commander with his or her
junior officers, each junior officer’s total length of service under each battalion
commander can be measured. Also, the study assumed a junior officer who served
under a battalion commander for a shorter period was less affected than one who
served under the same battalion commander for a longer period. Accordingly,
the study weighted the value of each junior officer retention decision in
proportion to the number of months the lieutenant served under that battalion
commander. Statistically, the study measured the BCE as the percentage of a
battalion commander’s junior officers who remained in the Army long enough to
command a company, weighted by the number of months each junior officer served
under the battalion commander.

B C Ej =

n


i=1

Mi ∗ [1(if LT retained past 6 years), 0(if not)]
n


i=1

Mi

M = months serving under battalion commander j
i = LT who served under battalion commander j

Figure 1. The battalion commander effect equation

Running this equation (figure 1) on each of the 1,745 battalion commanders,
the study found the average (mean, or µ) battalion commander had a BCE
n

Mi ∗ [1(ifdeviation
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years), 0(if
of 59 percent with ai=1standard
(σ) past
of 136 percent.
Thatnot)]
is, the average
BCE
=
j
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battalion commander in the study retained 59
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of
his
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lieutenants,
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and most battalion commanders retained between 46 percent and 72 percent
M = months
serving under
j their lieutenants. The range
(each one standard
deviation
frombattalion
the commander
mean) of
of the battalioni =commanders’
BCE
was
striking.
Some battalion commanders
LT who served under
battalion
commander
j
had a BCE of less than 20 percent while some were over 90 percent. If the
study assumes the sample of 1,745 battalion commanders is representative of
Army battalion commanders in general, then the 500-plus battalion commanders
with a BCE of less than 46 percent or greater than 72 percent are unusual.

Retaining High-Potential Lieutenants
This project’s previous analysis calculated the battalion commander effect
with the underlying assumption that all lieutenants have equal potential. But
1
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this assumption is erroneous. Since the new Army People Strategy recognizes each
person’s unique combination of knowledge, skills, behaviors, and preferences,
the BCE could be customized to better reflect a comprehensive talent management
approach.10 More specifically, some lieutenants are higher performing and
likely have more potential, while others do not display the minimal knowledge,
skills, and behaviors needed to serve as effective company commanders. Since
previous research has found lieutenants with higher ability respond differently
to leader influence, examining how well a battalion commander’s lieutenant
retention pattern matches the actual potential of his or her junior officers could
produce greater insights.11
To accomplish this goal, the Army could measure and use a version
of the battalion commander effect that accounts for high-potential
(HIPO) lieutenants—the BCEHIPO. Assuming an officer evaluation
report is an accurate (valid) classification of a lieutenant’s potential, each
lieutenant’s report profile, now available electronically, could be coded as a
high-, moderate-, or low-potential officer. For example, if at least
66.7 percent of a lieutenant’s evaluation reports were rated “most qualified”
by their senior raters, he or she could be coded as high-potential. If 66.6
to 33.3 percent of the reports were “most qualified,” he or she could be coded
as moderate-potential. If 33.2 percent or fewer of the evaluation reports
were “most qualified,” he or she could be coded as low-potential.
After each junior officer was coded as high-, moderate-, or lowpotential, the BCE formula could be changed to give the battalion
commander positive credit if each lieutenant’s retention decision was
most advantageous to the Army (if a high- or moderate-potential
junior officer retains or if a low-potential junior officer leaves) and
no credit if that decision was least advantageous to the Army (if a
high- or moderate-potential junior officer departs or if a low-potential
junior officer remains in the Army). In other words, if all of a battalion
commander’s high- and moderate-potential lieutenants chose to stay in the
Army, and all of his or her low-potential lieutenants departed the Army
before company command, the battalion commander would have a BCE HIPO
rating of 100 percent.
Other ways to code lieutenants as HIPO might include factors such as
performance in the basic and career officer courses, order of merit at their
commissioning sources (such as distinguished military graduate designations),
or the quality of their undergraduate institutions. Since the Army is
10. Ryan D. McCarthy, James C. McConville, and Michael A. Grinston, The Army People Strategy
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2019).
11. Carter et al., “Who’s the Boss?”
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generally better off when all junior officers want to stay on active duty,
an additional way to calculate the BCE HIPO would be to give battalion
commanders credit for all junior officers who stay, but give more weight to
the high-potential junior officers than the moderate- or lower-potential ones.
Since high-potential lieutenants are likely to find more attractive options in
the civilian workforce (and thus are more likely to decide to stay in the Army
because they want to), the study hypothesizes battalion commanders have
even more influence on their high-potential lieutenants’ retention decisions
than on those of moderate-potential or low-potential lieutenants.
To test this hypothesis empirically, lieutenants were coded as HIPOs using
available data: those who graduated from USMA, from an ROTC program
at a highly competitive undergraduate institution, or as a distinguished
military graduate of their ROTC or OCS cohort. In all, 12,239 (37.9 percent)
of the 36,032 lieutenants were classified as high-potential officers. Running
the regression equation again for only HIPO lieutenants, the study found the
identity of the battalion commander explains more of the variance in
high-potential lieutenants’ retention decisions than it does for average and
non-HIPO lieutenants.

Figure 2. Battalion commander effect distribution (BCE and BCEHIPO, n=1,745)

Additionally, BCEHIPO has a wider distribution than BCE (figure 2), which
would be expected if the BCEHIPO is stronger. For example, just one battalion
commander had a BCE of less than 10 percent, but 55 battalion commanders
had a BCEHIPO of less than 10 percent. Ultimately, the evidence strongly suggests
battalion commanders have even more influence over their high-potential
lieutenants’ decisions to stay or go. Measuring BCEHIPO, therefore, may be even
more important to effective Army talent management.
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Senior Officer Talent Management
Developing Future Battalion Commanders
By making the battalion commander effect official, the Army could clearly
signal to all officers that it places great weight on their ability to develop
subordinates, which will likely catalyze positive, thoughtful leader behavior in
battalion commanders across the service. The mere awareness that their BCE is
being calculated and potentially viewed by senior leaders would shape the behavior
of future and current battalion commanders, or at least increase those commanders’
awareness of their responsibility to nourish future leaders.
Developing Former Battalion Commanders
The BCE provides a wide range of options and contexts to reinforce and
spread positive leadership behaviors while also identifying and reducing
counterproductive ones. For example, when a former battalion commander
presents a very high or very low BCE (perhaps beyond one standard deviation
from the mean), the Army should check his or her Army Commander
Evaluation Tool (ACET) results, an existing 21-question peer and subordinate
evaluation administered by the US Army Combined Arms Center’s School for
Command Preparation.
Battalion commanders with a high BCE, strong positive ACET feedback,
and high organizational performance are likely the best in the Army. They
should be publicly acknowledged, rewarded, and presented as role models
for others. Officers with low a BCE and negative ACET feedback likely have
deep challenges, but may still have potential. They could be put into a four- to
six-month special leadership development program, with goals to become
self-aware of counterproductive behaviors such as toxicity or apathy. Such
mentorship programs could be led by a retired general officer with a high
BCE and high organizational performance. Upon completion, officers who do
not demonstrate significant behavioral changes could be thanked for their
service and asked to submit their retirements. Those who show increased
self-awareness and positive behavioral changes could be encouraged to remain
on active duty. Only those who demonstrate transformational behavioral change
should be given the opportunity to compete for a future command.
Informing Selection for Senior Officer Talent Management
Additional relevant information leads to better talent management decisions;
consequently, the Army has created several new programs designed to better match
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its officer talent with the talent profile required, such as the talent marketplace.12
Further, the Army has started gathering more information about the skills of its
officers, such as their communication ability, strategic potential, and mental and
physical fitness, during its new command assessment programs.
Due to the career timelines of the most junior lieutenants in a battalion, the
Army must wait up to five-and-a-half years after battalion commanders depart
their commands before it can calculate their full BCE and BCEHIPO. Considering
this lag, the Army could examine ACETs and climate surveys from officers’ time
in command to provide similar feedback to the senior service (war) college
selection board, colonels promotion board, and colonels command assessment
program (CCAP, which already considers ACETs).
To better inform these colonel-level selection boards and program, the
Army should calculate an interim BCE and BCEHIPO each year after a battalion
commander departs command. This data should be considered by the CCAP,
within the context of it still being incomplete. Certainly, each former battalion
commander’s full BCE and BCEHIPO should be calculated and strongly considered
by what is perhaps the Army’s most important leader selection event—
the brigadier general selection board.
Shaping Institutional-Level Leader Development
The battalion commander effect is also a potentially powerful tool for
improving Army leadership training and development. The Army should further
analyze the ACETs and climate surveys of officers with very high and very
low BCEs to identify the specific leader behaviors shown to be consistent with
their scores. These behaviors could then be taught as evidence-driven examples
of best and counterproductive leadership practices at pre-command courses and
all officer education schools. To further reinforce the message, the Army could
establish an annual battalion commander-level award informed by the BCE or
BCEHIPO, similar to the Army’s current General Douglas MacArthur Leadership
Award given to outstanding company-grade officers.
Additionally, calculating the battalion commander effect for each
battalion commander will allow the Army to see the developmental routes—
schools, assignments, interventions—that tend to produce battalion commanders
with high and low BCEs with corresponding organizational performance. By
examining these patterns, the Army could redesign its officer assignment system
to maximize developmental paths that yield high BCE, high organizational
performance officers.
12. Gautam Mukunda, Indispensable: When Leaders Really Matter (Boston: Harvard Business Review
Press, 2012).
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Limitations
While the battalion commander effect should be considered in senior officer
talent management decisions, it should not be the sole information source about
an officer’s past leadership or potential. Several contextual factors are needed to
interpret its meaning properly. First, it is easy to imagine a battalion commander who
practices “likership” more than quality leadership, resulting in a high BCE when
positive leadership such as “tough love” was absent. Second, a counterproductive—
toxic or ineffective—battalion commander’s negative effect could be mitigated
by a group of high-quality field- and company-grade officers and NCOs, with
the battalion commander ending up with a high BCE for which he or she is
not responsible.
Third, a battalion may have had a commander who was a very effective and
thoughtful leader, yet the battalion experienced an extremely difficult deployment,
or its lieutenants had to make their retention decisions during a particularly strong
economy with high-paying civilian job opportunities. Finally, one could imagine
a battalion commander who receives a cohort of lieutenants who are of unusually
high or low quality or predisposed to want to stay in or leave the Army. Therefore,
the battalion commander effect is just one of several important measures of
leadership effectiveness, including 360-degree feedback, command climate surveys,
reenlistment rates for junior enlisted personnel, unit conduct, and unit performance
at centralized training events.

Conclusion
The Army needs quality leadership, and it expects its officers to provide that
leadership consistently within the constraints of the institution. As the Army looks
for ways to retain talent, the battalion commander effect should play a role. While
officer evaluation reports capture supervisors’ perceptions of their subordinates’
leadership performance and potential, the BCE is an objective measure of leader
effectiveness by utilizing subordinates’ decisions to vote with their feet. In essence,
the battalion commander effect provides support for the notion that “people do not
quit organizations; they quit leaders.”13
When taken in context, the battalion commander effect is an important way to
identify the presence of counterproductive leader behaviors in a way performance
evaluations may not. Officers who are effective at managing the perceptions of their

13. Grace E. Mills, “Transformational Leadership and Employee Retention: An Exploratory Investigation of
the Four Characteristics” (doctoral diss., Capella University, 2007), 1.
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seniors while abusing or disregarding their juniors will likely ace official evaluation
reports, but they will be held accountable by the BCE.
Ultimately, the battalion commander effect is a new measure of leadership
effectiveness that should be calculated and considered, within context, when making
senior officer talent management decisions. In doing so, the Army will improve its
brigadier general selection process, better understand the developmental experiences
that produce officers who inspire retention, and send an unmistakable message to
current and future battalion commanders that they will be held accountable for
the retention or attrition of its most critical asset, its young talent, and especially its
high-potential lieutenants. Additionally, since leadership in a military context has
many similarities to leadership in civilian settings, a modified BCE could inform the
selection of the first tenured-level supervisors in other contexts, such as not-for-profit
senior directors, law firm partners, corporate general managers, and consulting and
banking executives.
In the words of retired Army Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer Jr.,
the former III Corps commander and former president and CEO of the
Center for Creative Leadership, “battalion commanders—even more powerfully
than division commanders—craft the organizational climates that motivate or
discourage lieutenants . . . and everybody else.”14 The BCE can measure that aspect
of leadership objectively, powerfully, and reliably, giving the Army a new tool to
help create an organizational climate that will maximize both its current and
future effectiveness.
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ABSTRACT: The concept of hybrid war has evolved from operational-level use of
military means and methods in war toward strategic-level use of nonmilitary means
in a gray zone below the threshold of war. This article considers this evolution and
its implications for strategy and the military profession by contrasting past and
current use of the hybrid war concept and raising critical questions for policy and
military practitioners.

n a 2005 article coauthored with James Mattis and in his 2007 analysis,
Frank Hoffman envisaged the “rise of hybrid wars.” According to Hoffman, these
wars involved the mixing of different methods and means and combined regular,
irregular, and criminal elements with terrorism and new technologies. This variety
of means and ways was expected to lead to positive synergy effects for those waging
war.1 In addition, converging modes of war and increasing complexity would result
in an increased threat to those targeted.2
Hoffman’s idea of hybrid war built on two ideal types of war: regular and irregular,
which fused together into a hybrid variant. The two previous ideal types are already
questionable since the regular interstate variant has long been the exception.3 Even
the Cold War remained cold because both superpowers sought to avoid escalation
that could lead to nuclear war. While the Cold War offers excellent examples of the
combined use of various military and non-military methods and means, this combined
use takes place in virtually all wars.4 In the end, the hybrid buzzword appeared most

The author would like to thank Kevin Köhler, Babak RezaeeDaryakenari, Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, and other
participants of the Leiden University Workshop in Political Science (where an earlier draft of this paper was presented
in November 2020) and colleagues Jan Ångström, Magnus Christiansson, and Oscar Jonsson for their constructive
comments. The writing of this article has been supported by The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) and the
Swedish Defence University through its Officers’ Programme Development Project. The views expressed in this article,
however, are the sole responsibility of the author.
1. James N. Mattis and Frank Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Proceedings, November
2005, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2005/november/future-warfare-rise-hybrid-wars; and Frank G.
Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy
Studies, 2007).
2. Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2009): 34–39.
3.
M. L. R. Smith, “Guerrillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare,” Review of
International Studies 29, no. 1 (2003): 19–37; and Antulio J. Echevarria II, Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative
Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2016).
4. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, eds., Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient
World to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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useful if it resulted in more analytical thinking about war and warfare or how it is
waged.5 Unfortunately, this is not what happened.
While the hybrid war concept received some initial attention, its breakthrough
came in 2014 with the Russian occupation and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula
from Ukraine. Hybrid warfare was immediately linked to a now-famous speech
by General Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff of the Armed Forces of
Russia, to the extent that it became used interchangeably with a(n entirely mythical)
doctrine named after him. In the September 2014 NATO Wales Summit, hybrid
warfare was discussed alongside Russian aggression.6 These developments caused
Hoffman’s original concept that already rested on shaky analytical grounds to start
evolving to a problematic direction. Hybrid war now became synonymous with Russia
rather than nonstate actors and was seen as the most immediate security threat for the
West.7 This evolution turned hybrid war into an ambiguous catchall concept, which
constantly risks reinventing the wheel. While this plasticity makes the buzzword
useful in policy and public discussions, the lack of precision hinders its use for scholarly
and policy purposes. Without a precise definition, hybrid war risks saying both
everything and nothing in a way prone to hindering a better understanding of
contemporary war and warfare.8
Contemporary research has failed to acknowledge the evolution of hybrid war
from Hoffman’s more precise definition to the catchall it has become today. This article
argues that the problem of defining hybrid war is not merely an analytical one. As the
concept essentially tries to come to terms with a more comprehensive understanding of
war, immediate real-world implications for strategy and the military profession arise.
The first part of the article describes the evolution of the concept toward gray
zone conflict; the contemporary understanding of hybrid war has moved away from
the operational level use of military means and methods into the strategic realm. The
evolved hybrid war has become a synonym for gray zone conflict with both terms
typically referring to Russian action in a way that hinders more general analysis.
The second part of the article focuses on the main issue at stake, of the elevation
of nonmilitary means over military ones. From the perspective of strategic theory that
focuses on the relationship between ends, means, and ways, hybrid war indicates the
5.
David Betz, “The Idea of Hybridity,” in Hybrid Conflicts and Information Warfare: New Labels, Old
Politics, ed. Ofer Fridman, Vitaly Kabernik, and James C. Pearce (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2019), 9–24.
6. “Wales Summit Declaration” (press release, NATO, August 30, 2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq
/official_texts_112964.htm
7. Bettina Renz, Russia’s Military Revival (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2018).
8. John Arquilla, “Perils of the Gray Zone: Paradigms Lost, Paradoxes Regained,” PRISM 7, no. 3 (2018):
118–29; Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History (New York: Public Affairs, 2017); Mark Galeotti,
Russian Political War: Moving Beyond the Hybrid (New York: Routledge, 2019); and Donald Stoker and
Craig Whiteside, “Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of American Strategic
Thinking,” Naval War College Review 73, no. 1 (2020): 13–48.
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insufficiency of narrow military strategy that focuses on use of force as a threat or as
actual employment of violence.
The third part of the article discusses the implications for the military profession.
Regardless of what the phenomenon is called, contemporary conflict is perceived to
have shifted from the narrow military domain. What does this shift away from use of
force mean for the military profession, which has traditionally focused on managing
and meting out death and destruction? The article concludes by exploring the centrality
of these questions for policymakers and military practitioners.

Evolution of Hybrid War to Gray Zone Conflict
The concept of hybrid war has constantly evolved. The concept dates to 1998
when it was used to describe the combination of conventional forces with special
forces.9 Whereas Hoffman’s understanding of hybrid war focused on mixing
regular and irregular means and methods on the operational level during war,
the Russian invasion and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in early 2014
caused practitioners to broaden the description. This almost bloodless operation
was interpreted through Gerasimov’s prescient, if not prophetic, speech printed a
year earlier in February 2013.10 Although Gerasimov did not mention the words
hybrid or Ukraine, his speech was soon interpreted as a Russian “Gerasimov
doctrine” of hybrid war.11 According to Gerasimov, nonmilitary means can be
used to ignite an armed conflict in a previously flourishing state that justifies a
decisive intervention by foreign forces.12 The resulting gray zone conflict waged
under the threshold of war bears more resemblance to the strategic-level use
of nonmilitary means than either traditional war or Hoffman’s hybrid variant.
Gerasimov and gray zone conflict thus envisage a shift from use of force in war to
use of nonviolent means below the threshold of war.
While the interpretation of a Gerasimov doctrine was incorrect, it proved
politically helpful after the exhausting wars waged in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Libya. Russian aggression against Georgia and Ukraine and more limited
operations elsewhere have contributed to the belief that Russia poses the greatest
and most immediate security threat for the Western countries. The Russian
threat was familiar to many politicians and armed forces. This threat was
also politically convenient since it allowed the focus to shift from a costly and
uncomfortable war on terror to what some observers immediately understood as a
renewed Cold War.
9. Robert G. Walker, Spec Fi: The United States Marine Corps and Special Operations (thesis, Monterey, CA:
Naval Postgraduate School, 1998), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA359694.pdf.
10. Originally published in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, February 27, 2013.
11. Mark Galeotti, “The Mythical ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and the Language of Threat,” Critical Studies on
Security 7, no. 2 (2019): 157–61.
12. Gerasimov, “Value of Science,” 24, 27.
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Politics aside, there are two reasons why equating hybrid war with Russian
foreign policy is unfortunate. First, this equation lacks conceptual clarity and
skews the understanding of reality by connecting dots in what may be unwarranted
places. If only Russia wages hybrid war, it logically follows that hybrid war can
be studied through Russian actions. From this perspective, every action Russia
undertakes can constitute warfare.13 This reasoning helps little in understanding
a more general category of war applicable even to other actors. Empirically,
it is uncertain whether Russia achieved its goals on Crimea, where unique
circumstances allowed limited use of force.14 Understanding all Russian actions as
a part of a coordinated strategy will undoubtedly lead to hawkish overestimations
of the Russian threat and risk the development of poor strategy for countering real
dangers, including unnecessary escalation.15
The second issue with equating hybrid war with Russia is the assumption
hybrid war will always be initiated by an aggressive opponent, leaving everyone
else on the receiving end. This difference between the perceived need to become
better at strategy while reactively shielding ourselves from outside interference is a
crucial one; status quo actors seek to protect and maintain what they have, whereas
revisionist actors like Russia actively seek to attain change. The assumption that
only our adversaries possess active strategies betrays a limited understanding and
practice of strategy and a lack of urgency to master hybrid war.
Limitations in regard to strategy are perhaps best evident in the Afghanistan
War, which demonstrates how strategies narrowly focused on deployment of
force are bound to face difficulties. With national defense establishments focusing
on deterrence and maintenance of the status quo during the relatively stable
years of the Cold War, most countries lacked experience on how to change it
through warfare. The Russian occupation of Crimea came at the precise moment
when the withdrawal of most Western forces from Afghanistan confirmed
the counterinsurgency strategy had failed. Paradoxically, the concept of hybrid
war, which emphasizes combining different ways and means, allowed shifting
attention from the failure to do so in Afghanistan. In this way, the timing of
the Russian occupation of Crimea was opportune for Western militaries, which
never had to admit defeat against the Taliban. With an urgent new threat, there
was little pressure to draw lessons from the long war.
Gerasimov’s presentation can be understood to advocate the opposite course
of action and to take stock of past experiences. The cumbersome full title of the
presentation was “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges
13. Renz, Russia’s Military Revival.
14. Michael Kofman, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,” War on the Rocks, March 11, 2016,
https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/; and Renz, Russia’s Military
Revival.
15. Freedman, Future of War; and Renz, Russia’s Military Revival.
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Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat
Operations.”16 As can be expected, the core issue was emphasizing the crucial
role played by military science in understanding contemporary realities. Much of
the presentation focused on key lessons of several recent wars fought by Russia
and the United States. One lesson was that “the role of nonmilitary means
of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they
have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”17 A figure
attached to the presentation illustrated this new reality by proclaiming a current
“correlation of nonmilitary and military measures” at a “4:1” ratio.18
The efforts in Afghanistan, descriptions of hybrid war, and Gerasimov’s
portrayal of contemporary war bear more than cursory resemblance.
Counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan too sought to combine different
military and nonmilitary means and ways to achieve positive synergy. In fact,
Gerasimov essentially repeated the classic counterinsurgency ratio of military
to nonmilitary means in a more general context that war consists of four-fifths
political action and one-fifth military action.19 Perhaps then, the main difference
between counterinsurgency and hybrid war is that we waged the former there,
while the latter targets us here? Is it possible that we are observing the same
kind of war, but that we are as unaccustomed to wage it as we are to experience it
waged against ourselves?
While it has since been emphasized that Gerasimov merely provided his
interpretation of the way Western countries wage war, the discrepancy between
our failures and perceived Russian successes in combining military with
nonmilitary means has been explained not only by skillful new strategy but also
by a superior Russian command and control system.20 Both explanations have
been criticized as “simply unrealistic.”21
To summarize, hybrid war and gray zone conflict suggest that success in
contemporary war depends on coordination and combination of military and
nonmilitary means. This is not a new argument and has been discussed at least
since the so-called Three Block War of the late 1990s.22 Neglecting to analyze
16. Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the
Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” Military Review (January–February 2016): 24.
17. Gerasimov, “Value of Science,” 24.
18. Gerasimov, “Value of Science,” 28.
19. For counterinsurgency, see David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT:
Praeger Security International, 2006), 63.
20.
Charles Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review (January–February 2016): 36; Roger
N. McDermott, “Does Russia Have a Gerasimov Doctrine?,” Parameters 46, no. 1 (2016): 97–105; and Oscar
Jonsson and Robert Seely, “Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal after Ukraine,” Journal of Slavic
Military Studies 28, no. 1 (2015): 21.
21. Bettina Renz, “Russia and ‘Hybrid Warfare’,” Contemporary Politics 22, no. 3 (2016): 297.
22. For instance, see Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines
Magazine, January 1999, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA399413.pdf; and Rupert Smith, The Utility of
Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Vintage, 2008).
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our own experiences in places like Afghanistan and equating Russian action and
hybrid war have contributed to a poor understanding of Russia and how we can
combine various means and ways to achieve our desired political ends.
Associating hybrid war with Russia alone also reflects the absence
of a major rethinking of war and warfare in general even though the Afghanistan
War alone illustrates how we struggle to wage this kind of war ourselves. It is
equally difficult to see any major organizational reforms these new insights
have heralded, for instance the need to coordinate and combine military and
nonmilitary means. Considering that armed forces do not possess most of
the nonmilitary means emphasized by notions of hybrid warfare, it is
unsurprising that use of force and military technology have remained top priorities
even in Russia.23
As its title suggested, even Gerasimov’s speech focused on carrying out
combat operations and soon turned to high-tech capabilities, including artificial
intelligence and robots. Military professionals around the world still assume
the centrality of traditional military operations and above all the use of violence
in war. This kind of narrow military strategy does not correspond with the
emphasis in contemporary conflicts that has shifted from use of force in war to
use of nonviolent means below the threshold of war. The evolution of hybrid
war indicates that the current emphasis lies in a grand strategy that applies
all available means an actor possesses, not in narrow military strategy that focuses
on mere violence.

Political Warfare and Strategy
Strategy lies at the core of the military profession because it bridges war
and politics. Without this connection, war would be mere violence, and those
who wage war little more than murderers. From the strategy perspective, the
use of what has been called the “full spectrum,” that includes even nonviolent
means, should only be surprising if one perceives strategy and warfare
narrowly as predominantly belonging to a military domain.24
Continuing a long emphasis of combining various military and nonmilitary
means in Russian strategic thinking, Gerasimov explicitly avoided this pitfall
by noting that “the focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the
direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and
other nonmilitary measures—applied in coordination with the protest potential
of the population.”25 As hybrid war evolved to overlap gray zone conflict, it
23.
24.
25.

Renz, “Russia and ‘Hybrid Warfare’,” 291.
Hoffman, Conflict 21st Century, 5, 56.
Gerasimov, “Value of Science,” 24.
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simultaneously expanded from narrow military strategy to subsume broader
grand strategy in a manner reminiscent of political warfare waged during the
Cold War. This evolution indicates devaluation of the perceived utility of violence
in contemporary war and comes with immediate implications for strategy.
The centrality given to violence in Western military theory can be traced
to Clausewitz’s early-nineteenth-century writings. Despairing over his
contemporaries’ relative lack of interest about fighting, Clausewitz emphasized
violence in war to the point of elevating violence as the constant nature of war,
and he defined war as the use of force to make the enemy submit to our (political)
will.26 His definition of war paved the way for a military profession focused on a
single activity—applying violence to make the enemy defenseless.
This focus has endured, as illustrated by Harold Lasswell’s definition of
soldiers as “specialists on violence.”27 Samuel Huntington famously built on the
definition when he dubbed officers “managers of violence,” claimed that “the
function of a military force is successful armed combat,” and argued that the
military constitutes a profession.28 Huntington saw that effectiveness dictated
leaving military matters to professionals, who acted under “objective civilian
control.”29 The domain of the military profession thus constituted war and
warfare or use of violence in war.
This division is evident even in strategic theory. While the prefix military
to strategy explicitly refers to violence, most writings on strategy still depart
from Clausewitz’s writings. For Clausewitz, strategy was “the theory of the
use of combats for the object of the War,” and tactics “the theory of the use
of military forces in combat.”30 While grand strategy encompasses all means
actors may employ to achieve desired political ends, military strategy focuses
more narrowly on a subordinate level where military means and actors prevail.31
Military strategy, therefore, involves the use of force, which in turn forms one of
the means available for broader grand strategy.
Clausewitz’s influence is discernible even in attempts to make sense of
hostile activities in the gray zone below the threshold of war. This is the starting
26. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J. J. Graham (New York: Barnes & Noble, 2004), 1.
27. Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (1941): 455–68.
28. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, rev. ed.
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981), 11.
29.
Huntington, Soldier and the State. For critical views, see Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers,
Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, reprint (New York: Anchor Books, 2003); Suzanne C. Nielsen,
“American Civil-Military Relations Today: The Continuing Relevance of Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier
and the State,” International Affairs 88, no. 2 (2012): 369–76; and Risa Brooks, “Paradoxes of Professionalism:
Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States,” International Security 44, no. 4 (Spring 2020): 7–44.
30. Clausewitz, On War, 66. Emphasis removed.
31. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2017).

TOC

122

Parameters 51(3) Autumn 2021

point of George F. Kennan, the American diplomat best known for writing the
“long telegram” analysis of the Soviet political system. He defined political
warfare as “the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace.
In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at
a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.”32 With his
definition and despite its age, Kennan succeeds in capturing gray zone conflict
better than many who write about the phenomenon today. Nevertheless, the
definition builds on potentially unstable conceptual foundations.
From the perspective of Clausewitz’s theory of war, political warfare is an
oxymoron.33 There are two reasons for this. First, considering Clausewitz’s
view of war as a continuation of politics by other means, the political prefix
makes little sense to warfare. For Clausewitz, all war and hence warfare is
inherently political. Considering the way Kennan believed “the realities of
international relations” to consist of “the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and
out of war,” the prefix political was likely chosen by Kennan to de-emphasize
violence and to move narrow military strategy toward broader grand strategy.
Political warfare in any case soon became a way to wage the Cold War in a
manner less likely to escalate to a nuclear exchange.
Second, if indeed all war is violent in the manner Clausewitz believed,
it is unlikely that he would have recognized activities that lack violence as
constituting war or warfare.34 While the evolution of hybrid war stemmed
from the emphasis given to nonviolent means, the gray zone furthermore
suggests these means are not employed during war or the traditional military
domain. Kennan’s political warfare departed from similar premises.
Appraisals of contemporary conflict which devalue violence have
immediate bearing for strategy: highlighting nonviolent means elevates
broader grand strategy at the cost of narrow military strategy. While it is
first and foremost Russian action that has fed into these theories, even other
past conflicts—including our own engagement in Afghanistan—illustrate
how military strategy and violence alone are unlikely to deliver wide-ranging
political goals.35 In this regard, it is important to note that Clausewitz’s

32.
George F. Kennan, “Long Telegram,” Wilson Center Digital Archive, February 22, 1946,
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116178.pdf; and Office of the Historian, “269. Policy
Planning Staff Memorandum,” in Foreign Relations of the United States 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence
Establishment, ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie, C. Thomas Thorne, Jr., and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC:
US Government Printing Office, 1996), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269.
33. Frank Hoffman, “On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats,” War on the Rocks,
July 28, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/.
34. See Thomas Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 (2012): 5–32.
35. Smith, Utility of Force.
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understanding of strategy has been criticized as focusing too much on what
is understood today as the operational level of war.36
Another criticism comes from the admission that the threat posed by
actors like Russia requires a more total defense than what armed forces
alone can provide. While total defense—the use of all available means in
the defense of a country and its interests—links back to grand strategy, this
thinking betrays the passive status quo assumption that it is others who
engage in what could be understood as a full-spectrum offensive.
The broadening of strategy to encompass nonmilitary means in ways
that potentially put them ahead of military means raises a troubling
question for military professionals. Regardless of the label used, many of the
activities ascribed to gray zone, hybrid war, and political warfare lie outside
the traditional military domain, or use of violence in war. How does the
devaluation of conventional warfare influence the military profession? In
other words, how will a profession that has so far focused narrowly on
managing death and destruction meet the new opportunities and threats?

Politics and the Military Profession
The Western military profession is founded on the ideal of its apolitical
nature. This emphasis is justified by the special remit of the profession—
use of violence. While necessary for protecting polities, militaries’ capacity
for violence raises the threat of militarism that endangers democracy. Violent
capacity allows not only maintaining political order, but also undemocratic
seizure of power. This type of loss of democratic political control was also
what Lasswell feared during World War II when he described “garrison states”
dominated by the military.37 As a result, militaries have been subjected to tight
political control and separated from and subordinated to democratic politics
when possible.38 This was Huntington’s solution, which envisaged a narrow
military domain that focuses on use of force and keeping the military separate
from politics.39
Huntington has since been accused of misunderstanding Clausewitz, who
according to a different reading rejected a politically neutral military that

36. Michael Howard, Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 2–4;
and Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd rev. and expanded ed. (London: Frank Cass
Publishers, 2001), 26.
37. Lasswell, “The Garrison State.”
38. Jan Willem Honig, “Military, War, and Politics,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral
Sciences, 2nd ed., ed. James Wright (Oxford, UK: Elsevier, 2015), 518–23.
39. Huntington, Soldier and the State.
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waged compartmentalized war in isolation from the surrounding society.40 The
question of whether warfare can be thus compartmentalized highlights the two
understandings of strategy—broad grand strategy and narrow military strategy—
and ultimately begs the question of who owns war. This question of ownership
is entrenched in bureaucratic, normative, and legal frameworks. Ownership
comes with crucial ramifications, not least political ones. If war is mainly
understood to concern use of force, it belongs to the remit of the military profession
which, like all professions, seeks autonomy within its professional domain. Here
it is important to emphasize that one key reason why the concept of grand
strategy was invented was to assert that the political control of war remains in
civilian, not military, hands.41
If one believes the adherents of hybrid war and similar concepts, much of
contemporary conflict lies outside this traditional military domain, raising
fundamental questions for the military profession. If violence is devalued in
contemporary conflict, then what remains of the special remit of the military
profession? Must the profession reinvent itself by expanding its traditionally
narrow professional domain? Would interfering with existing boundaries lead to
conflict and clash with democratic civil-military relations as militaries inevitably
become involved in what must be considered political activities?
These questions are uncomfortable, yet necessary. It is not difficult to
imagine why they have often been avoided. Beginning with Clausewitz,
his focus on violence largely allowed him to prescribe the core activity of
the emerging military profession in a rather technical way that offered the
promise of bypassing politics. Clausewitz elevated violence to the guiding
principle of war and saw that wars are decided through violence; political
goals in war were best achieved by forcing enemies to their knees. This
belief required destroying enough of an enemy’s armed forces to make them
unable to defend themselves. After this, an opponent’s country had to be
conquered to prevent its citizens from raising new forces and offering renewed
resistance.42 As Jan Willem Honig puts it, “such a definition of the strategic
object . . . possessed the great advantage of providing a seemingly clear-cut
professional remit for the military. Destroying the enemy’s armed forces was
a job they could do independently, without requiring constant political
oversight and inviting potential meddling.”43 Judging from recent
experiences and scholarship alike, the applicability of this prescription in the
contemporary era appears questionable.
40. John Binkley, “Clausewitz and Subjective Civilian Control: An Analysis of Clausewitz’s Views on the Role
of the Military Advisor in the Development of National Policy,” Armed Forces & Society 42, no. 2 (2016): 259.
41. Jan Willem Honig, “The Future of Military Strategy at Försvarshögskolan: An Attempt to Identify Some
Useful Fundamentals,” Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar Och Tidskrift 1 (2011): 151.
42. Clausewitz, On War, 20–21.
43. Honig, “Future of Military Strategy,” 150.
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Kennan fared little better in addressing the consequences broader strategy
causes to the military profession. While he envisaged political warfare had a
military component, he dodged addressing the role of the military in political
warfare by handing the responsibility over to the Department of State instead
of the Department of Defense.44 This choice made sense because political
warfare too is waged in the gray zone between war and peace. Ultimately,
and against Kennan’s wishes, the Central Intelligence Agency came to answer
for covert operations.45 While the supreme authority of the military continued
in theatres of war, the exact role the military was to play in political warfare
elsewhere was left undefined.
In this sense, Hoffman perhaps comes closest to the mark. Recognizing
the contradiction between Kennan’s and Clausewitz’s understandings of war,
Hoffman saw the main problem with the definition of political warfare was not
only that it employed nonmilitary means, but that they were employed “short
of war”: “if it [is] short of war, then it’s not warfare.”46 Like political warfare
in theatres of war, hybrid war was still war in a way that allowed the military
profession to remain in its traditionally narrow domain.
The problem with Hoffman’s argument is that the concept of hybrid war
has evolved from its original conceptualization. Whereas Hoffman’s concept
focused on combining regular and irregular means and ways predominantly
on the operational level and during times of war, the concept has moved
toward Gerasimov’s and Kennan’s strategic-level emphasis of nonmilitary
means in the gray zone. The shift to the gray zone terminology contains the
core of the issue at stake.
With its main activities lacking violence and taking place outside war,
what role should the military play in such conflict? In other words, the more
contemporary understanding of hybrid war conflates it with gray zone conflict
and makes it impossible to avoid the implications to the military profession.
To offer only one concrete example, the blurred line between war and peace
questions established norms of civil-military relations and the boundaries of
acceptable military action. Even policymakers should be cautious. Equaling
political competition with war risks expanding the military sphere and
militarizing not only foreign policy, but potentially whole societies.

44. Kennan, “Organized Political Warfare,” 2, 6.
45. Office of the Historian, “292. National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects,” in Foreign
Relations of the United States 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie,
C. Thomas Thorne Jr., and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996),
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d292; and John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan:
An American Life (New York: Penguin Group, 2011), 316–19.
46. Hoffman, “On Not-So-New Warfare.”
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Conclusion
The purpose of Gerasimov’s well-known 2013 presentation was to prod
Russian military experts to think harder. Early on, Gerasimov reasoned
the new context where war is waged leads to logical questions: “What
is modern war? What should the army be prepared for? How should it be
armed? Answering these questions will determine the construction and
development of the armed forces over the long term. To do this, it is
essential for military planners to have a clear understanding of the forms and
methods of the application of force.”47
It is uncertain whether Gerasimov’s plea led to substantial action among
Russian scientists or military professionals. One wonders whether we too need
a Gerasimov, someone who recognizes that war and warfare have changed
and who is capable of instigating research about these and related questions.
This article’s conclusions, which deserve to be addressed in future debates,
can be summarized as five points: poor definition of concepts, fixation on
Russia, evolved concepts of hybrid war toward gray zone conflict and political
warfare, insufficiency of narrow military strategy in this kind of war, and the
question of how the military profession can best contribute to waging it.
While hybrid war has entered academic, policy, and public debates, it still
frequently does so in the guise of a poorly defined neologism. In its evolved
form, hybrid war is a buzzword that can mean almost anything. The situation
is only slightly better with gray zone conflict. Like political warfare, both
these concepts are equal to grand strategy in their breadth. While this kind of
conceptual vagueness can explain in part the popularity of these concepts in
policy circles, ambiguity hinders a better understanding of contemporary war
and warfare, and ultimately a better policy. This ambiguity appears unfortunate
and above all unnecessary.
Most discussions of hybrid war continue to revolve around Russia, equating
the concept with its actions and saying little about the world at large. If hybrid
war is something only waged by Russia, then it logically does not describe a
more general type of war. This equation of hybrid war with Russia has also
contributed to a lack of urgency regarding learning to wage this kind of war; if
only Russia wages hybrid war, then we only need to defend ourselves. Our limited
success in combining means of different kinds raises two questions. First, how
has Russia succeeded in mastering this kind of war? Second, do our previous
failures not suggest there is still much to learn? In any case, forfeiting active
strategy risks leaves us as passive defenders of the status quo, not creators of a new
47.

Gerasimov, “Value of Science,” 24.
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one. To make matters worse, it is far from certain whether passive strategy can
safeguard our interests.
The hybrid war concept evolved after Hoffman presented it in 2007. As his
later comments demonstrate, his concept focused on the operational level and
gave primacy to military means—use of force—in a context that was clearly a
war. The means are less obvious with the evolved concept that comes closer to
Gerasimov’s notion of a gray zone conflict where nonmilitary means dominate
below the threshold of war. Ultimately, one wonders whether this conceptual
evolution is just rechristened political warfare, a term coined by Kennan
immediately after World War II. Much content in the hybrid war discussions
that concern Russia resembles Cold War debates, and hence risk reinventing
the wheel.48
Regardless of what one calls this kind of war, hybrid war envisages that
military means have lost their primacy in producing political ends. On one
hand, relying on force has become more expensive and hence difficult. On the
other hand, the aims sought in war may not be best delivered through death
and destruction or the threat of it.49 From the strategic theory perspective, this
development must be understood to emphasize grand strategy that applies
all available means at the cost of narrow military strategy that focuses on mere
violence. The use of similar kinds of strategy that sought to tie together various
military and nonmilitary means in Afghanistan suggests inherent challenges.
What most practitioners can agree on, however, is that military means alone will
not suffice when faced with fundamentally political problems.
This discussion suggests it is necessary to go further than Gerasimov and
the Russian military, which appears to have shifted little from its core focus on
conventional warfighting.50 If one accepts the premise that contemporary conflicts
witness a disproportionate use of nonmilitary means against traditional military
ones, does it not logically follow that policymakers and military professionals must
address this development?

Ilmari Käihkö
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48. For example, see Gregory F. Treverton, Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World
(New York: Basic Books, 1987).
49. Smith, Utility of Force.
50. Bettina Renz, “Russian Responses to the Changing Character of War,” International Affairs 95, no. 4
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Blood and Concrete: 21st Century Conflict
in Urban Centers and Megacities
Edited by Dave Dilegge, Robert J. Bunker, John P. Sullivan, and Alma Keshavarz
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Reviewed by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, professor of international
relations and international studies, Department of Political Science
and International Studies, Georgia Southern University

n 2014, then Chief of Staff of the Army General
Raymond T. Odierno convened a strategic studies group to
research a new reality facing the US Army. In the foreword
of the group’s report, Megacities and the United States Army,
Odierno wrote: “Our Army has [had] experience throughout
its history of operating in urban environments, from Aachen
to Seoul to Baghdad. We have not, however, operated in
urban areas with populations of over 10 million people—
the megacity” (Army, 2014, 2).

Bloomington, IN: Xlibris,
2019
768 pages
$22.99

Written by scholars and practitioners currently in the field or
retired from the military, this book:
[P]rovides a foundation for understanding urban operations and
sustaining urban warfare research. This Small Wars Journal (SWJ) Anthology
documents over a decade of writings on urban conflict. In addition to essays
originally published at SWJ it adds new content including an introduction
by the editors, a preface on “Blood and Concrete” by David Kilcullen, a
foreword “Urban Warfare Studies” by John Spencer, a postscript “Cities in
the Crossfire: The Rise of Urban Violence” by Margarita Konaev, and an
afterword “Urban Operations: Meeting Challenges, Seizing Opportunities,
Improving the Approach” by Russell W. Glenn. These essays frame the
discussion found in the collection’s 49 chapters” (Small Wars Journal,
January 14, 2019).

Together the chapters shed light on an important issue, conflict in densely
populated urban centers of the twenty-first century. Collectively, this anthology
also addresses an array of issues faced when “fighting in built-up areas (FIBUA)
or policing urban communities” (1). As the editors point out, “urban conflict is
dominated by blood in terms of casualties and concrete in terms of the built
environment,” which is where conflicts of the future will take place (li).
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While some military leaders still romanticize conflicts taking place in remote
jungles around the world, the reality of future military conflict is quite different.
Future conflicts, or so-called mega-urban operations, will most likely occur
in a megacity. A megacity is any large urban center, common in the twenty-first
century, with a total population of 10 million people or more.
Megacities are predominantly present in developing or emerging market
economies. Dhaka, Bangladesh, and Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo, Brazil, are
examples of megacities. Those major urban centers are often loosely integrated,
and many parts of its sovereign territory may be ungoverned areas controlled by
transnational organized crime, criminal factions, or cartels.
An ungoverned area is defined as “a sector where the government has lost
control and capacity to manage the population. Security is challenged by
non-state actors such as terrorists, insurgents, criminals, and extremist
organizations” (177). The provision of basic services, such as drinkable water
or electricity, are usually controlled by a militia that preys on the poor and
marginalized members of society. In many parts of the world’s megacities,
criminal elements are better armed than the armed forces of the state.
Whether we ignore it or take the “out of sight, out of mind” approach,
urban warfare will occur as societies continue to urbanize and industrialize, and
the US Army will have no option but to fight in such locations in the future.
As David Kilcullen notes, urban operations are here to stay. Not only have the
vast majority of major battles and campaigns taken place in urban terrain, but the
largest battles of any kind since World War II took place in cities (xxxvii).
There are several characteristics of megacities that make them a suitable
environment for conflict in the future. For example, most megacities have
the following attributes: potential for massive poverty and social unrest;
potential for environmental concerns; potential for ungoverned spaces; quick
mobilization of the population by social media during times of social unrest;
and demographic indications of higher birth rates, city migration, and young
unemployed masses (174–75). Furthermore, due to urbanization (tendency
for migrations to larger cities in the developing or emerging economies),
littoralization (the propensity for people to cluster on coastal cities), and
connectedness (the increasing connectivity among people, wherever they live),
megacities will be the new “bazaar of violence” in the future (35, 176).
An important lesson members of the armed forces, but especially the
US Army, will learn after reading this anthology is that in many instances,
government response to the challenges in megacities may exacerbate the
problem. As John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus pointed out in their essay
“Postcard from Mumbai: Modern Urban Siege,” “Government responses to
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urban terrorism, however well intentioned, have exacerbated the problem
through the usage of urban military special operations and the construction of
militarized space” (38).
In many instances, the community, rather than partnering with the
authorities to identify community criminals and drug dealers, resents the police
for how they treat members of the shantytowns. Rather than becoming an asset
in warfighting against criminal elements in the megacities, the citizens become
abettors. For the police forces operating within those megacities’ shanties, “there
is little distinction made between residents of the favela [shantytown] and
drug traffickers” (39).
Another important lesson provided by the contributors is the notion of
megacities as a “bazaar of violence.” According to this idea, urban insurgents
will attempt to destabilize governments through strategies of sheer violence
indiscriminately applied to government officials and civilian populations.
Those heinous acts of violence aim to demonstrate to the population that
the authorities cannot help them and that they are helpless against the
power of the gun (36).
The megacities of the twenty-first century also bear a resemblance to
Richard J. Norton’s idea of the “feral city.” According to Norton’s seminal essay
“Feral Cities,” a feral city is “a metropolis . . . of more than a million people
in a state the government of which has lost the ability to maintain the rule of
law within the city’s boundaries yet remains a functioning actor in the greater
international system” (Naval War College Review, 2003, 98). In the megacities
or feral cities of the developing world, militants can easily blend into the
local civilian population and use the city’s complex and dense terrain for
cover and concealment (648). Furthermore, the unwillingness, or perhaps the
inability of governments in megacities or feral cities, to address issues such as
urban poverty, youth unemployment, and social and economic marginalization
allows criminal networks to gain ground, enabling the flow of illicit drugs,
arms, and money into those already relatively deprived communities.
While some military leaders believe the US Army is designed for combat
in open terrain, the reality of future combat will be quite different. As the
aforementioned strategic studies group concluded, “the Army is currently
unprepared” for conflicts in megacities. “Although the Army has a long history
of urban fighting, it has never dealt with an environment so complex and beyond
the scope of its resources” (21). As Margarita Konaev succinctly states, “as the
world’s urban population continues to grow, the future of global security will be
determined by what happens in the cities” (651).
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The greatest Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu in The Art of War, argues that
military strategists should avoid urban warfare unless necessary. In other words,
attack cities only when there is no alternative. There is no alternative in future
wars. Warfare has become an urban phenomenon. Conflicts, political violence, and
war will most likely occur in urban megacities rather than rural areas (xli).
I recommend Blood and Concrete: 21st Century Conflict in Urban Centers and
Megacities to students and future leaders at the US Army.

TOC

Book Reviews: Irregular Warfare 133

Civil-Military Relations:
Control and Effectiveness across Regimes
Edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Aurel Croissant

C

Reviewed by Dr. John P. Sullivan, instructor, Safe Communities Institute,
University of Southern California

ivil-military relations refers to the relationships between
the military and the state it serves and protects. In democratic
societies, this field of study involves all facets of this interaction
including the relationships between elected officials and security
institutions such as the armed forces, law enforcement agencies,
and intelligence services. This profession essentially defines
and employs the mechanisms of state control over the military
to ensure the state’s interests are served. Generally, these
relationships involve applying civilian control over the military.
In democratic states, elected officials control the military. But
hybrid and authoritarian states can—and often effectively do—
exert civilian control over their armed forces.

Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2019
281 pages
$75.00

The precarious nature of civil-military relations is currently of great interest
as democratic norms involving the separation of civil and military affairs are
increasingly challenged. In the United States, the Trump administration blurred
the lines between professional ethics and norms by politicizing the military and
eroding the professional barriers to political action by servicemembers. The erosion
of the separation between military and political spheres is also evident in the rise
of authoritarian regimes outside the United States. These contemporary challenges
make this edited collection an important guidepost in the discussion of achieving
a balance between civil and military power.
The editors, Thomas C. Bruneau, a distinguished professor emeritus in national
security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and Aurel Croissant, a professor
of political science at the Institute of Political Science at Heidelberg University,
built this volume on the foundation of a workshop on comparative civil-military
relations centered on the nexus of control and effectiveness. Indeed, that nexus is
the key to understanding the relationship between the civilian political sphere and
the sphere of military operations. That relationship, as described in a continuous
implicit thread throughout the book, is one of maintaining balance between
civilian and military interests, politics and operations, and control and effectiveness.
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Achieving and understanding the factors influencing the balance between
civilian control and military effectiveness is the collection’s overarching theme.
In the book’s first chapter, “Civil-Military Relations: Why Control Is Not
Enough,” the editors chart the course for their exploration of civil-military
relations through a series of case studies. This introduction provides a useful
survey of the literature and introduces the case studies and the rationale for their
selection while identifying common themes and limitations in understanding
the scope of civil-military relations. Conventional warfighting is only one of
those missions—and a relatively rare one as interstate war is relatively rare in the
post–World War II setting.
Counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, humanitarian
disaster
relief,
peacekeeping operations, and supporting the police in fighting crime are
increasingly common. These endeavors, collectively known as military operations
other than war, challenge the traditional boundaries of the civil-military nexus.
Chapter 1 introduces three attributes of military effectiveness that help address
this range of activity: defense planning, structures, and resources.
The next two chapters, which are highly technical, address theory and
methodological considerations in researching civil-military relations. This rigorous
foundation for understanding the scope and applicability of the case studies in this
survey also inform future research design. Regime, coup, and military effectiveness
datasets are discussed in both qualitative and quantitative dimensions.
The remainder of the book is divided into three substantive sections on
civil-military relations with regard to “Establishing Democracies,” “Emerging
Democracies,” and “Hybrid and Authoritarian Regimes.” This information is
followed by the editors’ summary of the various facets of the civil-military nexus.
Part 1 contains a survey of the established democracies of America, Japan, and
Germany, providing a familiar, yet evolving landscape that recaps the historical
influences of political scientist Samuel P. Huntington and the relationship between
America’s Congress, president, secretary of defense, and military services. The
tensions inherent in these relationships and the balance between civilian control
and military effectiveness are then examined in Japan and Germany. These two
nations have respectively sought to ensure civilian control to limit militarism and
have based their military framework on participation in coalition operations and
avoidance of interstate war.
Part 2 looks at the emerging democracies of Chile, Tunisia, and Indonesia
where military operations other than war are predominate. Each of these states
imposed civilian control in the aftermath of strongman regimes. Tunisia and
Indonesia are now facing significant criminal or criminal-terrorist challenges.
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Part 3 examines the hybrid and authoritarian regimes of Russia, Turkey,
Egypt, and China. These case studies are perhaps the most interesting and pressing
in the current threat environment. In Russia, the military plays a key role in
domestic politics by exerting internal soft power in support of a regime ruled by a
strong leader. Information operations are thus a major component of maintaining
the civil-military balance and projecting hard power in external relations.
In Turkey, strengthening civilian control allowed Recep Tayyip Erdogan to
suppress opposition and consolidate personal power. In Egypt, military rules and a
lack of civilian control results in diminished military effectiveness, as seen in that
state’s inability to win interstate wars or contain terrorism. The chapter implicitly
suggests corruption is a key civilian influence over military affairs. China is the
final case examined, and here readers see the Chinese Communist Party is at the
core of the civil-military balance. The military owes fealty to the party, and in
return, the party gives the military significant control over the party’s operations.
This collection provides a solid political science exploration of civil-military
relations in a range of states. Senior military leaders, professors and students at
war colleges and of civil-military relations, and scholars of the states examined in
the case studies will benefit from reading this fine work of scholarship.
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Defense Studies

Confronting the Evolving Global Security
Landscape: Lessons from the Past and Present
By Max G. Manwaring

T

Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, director of research and analysis,
C/O Futures, LLC

his new effort by Max Manwaring compliments his
earlier trilogy of books that ended in 2012 with The Complexity
of Modern Irregular Warfare(Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 2012). A recognized subject matter expert in insurgency,
the gray zone, political warfare, and crime wars and how they
are influencing the twenty-first-century national security
environment, Manwaring belongs to an older generation of
warrior-scholars who are now fading into collective memory.
His past writings, especially those related to politicized gangs
and Venezuela under Hugo Chávez, proved quite insightful
regarding new and emerging patterns of war and conflict.

Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger
Security International, 2019
173 pages
$75.00

Confronting the Evolving Global Security Landscape conveys the accumulated
wisdom Manwaring has amassed over many decades of soldiering and study. The
foreword by Joseph M. Humire, executive director of the Center for a Secure Free
Society, discusses his past association with Manwaring and the need to change our
thinking about how to approach modern warfare given its increasingly changing
nature. The preface acknowledgments and prologue then provide background
context, which is meant to transmit “hard-learned, but too often ignored, lessons
from the past and present” (xvi).
Organized around themed chapters, the book takes a vignette approach
and includes structured analysis at the end of each case study presented. The
introductory chapter focuses on the lessons learned from the Portuguese Coup
of 1974, and the next seven chapters focus on the themes of stability (Italy 1968–
83 and Western Sahara 1975–present), stability and security (Somalia 1992–93
and Bosnia 1992–98), stability and development (Argentina 1960–present and
Mexico 1999–present), development and governance (Vietnam 1959–75 and
Algeria 1954–62), governance and sovereignty (Malaya 1948–60 and El Salvador
1979–92), sovereignty and security (Venezuela 1998–present and Uruguay
1962–2005), and a prototype for foreign policy and power asset management
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(Afghanistan 1979–89). The ninth and final chapter recaps the case study lessons
for decision makers and other interested parties.
The afterword by Alan D. Manwaring—the author’s son who has supported
his father for two decades and advocated for getting the national security policy
recommendations of his father (and his father’s associates) out to wider audiences
beyond policy makers—represents a tribute to his father, this book (quite possibly
his last work), and his prior major works. The notes and index sections are well
appointed although it is evident Manwaring relied on his decades of expertise to
provide the bulk of the creative insights and lessons learned rather than drawing
upon the constructs and theories of others.
The case studies and Manwaring’s interpretative analysis of them are the heart
of the book. For comparative purposes, each case study includes an introduction,
the key issue and context, the findings and response, an outcome, implications and
conclusions, and key points and lessons. The case studies build upon one another,
and Manwaring uses their qualitative dataset to extract selectively the gestalt of the
key points and lessons accumulated through this analytical process. The reviewer
sees the artistry and mastery of the process; however, “accumulated wisdom” when
transmitted is subjective and nuanced with some faith placed in the expertise of
the source. Readers will either accept Manwaring’s past record with the SWORD
model and his linear-analytic case study approach or discount his record from the
get-go for lack of quantitative scientific rigor (6–7).
The other more-pronounced drawback to this insightful work is the steep price
of both the hardcover and e-book editions. This criticism is principally directed
at the publisher rather than the author as the cost will severely curtail the book’s
distribution. It is hoped a more-affordable softcover edition will be produced in
the future. Until then, Confronting the Evolving Global Security Landscape will
remain principally within the purview of university and think-tank libraries and,
to a lesser extent, the private collections of national security specialists and military
officers. In summation, Manwaring is an “old dog” of sorts but, to his credit, he
still has the capacity to teach readers a new trick or two about twenty-first-century
insurgency, political warfare, and crime wars.
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Feeding Victory: Innovative Military Logistics
from Lake George to Khe Sanh
By Jobie Turner

P

Reviewed by Dr. Scott S. Haraburda, a retired US Army colonel

rofessionals study logistics, especially the impact
of logistics upon both strategy and tactics, to determine
the connection between victory and loss. That is precisely
what US Air Force Colonel Jobie Turner offers readers in
Feeding Victory. He sheds much-needed light on battlefield
successes being highly dependent upon the transportation
capabilities of its supply chains. During the past three centuries,
technology has evolved from the preindustrial era of horsedrawn wagons through the industrial era of locomotive iron
horses to the modern digital era of unmanned aerial systems,
requiring innovative methods along the way to supply military
operations successfully.

Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 2020
400 pages
$39.95

The book is divided into an acknowledgments section, an introduction,
five chapters, a conclusion, an appendix, notes, a bibliography, and an index.
Each chapter contains a well-documented historical case study that examines a
technological era represented by its motive power and dominant materials. Turner
aptly provides readers with a solid understanding of how changes in technologies,
skills, processes, and organizations impact logistical support planning.
During the French and Indian War (1754–63), the British fought the French
at Lake George. The larger British force should have quickly overwhelmed
the French, but control of the lake vacillated between both sides for years. The
French used well-fortified waterways for resupply, while the British moved
supplies overland using valuable resources and time-consuming construction
processes to produce animal-powered wagons and roads for their main supply
routes, which were most frequently attacked and required more resources for
fortification. Although the British won the battles, they financed their logistics
through increased levies and economic restrictions upon the colonists, which
later contributed to their loss of the colonies a few years later.
In a contest of sea versus rail power in 1917, Britain and Germany fought
battles as they leveraged new transportation technologies in which iron, coal,
and steam replaced wood, wind, and sail. With the world’s biggest navy, Britain
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preferred sea movement while Germany favored rail transportation to move
supplies overland nearly 50 times faster than horse-drawn wagons. Unfortunately,
British dominance of their sea lines of communications ended once they hit the
ground, relying heavily upon horses to move forces the “last tactical mile.” With
more concern for tracking soldiers and munitions and their one-way logistics
system, the British neglected to track port operations, rail usage, and traffic flows.
Turner acknowledges this flawed system further inhibited Britain’s ability to
handle crowded conditions, to communicate information, and to manage supply
flow to the proper locations at the right time. By the end of 1917, however, Britain
began employing combined arms—ground and air power—in their operations,
while Germany effectively used the rail lines to counter British successes.
Several years later with supplies being transported faster globally, the new
technologies of aluminum, oil, and radios replaced iron, coal, and steam, while
mobile firepower from aircraft and ships replaced the impact of artillery. As such,
aircraft speed, range, and firepower swiftly became necessary for both the United
States and Japan as they fought battles for the control of Guadalcanal from 1942–
43, with each possessing similar transportation systems and weapons. Logistics,
or the lack thereof, affected ground combat power with soldiers on both sides
suffering illnesses, hunger, and dehydration. Turner suggests the United States
used its valuable resources to project power on the island, doing whatever was
necessary to supply its forces. On the other hand, Japan projected its massive power
to obtain resources, leaving its forces to survive on their own. This contrast became
evident when the rapid influx of Japanese soldiers on the island to overwhelm
American forces instead resulted in the decimation of Japanese food supplies. The
starving Japanese soldiers, marching through the dense humid jungle, quickly
sapped their combat power and remaining supplies, eliminating their ability to
conduct effective offensive operations. Favoring its combat power over supplies
and choosing speed over capacity, Japan lost the logistics battle and ultimately lost
final control of the island.
At the same time, while fighting the Soviet Union during the Battle of
Stalingrad, Germany de-modernized its logistics, moving from engine-powered
vehicles that either broke down or lacked fuel to animal-powered transportation.
This degradation happened because the Germans outran their ground supply lines
that stretched hundreds of miles through mud and snow. The Soviets, however,
were unable to capitalize upon this weakness—even with more tanks, artillery,
and aircraft—because they lacked integration of their logistical efforts to support
effective military operations. Germany also controlled the land supply routes
by control of the air, done at great expense to logistical sustainment that often
resulted in halted attacks when they ran out of fuel. Without effective logistics,
Germany’s overwhelming combat power disappeared, and military missions failed.
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As part of the 1968 Tet Offensive, the North Vietnamese besieged American
soldiers during the Battle of Khe Sanh in South Vietnam. The US use of
computers, pressure sensors, improved radar sensors, and satellite communications
enhanced logistics and made it harder for the Vietnamese to conceal the location
of their combustion engines. The United States successfully used these new
technologies to control its supply lines, which allowed the transport of supplies
anywhere in the world in just days. Even with overwhelming firepower and
control of its supply lines, the United States was unable to destroy resupply efforts
of North Vietnamese guerrilla forces. Since the guerillas relied upon arms and
munitions, not food or fuel, supplies flowed mainly via human- or animal-powered
transportation, such as bicycles and elephants, making it difficult for the United
States to stop the flow completely. Ultimately, North Vietnam did not need to win
the battles; it just needed to move enough supplies to convince the United States
of its enduring strength.
Turner admirably illustrates the effects of technology upon logistics and its
abilities to support military missions. Centuries ago, military leaders understood
the need to command the sea. Today, command of the air and information domain
is equally important to military success. Senior military leaders will appreciate
Turner’s research, and his lessons will enhance their ability to address logistical
considerations when developing future strategic plans.

TOC

TOC

Book Reviews: Military History 143

Military History

Killing for the Republic:
Citizen-Soldiers and the Roman Way of War
By Steele Brand

T

Reviewed by Dr. John A. Bonin, consultant, US Army War College

his timely book answers the question of how Rome—originally
a small hill village—became the master of the Mediterranean world
by 146 BC through the employment of part-time citizen-soldiers.
Using classical Roman primary sources such as the works of Livy,
Polybius, and Cicero, he argues that Roman republican values and
institutions better prepared common men for the rigors and horrors
of war than any other ancient civilization. Brand, an assistant professor
of history at The King’s College in New York City, served from 2009
to 2013 as a US Army tactical intelligence officer who deployed
to Afghanistan.

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2019
392 pages
$34.95

The book includes a preface, a prologue, four parts (one thematic and the others
chronological), and an epilogue. The preface and the prologue argue why the Roman
Republic and its citizen-soldiers are significant to modern America. The first part describes
the relationship between ancient Rome’s citizens and their republic. Part 2 provides a
history of Rome’s original royal and early republic armies, while the third part continues
with the success of the Roman middle republic as their citizen-armies defeated the major
powers around the Mediterranean. Lastly, Part 4 covers the late Roman Republic from
Marius to its replacement with an empire by Augustus.The epilogue questions if the resulting
professional imperial Roman army is a better model than one with more participation by
citizen-soldiers.
Brand analyzes five specific battles that best represent Rome’s constitutional, military,
and cultural evolution. During this evolution, Rome’s citizen-soldiers, both the elites
serving as cavalry and the middling Roman landowners serving as infantry, confronted
some of the toughest warriors of the day—from barbaric Gauls at Sentinum in 295 BC to
Carthaginian mercenaries at Cartagena in 209 BC to professional Macedonian
successors to Alexander at Pydna in 168 BC. In every battle, the numbers, morale, and
competence of Roman citizen-soldiers proved decisive. But finally, Rome’s citizen-soldiers
faced their most dangerous foe, other Roman citizen-soldiers during brutal civil wars—
especially the battles of Mutina in 43 BC and Philippi in 42 BC.
TOC

144

Parameters 51(3) Autumn 2021

Brand does not just review military history. He also explores Rome’s cultural and
political history and investigates Rome’s constitutional basis as a republic and how it
obtained maximum military participation and effort from all classes so they achieved
socially acclaimed virtue through service. While Brand’s research and analysis is extensive, I
believe his thesis has several flaws.
First, and most significant, the Roman Republic had already become a de facto
empire with its successive defeats from 202 to 168 BC of every other major power in the
Mediterranean—Carthage, Macedonia (twice), and the Seleucid Empire. The wealth
derived from the empire and the demands of maintaining large deployments of Roman
citizen-soldiers in Spain, North Africa, and Asia Minor changed the empire’s social
structure by the late Roman Republic. The elites, who avoided these deployments, now
sought wealth accumulation and ruined the small Roman landowners whose plots were
then seized and operated by aristocratic landowners using the flood of slave labor provided
by these conquests.
Second, Brand overly focuses on the later stages of the late Roman Republic. Many
of the problems with the erosion of the Republic and the decreasing role of true citizensoldiers happened years before as described in The Storm before the Storm: The Beginning
of the End of the Roman Republic by Mike Duncan (PublicAffairs, October 2017). The
Roman Army and its civic militarism had already been significantly challenged—
especially by the 105 BC invasion of the Cimbri and Teutons—with the resulting military
reforms credited to Marius. These reforms reduced property qualifications for military
service, eliminated elite citizens as cavalry, began providing state equipment for common
soldiers, and increased soldier dependence on their generals for loot and retirement benefits.
In violation of the Republican constitution, Marius was elected consul numerous times and
later engaged in the first of several brutal civil wars with his rival and successor, Sulla.
Third, the first triumvirate of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus that ruled Rome circa
60 BC, and the subsequent civil war between Caesar and Pompey with their personal
armies from 49 to 45 BC, marked the end of the previous constitution. Brand appears
to believe the Roman Republic and its citizen-soldiers could still be saved as late as
the battle of Philippi in 42 BC between Caesar’s heir, Octavian, and Mark Anthony
and Caesar’s assassins, Brutus and Cassius. By this time, the Roman Republic and its
mass part-time citizen-armies appeared to have been irreparably destroyed. Of course,
historically Octavian became Augustus and created the actual Roman Empire and its
professional army that maintained Pax Romana for centuries to come. This historic
parallel with the contemporary United States Republic policing Pax Americana with a
professional army and its impact appears to be one of Brand’s primary concerns.
Despite my criticisms, Killing for the Republic: Citizen-Soldiers and the
Roman Way of War is a valuable resource for serious students of Roman history,
civil-military relations, and the future of the American political experiment.
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1939: A People’s History of the Coming of the Second World War
By Frederick Taylor
Reviewed by Donald A. Carter, historian, US Army Center of Military History

I

n his introduction, Frederick Taylor identifies
an alternate title for his book was “The War Nobody
Wanted” (1). He asserts that, unlike 1914, “there was no mass
outbreak of enthusiasm for war” in 1939 (1). Instead, “the
propaganda campaign undertaken by the Nazi regime . . .
provides a near-perfect example of how, when a government
exercises total control of information, an entire nation can
be bent to its will” (2). Taylor then tells the familiar story of
events leading up to the war, beginning with British Prime
Minister Neville Chamberlain’s pronouncement of “peace for
our time” and concluding with the opening days of the Nazi
invasion of Poland.

New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2020
448 pages
$30.00

Instead of extensive research into historical documents, Taylor bases his
narrative on newspapers, diaries, secondary sources, and interviews with British
and German citizens who lived through the experience. He notes there were “a host
of diaries, newspapers, and memoirs” providing insights into “the everyday lives,
fears, hopes, and prejudices of the British population during the year covered by
the book” (3). The British Imperial War Museum supported Taylor’s research with
audio interview recordings, and German archives and daily newspapers provided
individual perspectives on the increasing control of the Nazi party apparatus over
the news media. Through this approach, Taylor captures what individuals were
doing and thinking as the war approached, but did not necessarily dominate their
attention. The result is an interesting—if somewhat episodic—examination of
everyday life in Britain and Germany as both nations approached the abyss.
Although often engaging, the book fails to make a case for Taylor’s premise
that this was a war nobody wanted. Much to the contrary, he mounts a
convincing argument that the leaders of Nazi Germany waged a masterful
campaign of propaganda and misinformation to generate public support and
enthusiasm for the regime’s military adventures. Readers have only to watch
footage of the rallies at Nuremberg to understand the effectiveness of those
efforts. If anything, Taylor at times seems to be trying to exonerate the
general population, blaming the racism and anti-Semitic hysteria exclusively on
Nazi manipulation. Not overtly, but the undercurrent is there.
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On the other side, readers see the reluctance of the British citizenry to return
to the battlefield. Nonetheless, Taylor paints a vivid picture of their resilience and
growing resignation to the reality of what is taking place on the continent. A
more accurate assessment might conclude the war was one most of the German
population came to embrace, while most of the British population recognized the
war was one that had to be fought.
In today’s political climate, the book’s most relevant aspect is its depiction and
analysis of the news media as a weapon of warfare. Anyone who casually employs
the term fake news in irritation with today’s media would do well to read this
story of what the term really means and the power it wields. While the Nazi
mastery of information warfare is evident throughout the book, British efforts are
equally effective if more subtle. As the German media marshaled and harnessed
the outrage of its citizens to support the move toward war, so too did the British
newspapers as they began to sway public opinion toward intervention—all without
the benefit of the Internet, social media, or, for the most part, television.
While 1939: A People’s History of the Coming of World War II adds little new
insight into an admittedly well-worked field, it is, however, a satisfying and
entertaining account of the perceptions of everyday civilians to the gathering
storm brought to life through interesting anecdotes and insights. Although
Taylor occasionally digresses to current political affairs, he generally avoids the
comparison. While his argument that nobody wanted war is unconvincing, his
descriptions of efforts on both sides (particularly the Germans) to control the
information released to the public and to shape popular opinion are disturbing—
and at times uncomfortably familiar.
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Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War
Operations of the US Army’s Elite, 1956–1990
By James Stejskal

S

Reviewed by Dr. David P. Oakley, assistant professor and scholar,
National Defense University

pecial operations forces (SOF) have been at the forefront
of global counterterrorism efforts and an integral part of
America’s military approach since 2001.The military’s reliance on special
operations has led to closer cooperation between SOF and conventional
forces, while also resulting in a twofold increase in SOF over the past
two decades (CSIS 2019). Despite greater operational familiarity and
the increased regularity of irregular warfare in conventional military
lexicon, much remains unknown about the Cold War history of SOF
and how it shaped today’s special operators. This lack of information is Havertown, PA: Casemate
Publishers, 2020
unfortunate because current security professionals can learn much from
336 pages
previous irregular warfare experiences as the United States competes
$32.95
with Russia and China. Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War
Operations of the US Army’s Elite, 1956–1990 is a valuable unit history that reduces this gap.
James Stejskal, a former SOF and CIA officer, tells the story of the 39th Special Forces
Detachment/Detachment A and its successor Physical Security Support Element-Berlin
during their three-decade existence. Originally established in 1956 to provide small unit
direct action and unconventional warfare capabilities during a Soviet invasion, Detachment A
adopted a counterterrorism role in the 1970s as the threat of terrorism increased. In the early
1980s, Army officials closed Detachment A and replaced it with Physical Security Support
Element-Berlin over fear the unit and its personnel were too well known to Warsaw Pact
countries. Despite a name swap and a new cover story, the unit’s mission remained unchanged.
Toward the end of the Cold War, the Army disbanded Physical Security Support ElementBerlin and assigned its members to other Special Forces units. The unit’s unconventional
warfare and counterterrorism expertise, coupled with its clandestine collection capability,
made it a valuable asset for the US Army, its German allies, and its partners beyond Berlin’s
borders. Even though a Soviet invasion never occurred, the unit remained active during the
Cold War and helped shape contemporary SOF.
The book’s eight chapters follow a chronological time line of the unit’s evolution from
its founding in 1956 through its transition in 1984 to its closure in 1990. Although Stejskal
focuses on Special Forces in Berlin, he also nicely nests the unit’s history within a larger
historical context, allowing readers to appreciate how the environment shaped the unit and
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how the unit and its members influenced others. For example, a discussion in the first chapter
on the early years of SOF and its relationship with the CIA regarding unconventional warfare
is particularly useful. The chapter also provides an excellent example of early Department
of Defense/CIA relations. It describes bureaucratic struggles so readers can understand the
roles and responsibilities of each in a dynamic and uncertain environment. These debates will
resonate with practitioners trying to appreciate shifting roles and responsibilities within the
current security environment.
Practitioners will also find the discussion on the evolving unit mission and the risks
involved with shifting operational focus informative.Although a direct action counterterrorism
capability in Europe was needed during the 1970s and 1980s, Stejskal points out how
preparing for counterterrorism missions distracted the unit from “the more esoteric tradecraft
required for the wartime [unconventional warfare] UW mission” (272). Contemporary
security practitioners should appreciate this type of trade-off. Stejskal also shows how
organizations created for one purpose often evolve in directions that were unforeseen at their
establishment. Although practitioners might not discover solutions in the book, they should
find solace in knowing that previous generations grappled with similar dilemmas.
Having served in the unit during the 1970s and 1980s, Stejskal has personal knowledge
and access that most authors do not, and his storytelling approach results in interesting
personal stories and detailed descriptions of unit members and their experiences. He brings
the personalities to life and engages readers, making for a memorable and entertaining book.
Stejskal’s descriptive telling of unit members’ involvement in preparation for the attempted
Iran hostage rescue is one example. This story is fascinating and reveals the unique combined
capabilities the unit provided the United States.
Overall, readers will benefit from Stejskal’s insights and experiences; however, there are
times when his passion results in too much detail for general readers. For example, some
readers may find the in-depth discussion of underwater operations and SCUBA gear in
chapter 3 interesting, but it distracts from the more fascinating elements of the story. With
that said, the book is largely free of minutiae, and the presence of such details highlights
Stejskal’s passion and familiarity with the topic.
As Stejskal makes clear, this book was a labor of love. In addition to his reflections, he
interviewed more than 50 former unit members and senior leaders. His intimate knowledge
of special operations in Berlin, personal experiences, and passion shine through in his writing,
resulting in an enjoyable and engaging book that places readers in the visual environment
he creates. While Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the US Army’s
Elite, 1956–1990 is aimed at a more general audience, scholars will find value in accessing
experiences and details previously locked in a classified vault or unit members’ heads.
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Southern Gambit: Cornwallis and the British March to Yorktown
By Stanley D. M. Carpenter

I

Reviewed by Dr. Scott A. Smitson, professor of geostrategy, geoeconomics, and
transnational affairs at Joint Special Operations University

n a monograph for the US Army War College Press,
the late strategic theorist Colin S. Gray argued that despite
changes in the character of war over time, the core logic of
strategy remains timeless. During uncertain and increasingly
complex times in the global security environment, a select
numbers of scholars like Gray have routinely emphasized
the utility of history to examine contemporary challenges
for continuities in the human experience of designing,
implementing, and executing strategy. In that tradition
alone, Stanley D. M. Carpenter’s Southern Gambit: Cornwallis
and the British March to Yorktown is a tour de force.

Norman, OK: Oklahoma
University Press, 2019
332 pages
$34.95

The book meets the highest standards set for historical scholarship—
from the depth of Carpenter’s research, his demonstrated mastery of the topic,
and his avoidance of the myopic to his balanced analysis of the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of war and his clear contributions to the study
of the history of the American Revolution. Beyond these accomplishments,
Carpenter’s most important achievement is brilliantly weaving the core components
of strategic theory and practice in an underappreciated and understudied arena of
the Revolutionary War: the British Southern Campaign of 1778–81.
Two years after the Declaration of Independence, the Revolutionary War was
at a strategic stalemate, which drove the British to consider alternative approaches
to regain the initiative and bring the war to a reasonable conclusion amenable to
the desires of the Crown. Ending the war was imperative, as Carpenter illustrates,
because the Revolutionary War was a subset of a broader global war between the
British Empire and the French and Spanish Bourbon Empires. The British hoped
by emphasizing the South as the main theater of consequence in the war, it could
leverage Loyalist support in the agricultural-rich southern colonies, re-establish
Crown control colony-by-colony northwards,defeat the Continental Army under
the leadership of General George Washington, and bring about a negotiated
settlement to the war on terms favorable to the Crown. Once Crown control had
been re-established, British military assets could then be redeployed for the global
war against France.
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The strategic dilemma for the British, as put forth by Carpenter in the preface,
was not alien to the type of conflict America increasingly finds itself in today:
how does a distant great power prosecute an irregular war within the context of
a regional struggle, all within a global competitive environment? As Carpenter
explains, the war in the American colonies was largely an economy-of-force effort
for the British, given the competing resource demands in other regions around
the world in the war against France. This shortage of resources and manpower
motivated the Southern Strategy, yet also contained within it the seeds of its own
destruction: the assumption that the significant numbers of Loyalists within the
populations of the southern colonies would be a key asset and resource and enable
an ultimate British victory. As readers will learn, this assumption did not hold.
Carpenter’s central aim is to highlight and understand why a strategy that
seemed, in principle, a well-reasoned and logical approach, not only failed to
translate to success for the British in the south, but also led to their overall defeat
and eventual American independence. Carpenter expertly walks readers through
the collapse of the Crown’s approach through a British strategic perspective, to
include the role of Lord Charles Cornwallis, the commander of all Crown forces
in the southern colonies.
To structure his history and analysis of the Southern Strategy, Carter admirably
takes the time and effort to introduce a framework of strategic concepts that he
returns to time and time again. The introduction and inclusion of this framework
in the initial chapter is elemental to the book’s success, as it serves as the
foundation for a broader narrative that is subtly present throughout the detailed
chapters: while the character of war is always changing, its nature does not, and
the core logic of strategy endures across time and space. By taking this approach,
Carpenter elucidates issues of strategy and war that have applicability and utility
beyond the Revolutionary War period, up to and including the current complex
security environment in which the United States finds itself.
The violation of these enduring tenets of strategy led, in Carpenter’s
argument, to the ultimate undoing of British strategy—from a lack of strategic
and operational coherence across the colonies, repeated breakdowns in unity of
command and effort, the inability of strategic leaders to select and implement
appropriate strategies, and most crucially a flawed theory of victory that
rested on untenable assumptions that foundered in a kind of war the British
could not understand.
While the British were adept at projecting power globally and achieving
victory at sea and on land in conventional conflicts of the time, the Revolutionary
War was not a classic conventional war, from Carpenter’s perspective, but a hybrid
war with conventional, irregular, and revolutionary elements. For Cornwallis, his
TOC

Book Reviews: Military History 151

unwavering commitment to offensive, conventional war in a theater that was
anything but would be his ultimate undoing, including his inability to defeat the
Fabian approaches taken by Continental Army General Nathanael Greene and
the irregular warfare tactics employed by the “Swamp Fox” Francis Marion.
The British strategic and operational leadership failed to understand
the nature of the conflict in which they found themselves. Considering the
significant experience of Cornwallis, before and after the Revolutionary
War, this failure should be a cautionary tale to personnel in the profession of
arms—past victories do not easily and automatically translate to present and
emergent challenges. As the US military reorients its focus on great-power
competition, while still committed to fighting irregular wars in distant lands, the
implications of Carpenter’s argument in Southern Gambit are as timely as they
are relevant, making this book a must read for scholars and practitioners of the
strategic and operational arts.
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Strategic Leadership

Adopting Mission Command:
Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture
By Donald E. Vandergriff

I

Reviewed by Captain David M. Todd, US Nav y chaplain

n Adopting Mission Command: Developing Leaders for
a Superior Command Culture, noted author and practitioner
Donald Vandergriff offers a fascinating look into the change
needed to transform the Army from an Industrial-Age
behemoth to an Information-Age cheetah. The cultural
philosophy of the German Army, often summarized under the
concept of Auftragstaktik and translated as “mission command,”
has received much focus in the past 30 years. Few authors have
been more active researching, articulating, and implementing its
core tenets in both theory and practice.

Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2019
328 pages
$49.95

This book—a compilation of Vandergriff ’s previous publications Raising the
Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War
(Center for Defense Information Press, 2006), Today’s Training and Education
(Development) Revolution: The Future is Now! (Institute of Land Warfare, 2010),
and “Before There Was Digitization: How MG J. S. Wood’s 4th Armored
Division Stormed across France without Written Orders” (Armor, September–
October 2000)—provides a unique perspective on the contextual development of
his thoughts but makes for uneven reading.
In the first few chapters, Vandergriff sets the foundation for the optimal
learning environment for agile military leaders based on the concepts of mission
command. The unchanging nature of war consists, in no small part, in its
uncertainty and unknown, the “fog and friction” that make the simple difficult
(chap. 9). Therefore, the sine qua non of military leadership is the ability to form
and reform mental constructs constantly within that uncertainty and act upon
them quicker than the adversary’s decision cycle’s ability to respond to the
reality created by those decisive actions. Successful leaders create and clarify a
shared mental model of utmost importance—the mission—while entrusting to
their subordinates the creativity, innovation, and independence necessary for its
execution within the dynamic environment that is war. Following the first chapter
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featuring John Boyd’s theory on decision making, Vandergriff sees in the historic
German military culture the ideal embodiment of the development of a profession
of arms of excellence. The ultimacy of the leaders and their development—at every
level—is not the technology, doctrine, or even the system, but the asymmetrical
advantage necessary to win the future war.
Vandergriff is at his best when summarizing the essence of what Dr. Chet
Richards called the “blitzkrieg culture” the key cultural concepts of “Einheit,
Behändigkeit, Fingerspitzengefühl, Auftragstaktik, and Schwérpunkt” (chap. 11).
Interestingly, concepts such as mental agility, reciprocal trust and loyalty, intuition,
the development of tacit and collective knowledge, internalized ownership, and
decentralized control are found in cutting-edge leader development theories in
the civilian sector, Deliberately Developmental Learning Organization and HighVelocity Learning Organization to name a few. While education is essential for the
acquisition of knowledge (knowing) and training for the increase of competence
(doing), it is the focus on the transformative development of strength of character
(being) through shared life together (experience) that characterizes the leader who
can integrate knowledge, independence, and joy of taking responsibility inherent
into leading well.
The barrier to a mission command culture is the Army’s antiquated personnel
system, a holdover from Industrial-Age values and allegiances that facilitates
compliance, careerism, and micromanagement rather than ownership, innovation,
and trust. For Vandergriff, emphasizing the concepts of Auftragstaktik in the
preparation of Army leaders would set the conditions necessary for the longerterm reforms needed in the personnel system and force structure of the institution.
Implementing methodologies he and others pioneered, such as OutcomeBased Training and Education and the Adaptive Course Model, would enable
a generation of young mission command–developed leaders to emerge and
facilitate the evolution toward a flatter and more adaptive organization. These
methodologies incorporate the latest advances in experiential learning and
prioritize the development of agile, autonomous thinking leaders in changing and
uncertain environments over mere adherence to task, condition, and standards,
teaching how to think rather than what to think.
The heart of the book is a veritable “how-to” on developing the conditions for
this superior command culture, based on the German model and Vandergriff ’s
years of experience and implementation. Leaders must be teaching leaders par
excellence—which has two important implications. Only the best teaching leaders
should be assigned to education and training commands, and a leader mindset leads
by education, training, developing every day, and using daily tasks and contexts
(experience) as the curriculum for intentional leader development. Sharing best
practices for creating outcomes and measures, Vandergriff systematically lays out
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chapters on tactical decision games, war gaming, free play force-on-force exercises,
combat physical fitness, and evaluations to inculcate cognitive complexity,
initiative, and confidence in subordinate leader development. The leader leads not
only by demonstrating the commitment to a culture of professional excellence
but by an intentional dedication—intrusive in the best sense of the word—to the
personal growth and development of the team. A chapter on the implementation
of Outcome-Based Training and Education and an Adaptive Course Model at
the Army Reconnaissance Course showcases the promise and possibilities of
implementing these methodologies throughout the Army.
Vandergriff concludes the book with the mission command success of Major
General J. S. Wood and the 4th Armored Division in World War II as an example
of what right looks like. Many salient components of mission command are
personified in the character of Wood and his leaders. While strength of character
and, specifically, moral courage seem to be key components of the mission
command culture, this example is the closest Vandergriff comes to a clear definition
of these foundational elements. Interestingly, Wood’s success in utilizing mission
command is directly proportional to the German military leaders’ abandonment of
their Auftragstaktik culture; most tellingly, their loss of moral courage. In the final
analysis, perhaps, ultimacy must transcend mission—as lofty as the defense of the
fatherland is—or it may fall victim to something less than human excellence.
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Strategy

Reassessing US Nuclear Strategy
By David W. Kearn Jr.

D

Reviewed by Amy F. Woolf, specialist in nuclear weapons policy,
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress

avid W. Kearn Jr., in Reassessing US Nuclear Strategy,
sheds light on the public debate about US nuclear
weapons, with the goal of identifying “an optimal nuclear
strategy” for the United States (Introduction). In this
deeply researched volume, he collects the thoughts,
analysis, and recommendations of key writers and scholars
who have wrestled with nuclear strategy for nearly 60
years and divides their writings into “three ideal type
(or representative) nuclear strategies,” derived from the
schools of thought evident in the literature from both the
Cold War era and more recent years (Introduction).

Amherst, NY: Cambria Press,
2019
252 pages
$109.99

Kearn evaluates and compares the three approaches—nuclear primacy,
robust nuclear deterrent, and minimum deterrent—and assesses whether
the strategies and their associated force structures, declaratory policy,
and employment guidance would strengthen or undermine US national
security and nuclear deterrence objectives. He examines how the
approaches will affect the US goals of extending nuclear deterrence to US
allies and dissuading adversaries from challenging the United States—
whether they will bolster or weaken US arms control and nuclear
nonproliferation objectives and how they might affect the cost of nuclear
weapons modernization programs.
Kearn presents each strategic approach “on its merits . . . using the
best cases made by its advocates” (Introduction). Consequently, much of
the book consists of passages that piece together concepts enunciated
by “academic scholars and policy analysts,” with the goal of producing a
synthesized framework for each ideal strategy (Introduction). While this
approach demonstrates the depth and breadth of his research, it creates an
awkward narrative that often undermines his analysis.
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Many of the policy analysts cited are better characterized as policy advocates
who promote their views when out of government, while waiting for the
opportunity to join the government and implement their preferred strategies.
When these policy analysts do serve in government, they sometimes change
the rhetoric used to describe US nuclear strategy, but rarely have a lasting effect
on its fundamental character or its implementation.
This rhetoric is not evident in Kearn’s book because he never describes the
actual contours of US nuclear strategy. He focuses instead on public statements
and academic debates—an odd omission, as a study seeking to evaluate
possible changes in US nuclear strategy should, at the very least, offer enough
information about the current approach for readers to understand what would
change if the United States adopted any of the “ideal nuclear strategies”
(Introduction). By focusing on the theoretical concepts favored by scholars
and policy advocates, Kearn never addresses factors like domestic politics,
technological limits, and budgetary restrictions that have affected US nuclear
programs. For example, he assesses how each alternative strategy might affect
the cost of nuclear modernization, but never acknowledges the reverse, that
concerns throughout the nuclear age about costs have affected the size, structure,
and planning for US nuclear weapons.
Kearn’s study is also weakened with inaccurate data and superficial analysis.
He frequently provides incorrect dates for historical events—START II was
signed in 1993, not 1992; the Clinton administration’s Nuclear Posture Review
began in 1993, not 1992 (when Clinton was not yet president); and President
Obama’s speech in Prague occurred in 2009, not 2008 (when he was not yet
president). His descriptions of the current US nuclear force structure and the
goals of the modernization programs often reflect the preferences of his research
sources, not the goals enunciated by US national security officials. His summary
of US arms control and nonproliferation objectives is simplistic and echoes the
critiques of analysts who reject these goals. While these errors may be the result
of poor editing or Kearn’s unquestioned acceptance of his sources’ preferences,
the frequency of errors raises doubts about his understanding of the material.
Kearn limits the value of his analysis in two additional ways. First, he
asks a question that answers itself and second, he does not address the actual
question that animates most debates over US nuclear policy. On the first
point, Kearn opens his analysis with a discussion of the assumptions guiding
his effort. He begins with the “central assumption that nuclear weapons
are and will remain important for the overall security of the United States”
(Introduction). He also notes the United States “finds itself engaged in a
renewed great power competition with Russia and China” and indicates his
analysis will assume this security environment will persist into the future
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(Introduction). These assumptions essentially determine the outcome of
the study.
If one assumes China and Russia will remain great power competitors, then a
nuclear primacy strategy will fail. As Kearn notes, both nations have the means
to respond to US efforts to achieve dominance, and the effort itself would likely
generate an expensive and destabilizing arms race. The authors cited in the book
who support this strategy generally recognize this problem. Those writing in
the 1980s saw US nuclear superiority slip away as the Soviet Union expanded
its offensive forces and hoped a US buildup of ballistic missile defenses would
re-establish US primacy. The United States, however, lacked the technology—
and funding—for expansive missile defenses, while US policy supporting their
development likely encouraged the Soviet Union to further expand its offensive
arsenal. Authors writing about this strategy in the 2000s assumed Russia and
China could not compete with the United States, and, therefore, a US attempt
to establish primacy over regional adversaries would also produce primacy over
these two nations. They never argued the United States should seek primacy
over a resurgent Russian and growing China.
If one assumes “nuclear weapons are and will remain important for the
overall security of the United States” then a minimum deterrence strategy
will fail (Introduction). Scholars and analysts who support this strategy would
likely agree with Kearn’s assessment that the strategy would not achieve many
of the goals identified in his analysis because it is not intended to do so. Their
case for minimum deterrence rests on the argument the United States should
reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons. To achieve this goal, the United States
would need policies that mitigate the risks from great power competition
without relying on larger arsenals and more aggressive targeting.
Finally, although Kearn’s extensive research led him to conclude a robust
deterrent is the ideal approach for US nuclear strategy, the US national
security establishment has relied on this approach for decades (Introduction).
The United States has sought to maintain a robust deterrent since the
1960s, when it was evident the Soviet Union would challenge US nuclear
superiority. The debate within the US national security community has almost
always been about the numbers and types of weapons needed to maintain a
robust deterrent, not about whether the United States should change its strategy.
Thus, Reassessing US Nuclear Strategy shines light on a debate found mostly in
academic literature and fails to address the areas of debate relevant to senior
members of the US defense community.
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